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niency	 policy.	 The	 EU	 leniency	 programme	 is	 a	 key	weapon	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 fight	






tion	 to	 deterrence	 sustains	 substantive	 fairness,	 respecting	 fundamental	 rights,	 which	
play	an	increasingly	important	role	in	EU	competition	enforcement,	safeguards	procedur-
al	 fairness.	 The	 Commission’s	 first	 formal	 leniency	 programme	 established	 under	 the	
1996	Leniency	Notice	suffered	from	grave	deficiencies	in	terms	of	both	effectiveness	and	
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This	 thesis	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 use	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	
programme	as	one	of	the	key	weapons	in	its	fight	against	hard	core	cartels1.	Hard	core	
cartels	 are	 secret	 agreements	 between	 independent	 businesses	 to	 fix	 prices,	 share	
markets,	 limit	 output	 and/or	 to	 rig	 bids.	 They	 are	 the	 most	 egregious	 violations	 of	
competition	 law,2	described	 by	 regulators	 and	 judges	 as	 “cancers	 on	 the	 open	market	
economy”3	and	the	“supreme	evil	of	antitrust”.4	Competition	authorities	throughout	the	
world	 have	 therefore	made	 cartel	 enforcement	 their	 top	priority.5	The	main	 economic	
harm	 caused	 by	 cartels	 is	 the	 appropriation	 of	 consumer	 surplus,	 creation	 of	 a	
deadweight	loss	to	the	economy,	and	lessening	of	innovation.6	From	an	EU	perspective,	
cartels	 are	 all	 the	 more	 detrimental	 as	 they	 frustrate	 the	 attainment	 of	 the	 internal	
market.7	Although	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	quantify	the	precise	magnitude	of	this	harm,	
it	 is	 undisputed	 that	 it	 amounts	 to	 many	 billions	 of	 Euros	 every	 year.8 	The	 mean	






















overcharge	 calculated	 for	modern	 international	 cartels	 investigated	between	1962	and	
2006	was	slightly	over	28%.9		
Due	 to	 their	 inherently	 secret	 nature,	 cartels	 are	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 detect	 and	
prove.	This	difficulty	and	 the	enormous	harm	caused	generally	 serve	as	 justification	 to	
adopt	 a	 strong	 enforcement	 attitude	 against	 them.	 Indeed,	 the	 fight	 against	 cartels	 in	
many	 jurisdictions	around	the	world	has	seen	the	 inclusion	of	powers	and	 instruments	
from	 the	 criminal	 justice	 area	 into	 the	 enforcement	 arsenal	 of	 their	 competition	
authorities.	 The	 use	 of	 interviews	 and	 inspections	 is	 a	 common	 part	 of	 many	 cartel	
investigations.	 By	 far	 the	most	 important	 instrument,	 however,	 is	 the	 use	 of	 leniency	









cartel	 enforcement	 and	 the	 treatment	 and	 consequences	 for	 the	 parties	 involved.	 As	
noted	by	Jephcott,	“the	more	successful	such	a	leniency	programme	is	practiced,	the	less	
those	concerns	about	the	erosion	of	the	benefit	of	doubt	as	a	general	principle	of	 law,	
and	 indeed	 those	 about	 the	 morality	 of	 enforcement	 authorities	 cooperating	 with	
perpetrators	 will	 be	 entertained	 in	 the	 relevant	 communities.”10 	Indeed,	 the	 main	
objective	of	the	EU	leniency	policy	is	to	enhance	the	effectiveness	and	efficiency	of	the	
Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement.	 Increasing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Commission’s	









to	 the	 development	 or	maintenance	of	 a	 system	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 realisation	of	
substantive	(economic	or	political)	objectives.	Law	enforcement	is	perceived	as	legitimate	




oriented	 strategy	 of	 raising	 the	 costs	 of	 non-compliance	 through	 the	 threat	 of	
sanctions.12	In	an	enforcement	system	that	 is	merely	pursuing	effectiveness,	alternative	
concerns	 relating	 to	 democratic,	 transparent	 or	 equitable	 processes	 underlying	 the	
adoption	 of	 enforcement	 decisions	 are	 secondary	 to	 the	 achievement	 of	 substantive	
objectives.13		


































will	 result	 in	 a	 morally	 positive	 outcome.18	Individuals	 and	 firms	 comply	 with	 the	 law	
because	 they	 think	 it	 is	 substantively	 fair.	 Moreover,	 people	 also	 demand	 a	 just	
environment	 in	which	 their	 rights	of	defence	are	properly	 respected.	The	 legitimacy	of	
the	 law	 is	 enhanced	 when	 legal	 actors	 and	 institutions	 act	 in	 ways	 the	 community	
perceives	to	be	fair	and	just.19	Lower	levels	of	legitimacy	therefore	lead	to	lower	levels	of	
compliance,	and	consequently	make	social	regulation	and	enforcement	more	costly	and	
cumbersome. 20 	Hence,	 the	 output	 of	 a	 legitimate	 enforcement	 system	 requires	 a	
complementary	 input	 set	 of	 fairness.21	In	 order	 to	 safeguard	 its	 legitimacy,	 the	 EU	
leniency	 programme	must	 not	 only	 be	 effective,	 but	 the	 achievement	 of	 effectiveness	
must	 also	 not	 come	 at	 an	 unjustified	 expense	of	 fairness,	 both	 in	 a	 substantive	 and	 a	
procedural	sense.	
In	 weighing	 up	 effectiveness	 and	 fairness	 in	 competition	 law	 enforcement,	 and	 in	
particular	with	respect	to	the	EU	leniency	policy,	the	balance	is	often	struck	in	favour	of	
the	 former	 for	public	 interest	 reasons.	After	 initial	difficulties,	 it	appears	 that	 following	
the	 reform	 process	 between	 2002	 and	 2006	 the	 EU	 leniency	 policy	 does	 not	 unduly	
impair	 fundamental	 rights	 nor	 sacrifice	 retribution	 over	 deterrence	 for	 the	 sake	 of	




















advancing	effectiveness.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	deterrence	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	 retribution	
and	 fundamental	 rights	protection	on	 the	other,	 can	be	 reconciled	 in	an	 ‘effectiveness	
through	 fairness’	 narrative	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 a	 more	 effective	 and	 fair	 leniency	
programme.	The	research	question	this	thesis	seeks	to	explore	is	how	deterrence	in	the	
EU	 leniency	 policy	 has	 developed	 vis-à-vis	 retribution	 and	 the	 fundamental	 rights	
protection.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 concepts	 of	










“Fairness	 versus	Welfare”	 is	 the	 leading	 text	 juxtaposing	 the	 two	 seemingly	 opposing	
concepts	of	normative	economics	and	fairness.23	They	dismiss	the	use	of	fairness-based	




over	 welfare	 considerations.25	Given	 that	 sanctions	 are	 an	 essential	 aspect	 of	 law	 en-
forcement	and	also	highly	relevant	for	the	working	of	leniency	programmes	it	needs	to	be	








































































































two	 general	 categories:	 the	 protection	 of	 individuals	 and	 undertakings	 from	 anti-




social	 goods	 from	notions	of	 fairness	 since	 the	 latter	 focuses	on	distinct	 individuals	af-
fected	and	protects	 them	as	ends	rather	than	means.	Social	goods,	by	contrast,	 regard	











tion	 law	 scholarship.	 Instead,	 economic	 efficiency	 should	 be	 carefully	 balanced	 against	
fairness	 considerations,	 and	 in	 case	of	a	 conflict	 fairness	arguments	 should	 carry	more	
weight	than	the	economic	effects.48	Against	the	current	trend	of	moderate	deontological	
theories,	 this	 approach	 appears	 to	 be	more	 absolutist.	 The	 fundamental	 difference	 of	











a	 final	 judgment.49	In	 other	words,	 if	 people	 have	 preferences	 for	 fairness,	 then	 these	
preferences	 should	be	 taken	 into	account	 in	welfare	economic	analyses.	 The	 ‘taste	 for	
fairness’	argument	has	however	been	criticised	by	several	scholars.	Methodologically,	it	is	
difficult	 to	 determine,	measure	 and	 aggregate	 individuals’	 disinterested	 preferences.50	
From	a	conceptual	perspective,	preferences	and	normative	 judgments	might	differ	fun-
damentally.51	In	addition	 to	 the	 ‘taste	 for	 fairness’	argument	Kaplow	and	Shavell	argue	
that	the	definition	of	notions	of	fairness	could	be	broadened	to	also	incorporate	princi-
ples	that	are	equivalent	to	those	of	welfare	economics.52	Furthermore,	notions	of	fairness	





















while	 the	 deterrence	 theory	 is	 associated	with	 effectiveness,	 retribution	 or	 retributive	
justice	is	considered	a	form	of	fairness.	These	two	theories	will	be	looked	at	throughout	




The	 fundamental	 goal	of	 law	enforcement	 from	a	welfare	economic	perspective	 is	 the	





An	effectiveness	 threshold	 in	 terms	of	output	or	
enforcement	efficiency	is	achieved	if	 individuals	and	undertakings	are	deterred	from	in-
fringing	sufficiently	clear	competition	law	rules.	The	power	of	competition	authorities	to	


















as	 forward-looking	or	consequentialist,	as	 it	 looks	 to	 the	preventative	consequences	of	
punishment.61	There	are	two	aspects	of	deterrence,	namely	‘specific’	and	‘general’	deter-
rence.	 The	 former	 is	 concerned	 with	 deterring	 crime	 by	 punishing	 offenders	 for	 their	
transgression	and	deterring	them	from	reoffending,	whereas	general	deterrence	aims	at	
discouraging	offences	from	occurring	by	threat	of	anticipated	punishment.62		
The	 modern	 version	 of	 the	 utilitarian	 theory	 of	 deterrence,	 called	 ‘economic	
deterrence’,	was	pioneered	by	Becker	and	other	supporters	of	the	economic	analysis	of	
law	 approach.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 classic	 utilitarian	 approach,	 which	 advocated	 the	
maximisation	 of	 happiness,	 the	 economic	 approach	 to	 deterrence	 promotes	 the	
maximisation	 of	 welfare.	 Since	 crimes	 inflict	 direct	 and	 indirect	 costs	 on	 society,	
punishment	 should	be	 set	 so	as	 to	 curb	 crime	 to	 the	 level	 at	which	 total	 social	 cost	 is	
















violation.66	Given	 that	 not	 every	 competition	 infringement	 is	 detected	 or	 successfully	
prosecuted,	 the	 ‘net	 harm	 to	 others’	 should	 be	 multiplied	 by	 the	 inverse	 of	 the	
probability	of	detection	and	proof.67	Optimal	deterrence	therefore	requires	the	expected	
fine	 to	 exceed	 the	 expected	 gain	 in	 order	 to	 compensate	 for	 imperfect	 detection	 and	
prosecution.68	The	minimum	 fine	 to	 achieve	 deterrence	 thus	 equals	 the	 expected	 gain	
from	 the	 infringement	 multiplied	 by	 the	 inverse	 of	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 fine	 being	
effectively	imposed.69		


































considered	 as	 efficient	 and	 should	 therefore	 be	 encouraged	 if	 its	 welfare	 benefits	 to	











specific	 quantum	 for	 an	 effective	 penalty.	 The	 model	 of	 economic	 deterrence	 in	
particular	 allows	 for	 a	 non-arbitrary	 and	 principled	 approach	 based	 on	 quantifiable	
variables,	and	is	therefore	capable	of	resolving	the	practical	problem	of	penalty-setting.73	
The	major	drawback	of	deterrence-based	theories,	on	the	other	hand,	is	concerned	with	
moral	 considerations.	 Deterrence-based	 theories	 fail	 to	 adequately	 account	 for	 the	
constraints	 imposed	by	 the	 responsibility	principle,	 namely	why	punishment	 should	be	
limited	to	those	morally	responsible	for	breaking	the	law.74	The	limitation	of	punishment	
to	the	guilty	offender	is	a	costly	constraint	on	the	pursuit	of	the	general	aim	of	preventing	















could	 lead	 to	 justifying	 “efficient”	 infringements.78	There	 is	 a	 concern	 that	 if	 penalties	
persistently	and	 significantly	deviate	 from	common	notions	of	 fairness,	 then	over	 time	
the	public’s	faith	in	the	legal	system	and	the	respect	for	the	law	may	fade.	This	may	lead	
to	a	drop	in	the	level	of	obedience	to	the	law	and	an	erosion	of	the	deterrent	effect	of	
punishment. 79 	In	 avoiding	 this	 problem,	 deterrence	 theories	 must	 relativise	 their	








tification	 for	 their	 wrongdoing.82	According	 to	 von	 Hirsch,	 one	 of	 the	most	 prominent	
proponents	 of	 retribution-based	 theories,	 sentences	 convey	 official	 censure	 or	 blame,	
primarily	to	the	offender	but	also	to	the	society	at	large.83	In	contrast	to	the	deterrence-
based	theories,	 retributive	 justice	 is	backward-looking	to	the	offence.	Retribution	relies	






















severity.	 ‘Cardinal	 proportionality’,	 by	 contrast,	 concerns	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	
gravity	of	the	offence	and	the	severity	of	punishment.	The	principle	of	proportionality	is	
undoubtedly	acknowledged	in	theories	of	retribution,	however	there	are	variations	in	its	
specific	 content	 and	 implementation.	 Von	 Hirsch	 regards	 the	 principle	 as	 a	 crucial	










gains	an	unfair	advantage	over	 those	who	abide	by	 the	 law.	Punishment	 is	 imposed	 in	
order	 to	 neutralise	 this	 unfair	 advantage	 and	 thus	 restores	 the	 social	 balance.90	It	 is	
argued	 here	 that	 in	 competition	 law	 enforcement	 	 the	 adherence	 to	 retributivist	
principles	could	 restore	competition.	The	second	variant	 relates	 to	 the	 ‘communicative	
function’	of	punishment.	Punishment	according	to	proponents	of	this	variant	conveys	the	
inherent	 wrongness	 of	 an	 act	 to	 society	 and	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 a	 resultant	 legal	
action.	It	is	the	wrongful	act,	in	and	of	itself,	which	is	morally	repugnant	and	hence	liable	
to	punishment.91	













The	primary	advantage	of	 theories	of	 retribution	 is	 that	 they	are	deeply	 rooted	 in	




demerit	of	 retribution-based	theories,	however,	 is	 that	 they	are	unable	 to	substantiate	
the	 link	 between	 crime	 and	 punishment	 without	 relying	 on	 consequentialist	
considerations.92	These	theories	fail	to	justify	criminal	sanctions	for	unwanted	behaviour	
as	opposed	to	simple	reprobation	or	social	avoidance.	While	they	may	well	justify	moral	
condemnation	 for	 a	wrongdoing,	 they	alone	 cannot	explain	why	 condemnation	 should	











A	 theory	 of	 punishment	 that	 is	 either	 purely	 utilitarian	 or	 purely	 retributive	 is	
unsatisfactory	due	to	the	flaws	of	both	deterrence	and	retributivist	theories	as	explained	
above.	 Instead	 a	 combination	 of	 these	 two	 theories	 of	 punishment,	 a	 mixed	 theory,	

















attempts	 to	uphold	 the	principle	of	personal	autonomy	and	 inflict	punishment	only	on	
those	morally	responsible	for	their	actions.98	Neither	of	these	theories	should	be	rejected	
simply	because	one	favours	the	use	of	one	over	the	other.	As	argued	by	Hart,	a	morally	
tolerable	 justification	 of	 punishment	 must	 exhibit	 a	 compromise	 between	 these	
theories.99	For	 example,	many	 advocates	 of	 retributivist	 theories	 indeed	 hold	 a	mixed	























	 Furthermore,	 the	 two	theories	can	be	approximated	on	the	basis	of	 fairness,	 for	 in-
stance	 if	 the	 definition	 includes	 proportionality	 in	 punishment	 and	 the	 right	 to	 com-
pete.104	Kaplow	and	Shavell,	who	are	strict	advocates	of	welfare	economics,	discern	that	
the	notion	that	punishment	should	be	proportional	to	the	gravity	of	an	offence	is	viable	














Taking	 into	 account	 the	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 the	 theories	 of	 deterrence	 and	
retribution	a	mixed	or	hybrid	 theory	may	also	be	applied	 in	cartel	enforcement.108	It	 is	


















of	 proportionality	 should	 preclude	 excessive	 punishment.	 Since	 the	 imposition	 of	
sanctions	 for	a	competition	 law	 infringement	does	not	serve	primarily	 to	communicate	
moral	 censure,111	the	 severity	 of	 punishment	 does	 not	 convey	 the	 degree	 of	 blame	
attached	 to	 the	 offence.	 The	 principle	 of	 proportionality	 therefore	 serves	 as	 a	
































	 From	 the	 outset	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 stated	 that	 sanctions	 and	 leniency	 are	 inextricably	
linked.	Leniency	cannot	be	awarded	without	the	threat	of	sanctions.	Hence,	the	theories	










and	 used	 as	 an	 independent	 principle).	 The	 investigation	 and	 prosecution	 of	 cartel	 in-
fringements	is	advanced	through	deterrence,	mainly	by	relying	on	sanctions	and	lenien-
cy.117		
































contexts	 fairness	 is	 treated	not	as	an	 independent,	evaluative	principle	but	 rather	as	a	
factor	that	is	balanced	against	the	aforementioned	notion	of	effectiveness.		
Under	the	meaning	of	substantive	fairness,	retribution	is	used	as	a	proxy	for	fairness	
and	 is	 juxtaposed	with	deterrence.	 In	 the	context	of	 sanctions	and	 leniency	 retributive	






fringer.	Under	 this	approach	 fair	punishment	would	often	accord	with	 the	punishment	
following	the	deterrence	approach.119	In	a	similar	way,	in	meting	out	fair	leniency	awards	
the	 level	 of	 cooperation	of	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 is	 taken	 into	 account.	 In	 private	 en-
forcement,	substantive	fairness	is	primarily	concerned	with	corrective	justice.	The	infring-
ing	undertakings	have	to	compensate	the	victims	of	the	anti-competitive	conduct	by	pay-














fundamental	 rights	 is	 assessed	under	 the	 standard	 set	 by	 the	European	Convention	of	
Human	Rights	(ECHR).		
 Effectiveness	through	fairness		3.
The	 second	meaning	of	 effectiveness	used	 in	 this	 thesis	 takes	 into	account	 the	 above-
described	notions	of	fairness.	The	concept	of	‘effectiveness	through	fairness’	was	recently	
                                                
119	See	Kaplow	and	Shavell	(2002),	327-328.	
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affect	 or	 frustrate	 effective	 competition	 law	 enforcement.	 Rather,	 those	 require-
ments	are	being	 internalised	 in	discussions	of	what	effective	 competition	 law	en-
forcement	 should	 amount	 to.	 A	 fair	 procedural	 context	 and	 institutional	 frame-
works	that	allow	for	such	context	to	come	to	being	are	thus	considered	policy	goals	
that	determine	whether	or	not	a	competition	 law	enforcement	system	should	be	
considered	 effective;	 individuals	 should	 indeed	 still	 be	 able	 to	 be	 fined	 for	 illegal	
behaviour,	but	 should	also	be	able	 to	benefit	 from	a	procedural	 context	 in	which	
they	can	at	least	somehow	predict	the	different	stages	through	which	their	investi-
gated	 behaviour	will	 have	 to	 be	 structured.	 From	 that	 point	 of	 view,	 fairness	 re-
quirements	 do	 not	 frustrate,	 but	 rather	 directly	 contribute	 to	 the	 effectiveness	
benchmarks	underlying	the	design	of	EU	competition	law	enforcement…”122		
Similarly,	 Scordamaglia-Tousis	 claims	 that	 “a	 rigorous	 and	 bona	 fide	 respect	 of	
fundamental	 rights	 in	 legal	 proceedings	 substantially	 translates	 into	 an	 enforce-
ment	 regime	 that	 also	 gains	 in	 terms	 of	 legitimacy,	 and	 thereby	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
overall	 effectiveness.”123	Moreover,	according	 to	Al-Ameen	 fairness	enhances	 le-
gitimacy	which	could	consequently	help	in	achieving	optimality.124	
	 At	the	moment	only	bits	and	pieces	of	the	‘effectiveness	through	fairness’	concept	can	
be	 identified	 throughout	 the	 case-law.	Although	 the	Courts	have	 imposed	due	process	
requirements	and	shaped	this	concept,	they	cannot	do	so	on	a	general	and	ex	ante	ba-
sis.125	Another	explanation	might	be	that	conflicts	between	fundamental	rights	and	effi-


































the	 Prisoner’s	 Dilemma,	 the	 best-known	 example	 of	 game	 theory.	 Nonetheless,	 this	
thesis	employs	both	a	normative	and	an	empirical	analysis	as	its	research	methods	rather	





focus	 on	 effectiveness	 (i.e.	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 efficiency)	 but	 also	 take	 in	 consideration	





notions	of	 fairness.	 Retributive	 justice	 and	 the	 respect	 for	 fundamental	 rights	 serve	 as	
deontological	 constraints	on	 the	maximisation	of	effectiveness.	Due	 to	 this	approach	a	
law	and	economics	approach	would	seem	ill-suited.	Instead,	the	research	method	applied	
in	this	thesis	tries	to	reconcile	welfare	economist	and	moderate	deontological	theories.130	
To	 that	 effect,	 this	 thesis	 analyses	 the	 implications	 of	 using	 leniency	 on	 fundamental	
rights	 protection	 and	 evaluates	 the	 impact	 on	 deterrence	 and	 retribution	 under	 a	
normative	 framework,	 which	 is	 developed	 in	 the	 third	 chapter.	 This	 framework	
incorporates	 retributive	 constraints	 in	 the	 economic	 analysis	 of	 leniency	 not	 only	 to	
rectify	 some	 of	 the	 normative	 flaws	 of	 conventional	 approaches	 such	 as	 cost-benefit	
analyses	 but	 also	 as	 a	 predictive	 tool,	 without	 considerably	 compromising	 the	
methodological	rigor.131	Since	measuring	deterrence	and	in	particular	retribution	is	very	
difficult	 –	 if	 not	 impossible	 –	 	 this	 thesis	 relies	 on	 trade-offs	 between	 deterrence	 and	
retribution	in	providing	qualitative	rather	than	quantitative	indications.	
In	addition,	in	applying	an	empirical	analysis	this	thesis	evaluates	the	development	of	
the	 EU	 leniency	 programme	 over	 time.	 The	 Commission’s	 first	 leniency	 programme	
established	 under	 the	 1996	 Leniency	 Notice	 is	 not	 only	 used	 as	 basis	 to	 develop	 the	
normative	 framework	 but	 also	 used	 as	 benchmark	 for	 evaluating	 the	 reforms	 of	 the	
leniency	programme	in	2002	and	2006.			
 Contribution	and	Scope		V.
Leniency	in	the	antitrust	context	 is	a	topical	 issue;	not	 just	due	to	the	tension	between	
public	 and	 private	 enforcement	 in	 recent	 years. 132 	The	 number	 of	 new	 leniency	
programmes	adopted	by	competition	authorities	around	the	world	has	increased	rapidly	
in	 the	 past	 years	 while	 others	 have	 been	 reformed.133	This	 thesis	 offers	 guidance	 to	
countries	 that	 intend	 either	 to	 implement	 a	 new	 leniency	 programme	 or	 reform	 their	










existing	 one,	 on	 how	 a	 leniency	 programme,	 that	 is	 both	 effective	 and	 fair,	 could	 be	
designed.	Despite	the	growing	number	of	publications	on	the	topic	of	due	process	and	
fairness	 in	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 in	 the	past	 couple	of	 years,	 there	 is	 still	 a	 dearth	of	
scholarship	devoted	to	the	notion	of	fairness	in	the	context	of	leniency.	This	thesis	takes	
up	Schroll’s	idea	of	the	influence	of	internal	and	external	factors	on	the	effectiveness	of	
the	 leniency	 policies	 of	 the	 EU	 Commission	 and	 the	 German	 Federal	 Cartel	 Office	
(FCO).134	There	 have	 been	 other	 works	 (many	 of	 them	 in	 German)	 dealing	 with	 the	
effectiveness	of	leniency	programmes.135	To	the	author’s	knowledge	this	thesis	is	the	first	
scholarly	work	 to	extensively	 analyse	 the	effectiveness	and	 fairness	 in	 the	EU	 leniency	
policy.	 Both	 concepts	 are	 examined	 under	 a	 novel	 normative	 framework	 juxtaposing	
deterrence	and	retribution.136	This	thesis	delivers	further	support	for	the	proposition	that	
effectiveness	 and	 fairness	 in	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 can	be	 reconciled.137	In	 examining	
external	factors,	this	thesis	limits	itself	to	private	enforcement.	Excluded	from	the	scope	
is	 the	 criminalisation	of	 the	 cartel	offence	and	multi-jurisdictional	 leniency	applications	
(such	as	a	‘one-stop	leniency	shop’	in	the	European	Competition	Network	(ECN)).		
 Structure	VI.

























subsequent	 three	 chapters	 deal	 with	 the	 development	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	 policy.	 The	
analysis	 is	 conducted	 in	 a	 chronological	 manner:	 starting	 with	 the	 pre-1996	 leniency	
practice	and	the	1996	Leniency	Notice,	then	over	to	the	revisions	in	the	2002	and	2006	
Leniency	Notices	(including	the	publications	of	the	1998	and	2006	Fining	Guidelines),	and	
finally	 the	 latest	 development	 concerning	 the	 public/private	 interface	 in	 competition	
enforcement	and	the	adoption	of	the	Antitrust	Damages	Directive.		
Chapter	 2	 lays	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 whole	 thesis	 with	 the	 proposition	 that	 in	 EU	
cartel	 enforcement,	 effectiveness	 and	 fairness	 are	 reconciled.	 It	 first	 sets	 out	 the	













the	 principle	 of	 legality.	 By	 examining	 the	 2002	 and	 2006	 Leniency	 Notices	 under	 the	
normative	framework,	the	focus	is	on	the	severity	and	foreseeability	of	the	EU	cartel	fines	
and	certain	other	important	internal	factors.	By	contrast,	Chapter	5	tackles	the	interplay	
between	 public	 (administrative)	 and	 private	 antitrust	 enforcement	 as	 an	 external	
factor. 138 	It	 addresses	 the	 complementarity	 between	 these	 two	 enforcement	
mechanisms	as	well	as	the	tension	between	private	actions	for	damages	and	leniency.	It	












Over	 the	past	 few	decades,	 the	EU	has	adopted	a	 tougher	attitude	 towards	hard	 core	
cartels.	 In	 order	 to	 increase	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 its	 cartel	 enforcement,	 the	 European	
Commission	 has	 been	 firm	 in	 increasing	 deterrence	 by	 threatening	 to	 sanction	 cartel	
offenders	very	severely.	A	crucial	step	in	the	Commission’s	fight	against	cartels	was	the	
fundamental	 change	 in	 the	 cartel	 enforcement	 landscape	 in	 2004.	 Regulation	 1/2003	
(‘the	 Modernisation	 Regulation’),	 which	 replaced	 Regulation	 17/62,	 decentralised	 the	
enforcement	 of	 Article	 101	 TFEU.	 It	 abolished	 the	 cumbersome	 notification	 of	
agreements	 to	 the	 Commission	 for	 individual	 exemption	 and	 instead	 allowed	 Article	
101(3)	to	be	applied	by	national	competition	authorities	 (NCAs)	and	courts.	One	of	the	
reasons	 for	 the	 change	 of	 the	 enforcement	 regime	 was	 to	 free	 up	 the	 Commission’s	
resources	and	to	allow	it	to	focus	on	the	most	serious	breaches	of	EU	competition	law,	
such	as	hard	core	cartels.1	To	better	equip	 the	Commission	 in	 the	 fight	against	 cartels,	
Regulation	 1/2003	 also	 expanded	 the	 Commission’s	 arsenal	 to	 investigate	 and	 punish	
infringements.	 In	 the	aftermath	of	Regulation	1/2003,	 the	number	of	 cartels	detected,	






















From	 an	 institutional	 perspective,	 an	 important	 innovation	 was	 the	 creation	 of	 a	
cartels	directorate	within	the	Directorate-General	for	Competition	in	2005.3	Importantly,	
Regulation	 1/2003	 has	 also	 reinforced	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 protection	 in	 EU	 cartel	
enforcement	 by	 stating	 that	 it	 respects	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 and	 observes	 the	
principles	 recognised	 in	particular	by	 the	CFR.4	A	key	concern	 for	 the	Commission	 is	 to	




The	purpose	of	 this	chapter	 is	 to	shed	 light	on	 the	 interplay	between	effectiveness6	
and	fairness7	in	EU	cartel	enforcement.	It	is	submitted	that	the	concepts	of	effectiveness	
and	fairness	need	to	be	reconciled	in	order	to	ensure	legitimate	enforcement.	A	rigorous	
and	bona	 fide	 respect	of	 fundamental	 rights	 in	 the	EU	 cartel	 proceedings	 substantially	
translates	into	an	enforcement	regime	that	also	gains	in	terms	of	legitimacy,	and	thereby	
in	 terms	 of	 its	 overall	 effectiveness.8	This	 chapter	 consists	 of	 two	 sections.	 The	 first	
section	concerns	 the	 legitimacy	of	EU	cartel	enforcement.	The	other	 section	addresses	
the	issue	of	due	process	in	EU	cartel	proceedings.		
 Legitimacy	in	EU	cartel	enforcement		II.
As	 explained	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 the	 thesis,	 legitimacy	 in	 law	 enforcement	 does	 not	 only	
require	that	enforcement	is	efficient	but	that	it	also	results	in	morally	just	outcomes	and	












is	 to	 give	 an	 introduction	 to	 the	 elements	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 EU	








Cartel	 enforcement	 systems	 traditionally	 pursue	 three	 main	 objectives:	 (1)	 the	
eradication	 of	 cartels;	 (2)	 the	 achievement	 of	 a	 high	 clear-up	 rate;9	and/or	 (3)	 the	
provision	 of	 justice	 and	 restitution.10	These	 objectives	 are	 often	 advanced	 by	 three	
systematically	 different,	 yet	 substantively	 interconnected	 functions	 of	 competition	 law	
systems. 11 	The	 first	 function	 is	 punitive	 and	 involves	 preventing	 competition	
infringements	 from	 taking	 place	 by	 threatening	 to	 impose	 sanctions. 12 	The	 second	
function	is	injunctive	and	seeks	to	bring	anti-competitive	infringements	to	an	end.13	The	
third	 function	 is	 compensatory 14 	and	 requires	 offenders	 of	 anti-competitive	























infringements	 to	 remedy	 the	 harm	 suffered	 by	 victims.	 The	 latter	 two	 functions	 are	
arguably	 of	 secondary	 importance	 (at	 least	 in	 EU	 competition	 law	 at	 the	 current	
moment).15	Nonetheless,	 they	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 optimal	 enforcement	 of	




forming	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 ensuing	 enforcement	 functions	 are	 injunctive	 and	
compensatory.	These	two	functions	are	hence	purely	backward-looking.		
The	 Commission	 pursues	 the	 three	 aforementioned	 main	 objectives	 in	 its	 cartel	
enforcement	efforts.18	Eradicating	cartels	 is	an	 inevitable	objective	of	 legal	control	as	 it	
lends	 normative	 justification	 to	 the	 enforcement	 of	 cartel	 law.	 Former	 Competition	
Commissioner	 Kroes	 adopted	 a	 particularly	 strong	 rhetoric	 against	 cartels. 19 	The	
eradication	of	cartels	necessarily	requires	great	efforts	in	terms	of	detection	and	severe	
sanctions.	 Due	 to	 the	 limited	 resources	 of	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 difficulty	 of	 cartel	
detection,	the	complete	eradication	of	cartel	behaviour	is	bound	to	be	an	elusive	aim.		




relatively	 feasible	 objective,	 its	 measurement	 and	 assessment	 are	 fraught	 with	
difficulties.	It	may	be	true	that	the	Commission	has	prosecuted	an	increasing	number	of	


















cartels	 in	recent	years,	but	this	 in	 itself	does	not	mean	that	the	goal	of	deterrence	has	







underlying	argument	 is	that	breaking	up	a	cartel	and	fining	 its	members	 is	not	enough;	
justice	 requires	 that	 cartel	 victims	 are	 compensated. 22 	The	 Commission	 has	 been	




The	Commission’s	main	weapon	 to	 enforce	 the	 EU	 competition	 rules	 is	 its	 sanctioning	
power	under	Article	23(2)	of	Regulation	1/2003,	according	to	which	the	Commission	can	
impose	 fines	 against	 undertakings	 that	 infringe	 those	 rules.	 This	 provision	 does	 not	




electrodes,	 it	 explained	 that	 the	 competition	 law	 fines	 “are	 designed	 to	 punish	 the	
unlawful	 acts	 of	 the	 undertakings	 concerned	 and	 to	 deter	 both	 the	 undertakings	 in	
question	 and	 other	 operators	 from	 infringing	 the	 rules	 of	 [EU]	 competition	 law	 in	
future.”24	Similarly,	the	Commission	has	stated	that	the	purpose	of	the	fines	 is	twofold,	









namely	 to	 impose	 a	 pecuniary	 sanction	 on	 the	 undertaking	 for	 the	 infringement	 and	
prevent	 a	 repetition	 of	 the	 offence,	 and	 to	 make	 the	 prohibition	 in	 the	 Treaty	 more	
effective.25	Moreover,	 the	Courts	have	found	that	 in	addition	to	being	persuasive,	 fines	
must	also	be	proportionate.	The	severity	of	the	penalty	must	be	determined	on	the	basis	
of	 the	 facts	and	circumstances	of	 the	 infringement	and	none	of	 these	 factors	must	be	
given	 disproportionate	 significance	 over	 the	 others.26	In	 case	 of	 an	 infringement	 by	
several	 undertakings,	 the	 relative	 gravity	 of	 each	 individual	 undertaking’s	 participation	
has	 to	be	 taken	 into	account.27	The	objectives	of	punishing	past	and	preventing	 future	
infringements	 show	 that	 the	 Courts	 support	 a	 mixed	 approach	 of	 deterrence	 and	
retribution.28	It	 can	be	argued	 that	deterrence	and	 retribution	are	also	 reflected	 in	 the	
twin	 goals	 of	 EU	 competition	 law,	 namely	 the	 protection	 of	 competition	 and	 the	





the	 future,	while	 the	retributive	 function	shall	 restore	 the	competitive	situation	on	 the	
market	before	the	 infringement	occurred.	 It	can	also	be	argued	that	the	10%	ceiling	of	
fines31	as	well	as	the	Commission’s	‘inability	to	pay’	policy	are	retributive	measures.	They	
prevent	 excessive	 fines	 (at	 least	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 opinion)	 which	 would	 bankrupt	

































rights	of	 the	accused.35	Fundamental	 rights	protection	or	due	process	 is	understood	as	
the	procedural	aspect	of	the	notion	of	fairness.36	Compared	to	the	situation	two	decades	
ago	 a	 large	 number	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 competition	 cases,	 and	 its	 cartel	 cases	 in	
particular,	 are	 nowadays	 challenged	 on	 procedural	 grounds. 37 	Fundamental	 rights	
protection	 has	 clearly	 taken	 up	 a	 central	 place	 in	 the	 EU	 competition	 law	 reform	
debate.38	This	 section	 gives	 a	 brief	 introduction	 to	 the	 applicable	 fundamental	 rights	
regime	 in	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement.	 Some	 of	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 introduced	 in	 this	
section	are	addressed	in	more	detail	in	the	following	chapters.		
 Relevant	framework	of	fundamental	rights	protection	in	the	EU		1.













The	 sufficiency	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 procedural	 safeguards	 in	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	
needs	 to	 be	 tested	 against	 the	 legal	 framework	 of	 human	 or	 fundamental	 rights	
protection.	 The	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	 Rights	 (ECHR)	 as	 a	 human	 rights	
catalogue	was	in	the	first	place	conceived	to	protect	natural	persons	from	the	arbitrary	or	
undue	 exercise	 of	 State	 powers.39	From	 the	 outset,	 it	 should	 therefore	 be	 clarified	
whether	 and	 to	what	extent	 the	 rights	 laid	down	 in	 the	Convention	 can	be	applied	 to	
non-natural	persons	such	as	businesses.	Due	to	 the	risk	of	abusive	use	of	 fundamental	
rights	 by	 large	 corporations,	 the	 transposability	 of	 the	 Convention	 to	 legal	 entities	 is	
controversial. 40 	The	 applicability	 of	 certain	 fundamental	 rights	 to	 legal	 entities	
nonetheless	appears	to	be	justified	on	the	basis	of	principles	such	as	the	rule	of	law	and	
embedded	 in	 the	 values	 of	 European	 liberalism,	 which	 motivated	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	
Convention.41	A	 textual	 interpretation	 of	 the	 term	 ‘everyone’	 in	 Article	 1	 ECHR	 can	 be	
understood	 to	 include	 both	 natural	 and	 legal	 persons.42	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 literal	
reading	 of	 the	 Convention	 also	 puts	 forward	 that	 not	 all	 fundamental	 rights	 are	
extendable	to	legal	entities	as	its	drafters	clearly	intended	some	of	the	rights	to	apply	to	
human	beings	only.43	A	contentious	matter	 is	 the	 standard	of	 review	as	 regards	claims	
brought	by	corporate	applicants.	In	Orkem44	and	Hoechst,45	the	CJ	found	that	the	right	to	
a	fair	trial	and	the	right	to	privacy	in	Articles	6	and	8	ECHR	respectively	may	be	invoked	by	
undertakings	 subject	 to	 antitrust	 investigations,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 noted	 that	 the	
scope	of	application	of	these	rights	to	legal	persons	is	not	as	extensive	as	in	the	case	of	
natural	persons.46	




















When	 the	 European	 Economic	 Community	 (EEC)	 started	 off,	 the	 protection	 of	
fundamental	 rights	 was	 a	 rather	 trivial	 matter.	 The	 reason	 for	 the	 EEC’s	 silence	 on	
fundamental	 rights	 was	 probably	 that	 it	 was	 perceived	 as	 an	 economic	 organisation	
where	such	rights	were	of	little	relevance.47	Although	the	EU,	unlike	its	Member	States,	is	
not	a	signatory	to	the	Convention,	the	CJ	adopted	the	Convention	as	a	yardstick	to	test	
EU	 measures	 and	 procedures.48 	Nonetheless,	 since	 the	 Convention	 has	 never	 been	







On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Courts	 referred	 to	 the	 Charter	 in	 a	 number	 of	 cases,50	thus	
reflecting	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 Charter	 and	 the	 Courts’	 motivation	 to	 protect	
fundamental	rights.51	The	Lisbon	Treaty	strengthened	the	EU’s	adherence	to	fundamental	
rights	 by	 incorporating	 the	 Charter	 in	 the	 Treaty	 framework52	and	mandating	 the	 EU’s	
accession	 to	 the	 ECHR.53	Article	 6(1)	 TEU	 states	 that	 the	 Charter	 “shall	 have	 the	 same	
value	as	the	Treaties”,	and	has	consequently	removed	doubts	as	to	the	legal	status	of	the	
Charter.	 Shortly	 after	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty,	 the	 CJ	 reaffirmed	 the	
Charter’s	constitutional	legal	value.54		




















Rights	 (ECtHR)	 found	 that	 the	 protection	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 by	EU	 law	 could	 be	
considered	to	be	equivalent	to	that	of	the	ECHR.55	Until	the	EU’s	accession	to	the	ECHR,56	
the	 Convention’s	 minimum	 protection	 standards	 will	 be	 maintained	 in	 light	 of	 Article	
52(3)	CFR,	in	so	far	as	the	Charter	contains	rights	which	correspond	to	rights	guaranteed	
by	the	ECHR,	and	the	meaning	and	scope	of	those	rights	shall	be	the	same	as	those	laid	





the	 principles	 recognised.59	It	 sets	 out	 a	 series	 of	 procedural	 guarantees	 on	 which	
undertakings	may	rely	during	the	investigation	stage,	and	which	must	be	interpreted	and	
applied	with	 respect	 to	 those	 rights	 and	principles.	 The	 current	 EU	 fundamental	 rights	





Charter	 rights	 that	 correspond	 to	 those	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 Convention	 are	 to	 be	

























evidence	 adduced	 by	 the	 Commission	 as	well	 as	 the	 right	 of	 defence	 in	 Article	 6(3).64	
Other	Convention	rights	that	have	been	used	are	Article	7	(no	punishment	without	law),	
Article	 8	 (right	 to	 respect	 for	 private	 and	 family	 life),	 Article	 13	 (right	 to	 an	 effective	
remedy),	 and	 Article	 4	 of	 Protocol	 No.	 7	 to	 the	 Convention	 (right	 not	 to	 be	 tried	 or	
punished	twice).65	
 Interplay	 between	 deterrence	 and	 fundamental	 rights	 protection	 in	 EU	 cartel	D.
enforcement		
The	continuing	quest	for	more	effective	cartel	enforcement	has	seen	the	introduction	of	
greater	 investigation	 powers,	 the	 imposition	 of	 heavier	 fines	 and,	 more	 recently,	 the	























developments	 typically	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 of	
those	 subject	 to	 investigation.67 	Legitimate	 cartel	 enforcement	 requires	 that	 strong	
enforcement	is	met	by	an	adequate	respect	for	justice	and	fairness.68		
As	 established	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 deterrence	 (or	 effectiveness)	 and	 due	 process	 (or	
procedural	 fairness)	 have	 often	 been	 presented	 as	 contrasting	 and	 ostensibly	
irreconcilable	 concepts.69	For	 instance,	 effective	 punishment	 and	 fundamental	 rights	
might	potentially	clash	where	the	latter	may	inhibit	the	ability	of	competition	authorities	
to	 legally	 detect	 and	 qualify	 collusive	 conduct.70	The	 antithetical	 relationship	 between	
deterrence	 and	due	process	 is	 often	deemed	 to	 be	 even	 stronger	 in	 criminal	 antitrust	
enforcement	 since	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 is	 typically	 higher	 in	 criminal	 cases	 than	 in	
administrative	ones.71	Deterrence	and	due	process	nonetheless	require	careful	balancing	
in	 order	 to	 safeguard	 a	 workable	 enforcement	 environment.72	In	 the	 endeavour	 to	
achieve	effective	EU	competition	enforcement,	a	principal	concern	for	the	Commission	is	
to	conduct	proceedings	that	strike	the	right	balance	between	effective	enforcement	and	
sufficient	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 defence.73	The	 question	 that	 has	 emerged	 is	




























101	 but	 also	 promote	 legal	 certainty	 and	 deterrence.	 First,	 the	 presumption	 of	 an	
infringement	makes	 lengthy	 case-by-case	analyses	of	market	 conditions	and	 the	actual	
impact	 on	 competition	 in	 a	 given	 case	 redundant,	 thus	 conserving	 resources	 of	




in	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	 EU	 Courts.	 At	 times	 the	 concept	 of	 restriction	 by	 object	 was	
interpreted	 so	broadly77	to	 the	point	 that	 the	boundary	between	 restrictions	by	object	
and	restrictions	by	effect	has	become	fluid.78	In	Allianz	Hungária,	the	CJ,	with	reference	
to	 its	 judgment	 in	 T-Mobile,	 found	 that	 a	 measure	 capable	 of	 restricting	 competition	
could	be	regarded	as	having	an	anti-competitive	object.79	However,	in	Cartes	Bancaires,	
the	 CJ	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	 broad	 interpretation	 and	 held	 that	 the	 concept	 must	 be	
interpreted	 narrowly.	 The	 decisive	 legal	 criterion	 applicable	 is	 that	 it	 concerns	
infringements	 which	 demonstrate	 	 a	 sufficient	 degree	 of	 harm	 to	 competition	 that	 it	























purpose	 of	 defining	 which	 may	 benefit	 from	 the	 De	 Minimis	 Notice83	provided	 some	
clarity	 on	 	 which	 anti-competitive	 practices	 constitute	 restrictions	 by	 object.	 The	




catches	 ‘concerted	 practices’	 which	 are	 looser	 forms	 of	 collusion.	 The	 latter	 aims	 to	
forestall	the	possibility	of	undertakings	escaping	the	ambit	of	Article	101	by	colluding	in	a	
manner	 falling	 short	 of	 an	 agreement,	 and	 therefore	 serves	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘safety	 net’.85	
Moreover,	 the	Commission	has	developed	 the	concepts	of	a	 ‘single	overall	agreement’	
and	 a	 ‘single	 continuous	 infringement’	 (SCI),	 both	 of	 which	 have	 been	 upheld	 by	 the	
Court.86	An	 undertaking	 can	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 an	 overall	 cartel,	 even	 though	 it	
participated	in	only	one	of	its	constituent	elements,	if	it	is	demonstrated	that	it	knew	or	
must	have	known	that	the	collusion	in	which	it	participated	was	part	of	an	overall	plan	
intended	 to	 distort	 competition	 and	 that	 the	 overall	 plan	 included	 all	 the	 constituent	
elements	of	a	cartel.87		




























be	 immensely	 high,	 as	 it	 were	 otherwise	 required	 to	 prove	 that	 an	 individual	
undertakings	 participated	 in	 every	 meeting	 and	 adhered	 to	 every	 common	 plan	
throughout	the	duration	of	the	cartel.	The	Courts	have	thus	lightened	the	finding	of	an	




distance	 itself	 from	what	was	agreed	 in	that	meeting.	The	GC	found	that	the	notion	of	
‘publicly	 distancing’	 as	 a	 means	 of	 avoiding	 liability	 must	 be	 interpreted	 narrowly.91	
Rebutting	the	presumption	of	participation	 is	difficult,	and	becomes	even	 impossible	 in	
certain	situations.92	The	only	way	to	terminate	its	cartel	participation	would	be	to	blow	
the	whistle	 in	 the	 framework	of	 the	 leniency	programme.93	It	 can	 therefore	be	argued	
that	there	is	added	pressure	for	cartel	members	to	be	the	first	to	apply	for	leniency,	as	
each	 of	 them	 can	 be	 easily	 implicated	 in	 the	 infringement	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 public	
distancing.94		
However,	 the	 expansive	 interpretation	 of	 Article	 101(1)	 is	 not	 boundless,	 and	 the	
Court	in	some	judgments	reprimanded	the	Commission	for	having	overstepped	the	mark	
for	castigating	purely	unilateral	decisions	as	multilateral	behaviour.95	The	Court	has	most	


















notably	done	so	 in	 the	case	of	parallel	behaviour.96	In	such	cases	 it	 is	 sufficient	 for	 the	
parties	 to	 adduce	evidence	 that	 cast	 the	 facts	 found	by	 the	Commission	 in	 a	different	
light	 and	 therefore	 provide	 another	 plausible	 explanation	 of	 those	 facts.97	Despite	 the	
occasional	objections	from	the	Courts,	the	concepts	in	Article	101(1)	nonetheless	remain	
wide	 and	 the	 Courts	 are	 likely	 to	 continue	 to	 accede	 to	 the	 Commission	 considerable	
latitude	for	deterrence	purposes.	
	 While	 the	 Courts	 have	 facilitated	 the	 legal	 qualification	 of	 cartel	 infringements	 by	
allowing	legal	presumptions	and	interpreting	Article	101(1)	broadly,	the	same	cannot	be	
said	about	 the	proof	of	 such	 infringements.	 The	allocation	of	 the	burden	of	proof	 and	
evidentiary	 standards	 are	 imperative	 for	 upholding	 notions	 of	 fairness,	 as	 they	 should	
limit	 the	 occurrence	 of	 erroneous	 outcomes. 98 	The	 CJ	 has	 emphasised	 that	 in	 all	
proceedings	where	 sanctions	may	 be	 imposed	 the	 right	 of	 defence	must	 be	 complied	
with	even	if	the	proceedings	in	question	are	administrative	proceedings.99		
The	Court	held	that	in	competition	proceedings	it	is	for	the	Commission	to	prove	the	
infringement	 it	 has	 found.100	Once	 the	Commission	has	 established	a	prima	 facie	 case,	
the	burden	shifts	to	the	accused	undertaking	which	must	then	provide	an	explanation	or	
justification.101	It	has	been	argued	that	the	Commission	bears	the	legal	burden	of	proof	
that	 Article	 101(1)	 has	 been	 infringed,	 whereas	 an	 accused	 undertaking	 may	 under	
certain	 circumstances	 bear	 the	 evidential	 burden	 of	 proof	 or	 burden	 of	 persuasion,	 in	
that	it	has	to	prove	that	the	Commission	erred	in	its	findings	due	to	insufficient,	poor	or	
misleading	evidence.102	The	intensity	of	this	burden	cannot	be	assessed	in	abstracto,	as	it	


























to	 the	 undertaking	 accused	 of	 the	 infringement,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 principle	 of	
presumption	 of	 innocence	 in	 Article	 6(2)	 ECHR.106	The	 Court	 stated	 the	 Commission	 is	










would	 unnecessarily	 overload	 the	 courts	 and	 lead	 to	 over-deterrence.110	Following	 the	



























	 A	 similar	 conclusion	 can	be	 reached	with	 regard	 to	 the	 interplay	between	 the	 legal	
qualification	and	the	proof	of	cartels.	The	legal	qualification	of	cartels	and	the	finding	of	a	
restriction	 of	 competition	 are	 rendered	 less	 difficult	 for	 the	 Commission	 due	 to	 the	
existence	of	legal	presumptions	and	the	broad	interpretation	of	Article	101(1).	Provided	
the	 requisite	 evidentiary	 burden	 is	met,	 it	will	 be	 less	 onerous	 for	 the	 Commission	 to	




based,	 the	 evidentiary	 proof	 is	 largely	 based	 on	 procedural	 fairness.	 The	 burden	 and	







(for	 instance	 in	Orkem	with	 respect	 to	 the	privilege	against	 self-incrimination	 (Article	6	
ECHR)113	and	in	Hoechst	with	respect	to	the	right	to	privacy	in	the	context	of	inspections	
(Article	 8	 ECHR)).	 Furthermore,	 as	 will	 be	 established	 below,	 the	 CJ	 has	 declined	 to	
characterise	 the	 EU	 competition	 proceedings	 as	 being	 of	 a	 ‘criminal’	 law	 nature	 for	
reasons	of	effectiveness	of	the	EU	competition	rules.	Arguably	the	public	interest	in	the	
prevention	of	distortions	of	competition	is	not	the	only	reason	for	the	narrower	scope	of	
fundamental	 rights	 under	 EU	 competition	 law.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 ‘traditional’	 cases	
involving	natural	persons	heard	before	 the	ECtHR,	 competition	proceedings	before	 the	
EU	Courts	 concern	 legal	 persons.	 An	 undertaking	 as	 such	 (by	 contrast	 to	 its	 corporate	
actors)	 is	 less	 vulnerable	 than	human	beings.	 This	 logic	has	also	been	accepted	by	 the	











In	 pursuing	 the	 objective	 of	 achieving	 a	 high	 cartel	 clear-up	 rate	 the	 EU	 has	 built	 an	
enforcement	 system	 that	 is	 based	mainly	 on	 deterrence	 but	which	 nevertheless	 takes	
into	 account	 retribution.	 The	 latter	 ensures	 substantive	 fairness	 in	 accordance	 with	




without	 the	 10%	 cap.	 Secondly,	 the	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 does	 not	 unconditionally	
pursue	 effectiveness.	 Procedural	 rights	 form	 an	 essential	 counterbalance	 to	 the	




importance	 in	 the	 past	 decade,	 against	 the	 background	 of	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 fines,	 a	
frequently	 raised	 question	 is	 whether	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 is	 fair	 towards	
defendants.115	Compliance	with	procedural	fairness	is	not	only	considered	as	a	value	on	
its	 own,	 but	 must	 also	 be	 used	 to	 as	 counterbalance	 to	 excessive	 deterrence	 in	 law	
enforcement.116		
In	order	to	answer	the	question	about	the	adherence	of	EU	cartel	proceedings	to	due	
process	 requirements	under	EU	 law	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 identify	 the	 real	nature	of	 these	













The	 nature	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 proceedings	 has	 become	 a	 widely	 debated	
topic.117	Cartel	enforcement	has	clearly	changed	since	the	inception	of	the	EEC.	Harding	
and	 Joshua	 in	 describing	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 enforcement,	 argue	
that	“a	more	adversarial	and	combative	system	of	enforcement	(in	some	senses	a	‘quasi-
criminal’	 law	 model)	 has	 been	 grafted	 onto	 a	 ‘softer’	 more	 administrative	 culture	 of	
regulation”. 118 	The	 Commission’s	 enforcement	 procedure	 cannot	 be	 described	 as	
‘administrative’	 in	 the	 classical	 sense	 as	 it	 appears	 to	 feature	 some	 strong	 penal	 and	
criminal	 law	 characteristics.119	For	 instance,	 a	 leniency	 programme	 is	 a	 tool	 that	 has	
traditionally	only	been	applied	in	the	criminal	justice	area.	The	debate	in	that	respect	has	
gained	 momentum	 in	 the	 past	 couple	 of	 years	 as	 a	 result	 of	 three	 important	
developments.	First,	the	level	of	cartel	fines	has	increased	dramatically	(compared	to	the	






















rights	 protection.	 Mann	 observes	 that	 due	 process	 demands	 a	 “positive	 correlation	
between	 investigative	 intrusiveness	 and	 severity	 of	 sanction	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	
stringency	of	procedural	protections	on	the	other.”122	The	proper	characterisation	of	the	
legal	nature	of	enforcement	proceedings	is	of	importance	for	the	scope	and	intensity	of	
fundamental	 rights’	 protection. 123 	If	 the	 procedure	 is	 ‘criminal’	 (or	 substantially	
equivalent	 to	 that),	 then	 certain	 higher	 standards	 and	 expectations	 will	 apply.	 The	
severity	 of	 criminal	 sanctions	 calls	 for	 a	 higher	 level	 of	 defence	 protection,	 inter	 alia	
regarding	 the	 standard	 of	 proof,	 collection	 of	 evidence,	 conduct	 of	 investigations,	 and	
opportunities	for	presenting	a	defence	and	securing	legal	review	of	formal	decisions.	If,	
on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 procedure	 is	 ‘administrative’,	 then	 a	 lower	 standard	 of	 legal	
protection	 is	 applicable.124	Criminal	 proceedings	 demand	 higher	 procedural	 standards	
than	normally	applied	in	civil	proceedings	since	enforcement	authorities	possess	stronger	
information	gathering	and	investigative	powers.		
Sanctions	 in	criminal	 law	and	civil	 law	are	conceptually	different.	While	criminal	 law	
has	 a	 censuring	 and	 punitive	 role	 in	 response	 to	 conduct	 that	 infringes	 a	 collective	
interest,	 civil	 law	 mainly	 serves	 the	 purpose	 of	 compensating	 the	 harm	 of	 a	 private	
interest.	However,	the	distinction	between	civil	and	criminal	liability	does	not	seem	to	be	
very	 clear-cut	 anymore.	 This	 is	 true	 especially	 in	 regulatory	 law	 (including	 competition	
law)	 where	 punitive	 sanctions	 have	 become	 common	 mainly	 to	 deter	 economic	 and	
social	activity	considered	to	be	detrimental	to	the	collective	welfare	instead	of	primarily	
condemning	 morally	 wrongful	 conduct.	 With	 these	 so-called	 ‘hybrid	 sanctions’	 a	 look	
behind	 their	 formal	 label	 is	 required.	Yeung	 for	example	suggests	constructing	a	 rough	














criminal	 sanctions.125	Due	 to	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 hybrid	 sanctions	 rigid	 adherence	 to	
their	formal	‘civil’	designation	may	result	 in	the	use	of	procedures	that	fail	to	meet	the	
demands	of	procedural	 fairness	which	unfairly	 subject	defendants	 to	 risks	arising	 from	
mistakes	in	the	sanctioning	process.126	According	to	Yeung,	“[a]cceptance	of	a	‘third	way’	
form	of	procedure	in	the	imposition	of	hybrid	sanctions	would	not	only	be	normatively	
consistent	with	our	understanding	of	 the	demands	of	procedural	 fairness	as	 varying	 in	
proportion	 to	 the	 consequences	 flowing	 from	 a	mistaken	 outcome,	 but	 it	 would	 also	
avoid	 the	 artificiality	 of	 attempting	 to	 shoe-horn	 hybrid	 sanctions	 into	 the	 binary	
constraints	 of	 the	 civil/criminal	 paradigms.” 127 	It	 is	 necessary	 to	 identify	 certain	
characteristics	underlying	the	civil/criminal	tag	that	may	shed	light	on	the	quality	of	the	
sanctions	 in	order	 to	 identify	 the	appropriate	procedures	 that	 should	apply	when	such	
sanctions	 are	 imposed.128	On	 a	 sliding	 scale	 of	 sanctions	 roughly	 corresponding	 to	 the	
severity	or	moral	reprehensibility	of	offences,	cartel	fines	(at	the	current	level)	should	be	





























of	 cases	 dealing	 with	 ‘criminal	 charges’	 in	 various	 forms,	 such	 as	 tax	 surcharges,136	
financial	service	penalties,137	and	competition	fines138.		
a. Domestic	classification	of	the	offence		
Uncertainty	 concerning	 the	 characterisation	 of	 EU	 cartel	 proceedings	 as	 being	 of	 a	
‘criminal’	 law	 nature	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 Article	 6	 ECHR	 stems	 from	 the	 domestic	
classification	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 sanctions	 under	 EU	 legislation.	 Article	 23(5)	 of	
Regulation	1/2003	explicitly	states	that	 fining	decisions	for	antitrust	 infringements	shall	
not	 be	 of	 a	 criminal	 nature,	 and	 this	 has	 been	 confirmed	 by	 the	 EU	 Courts	 in	 various	
judgments.139	A	contrario,	based	on	a	literal	interpretation	it	would	follow	that	antitrust	
fines	are	of	a	civil	or	administrative	nature.140	Still,	this	classification	is	not	conclusive	for	



























is	 merely	 a	 starting	 point. 141 	The	 ECtHR	 occasionally	 went	 against	 the	 domestic	
classification.	It	noted	that	the	significance	of	the	right	to	a	fair	trial	“prompts	the	Court	to	
prefer	a	‘substantive’	rather	than	a	‘formal’	conception	of	the	‘charge’	contemplated	by	
[Article	 6(1)	 ECHR].	 The	 Court	 is	 compelled	 to	 look	 behind	 the	 appearances	 and	
investigate	 the	realities	of	 the	procedure	 in	question.”142	This	 is	notably	 to	prevent	 the	




non-criminal	 in	 nature.	 The	 wording	 of	 Article	 6	 ECHR	 does	 not	 speak	 of	 ‘criminal	





The	 fines	 imposed	 under	 Regulation	 1/2003	 have	 a	 strong	 punitive	 and	 deterrent	




















point	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 stance	 towards	 cartel	 fines. 149 	Since	 the	 1980s,	 the	
Commission	has	regularly	 imposed	increasingly	heavy	fines.150	While	 in	the	period	from	
1990	to	1999,	the	total	amount	of	fines	was	around	EUR	600	million,	 in	the	2000-2009	
period	 this	 figure	was	 almost	 twenty	 times	 higher	 (EUR	11.5	 billion).151	According	 to	 a	
study	by	Conner	and	Miller,	 the	Commission’s	cartel	 fines	 (accounting	 for	 inflation	and	
assessed	 in	proportion	to	the	scale	of	the	 infringement)	 increased	by	8%	per	year	over	







of	 leniency	 policies,	 traditionally	 an	 instrument	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 area,	 at	 EU	 and	
Member	State	level	is	deemed	to	point	towards	the	stigmatisation	of	cartels.155			
 Case-law	of	the	ECtHR	and	EU	Courts		3.
The	 most	 notable	 application	 of	 the	 Engel	 criteria	 was	 probably	 in	 the	 Jussila156	case	
which	 concerned	 the	 imposition	 of	 tax	 surcharges	 on	 the	 applicant	 by	 the	 Finnish	 tax	
administration.	The	Strasbourg	Court	stated	that	the	guarantees	of	Article	6	ECHR	may	be	

























carry	 any	 significant	 degree	 of	 stigma.	 There	 are	 clearly	 ‘criminal	 charges’	 of	 differing	
weight.	 What	 is	 more,	 the	 autonomous	 interpretation	 adopted	 by	 the	 Convention	
institutions	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 ‘criminal	 charge’	 by	 applying	 the	Engel	criteria	 have	
underpinned	a	gradual	broadening	of	 the	criminal	head	to	cases	not	strictly	belonging	to	
the	 traditional	 categories	 of	 the	 criminal	 law,	 for	 example	 administrative	 penalties	 […],	





‘hard	 core’	 of	 criminal	 law	 and	 those	 that	 are	 in	 the	 ‘periphery’.	 From	 this	 distinction	








to	 Findlay.	The	 imposition	of	criminal	charges	 in	 the	 first	 instance	by	an	administrative	
body	may	be	compatible	with	Article	6	even	if	the	penalties	are	large	ones.160	This	refutes	
some	 commentators’	 view161	that	 only	 penalties	 for	 ‘minor	 infringements’	 could	 be	
imposed	by	an	administrative	body	in	the	first	instance.162	The	penalty	in	Findlay,	on	the	
other	hand,	 involved	a	 two-year	prison	sentence.	The	ECtHR	 found	 that	 in	 such	a	case	









concerned	 with	 serious	 charges	 classified	 as	 ‘criminal’	 under	 both	 domestic	 and	
Convention	law,	the	applicant	was	entitled	to	a	first-instance	tribunal	which	fully	satisfied	
the	requirements	of	Article	6(1).163		
The	 latest	 important	 development	 regarding	 the	 distinction	 between	 criminal	 and	






Article	6	depends	on	 the	nature	and	depth	of	 the	 judicial	 review	of	 the	administrative	




ECtHR	 after	Menarini	 the	 legal	 qualification	 of	 competition	 proceedings	 was	 not	 an	
issue.166	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	ECtHR,	 the	EU	Courts	 refused	 to	 characterise	 the	EU	competition	
proceedings	as	‘criminal’.	In	the	Dyestuffs	case,	the	applicants	with	reference	to	the	non-
criminal	nature	of	fines	under	Regulation	17/62	argued	that	fines	should	not	be	imposed	
in	 order	 to	 punish	 infringements	 which	 have	 already	 occurred	 but	 to	 prevent	 their	
recurrence.167	By	 rejecting	 this	argument	on	 the	grounds	 that	 such	a	 limitation	 “would	
















imposition	of	 sanctions	only	 to	 intentional	 infringements	as	opposed	 to	negligent	ones	
would	 diminish	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 EU	 competition	 law.171	In	 Compagnie	 Maritime	
Belge,172	the	GC	 relying	 on	 the	Volkswagen	 judgment	 found	 that	 “the	 effectiveness	 of	
[EU]	competition	 law	would	be	seriously	affected	 if	the	argument	that	competition	 law	
formed	part	of	 criminal	 law	were	accepted”.	 In	Tetra	Pak,173	the	GC	also	held	 that	 the	
administrative	character	of	antitrust	proceedings	 remains	unaffected	by	 the	amount	of	
the	fine.	Despite	the	EU	Courts’	unequivocal	stance,	the	administrative	law	classification	
of	 the	 EU	 cartel	 procedure	 is	 nonetheless	 contested,	 inter	 alia	 by	 several	 Advocate	









rule	 of	 law. 177 	Irrespective	 of	 whether	 EU	 competition	 proceedings	 are	 of	 an	
administrative	or	 criminal	 law	nature,	pursuant	 to	Article	6	ECHR	proceedings	must	be	
carried	 out	 by	 an	 ‘independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal’.	 At	 first	 sight,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
characterise	a	 tribunal	 that	possesses	 the	 investigatory,	prosecutorial,	 and	adjudicative	
















that	 a	 criminal	 proceeding	 within	 the	 meaning	 of	 Article	 6	 can	 be	 entrusted	 to	
administrative	 authorities	 provided	 that	 a	 right	 to	 appeal	 from	 that	 decision	 to	 an	
independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal	 exists.178	The	 ECtHR	 reasoned	 that	 “[d]emands	 of	
flexibility	and	efficiency,	which	are	fully	compatible	with	the	protection	of	human	rights,	
may	justify	the	prior	intervention	of	administrative	or	professional	bodies	and,	a	fortiori,	
of	 judicial	 bodies	which	 do	 not	 satisfy	 the	 said	 requirements	 in	 every	 respect”.179	The	
ECtHR’s	 flexible	 interpretation	 has	 also	 been	 followed	by	 the	 EU	Courts.	While	 finding	
that	 the	Commission	 is	 not	 an	 independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal	 for	 the	purposes	 of	
Article	6,	the	judicial	control	exercised	by	the	GC	over	the	Commission	ensures	that	the	
latter’s	proceedings	do	not	violate	due	process.180	In	competition	cases,	it	is	primarily	the	
GC	 that	 exercises	 judicial	 review	 since	 it	 is	 the	 court	 of	 both	 first	 and	 last	 instance	
regarding	the	assessment	of	facts,	while	further	appeals	to	the	CJ	are	limited	to	points	of	
law.181		
The	 requirement	 of	 judicial	 review	 constitutes	 a	 general	 principle	 of	 EU	 law.182	The	
possibility	of	appealing	Commission	decisions	to	the	GC	also	has	a	disciplining	effect	on	
the	Commission,183	reducing	the	risk	of	prosecutorial	bias	enormously.184	Articles	261	and	
263	 TFEU	 provide	 the	 legal	 basis	 for	 the	 EU	 Courts	 to	 review	 decisions	 of	 the	 EU	























In	 light	of	the	 increasing	 level	of	 fines,	there	has	been	growing	doubt	as	to	whether	
the	judicial	review	process	in	the	EU	system	is	in	full	compliance	with	the	required	degree	
of	 fundamental	 rights	 protection.186	The	 GC	 has	 been	 accused	 of	 showing	 too	 much	
respect	 for	 the	 Commission	 as	 a	 policymaker	 and	 limiting	 its	 reviews	 to	 checking	
compliance	 with	 the	 Fining	 Guidelines.187	In	 cartel	 appeals,	 there	 are	 often	 two	 main	
categories	 of	 argument	 raised	 to	 challenge	 Commission	 decisions:	 first,	 regarding	 the	
sufficiency	 of	 meeting	 the	 standard	 of	 proof;	 and	 secondly,	 regarding	 procedural	
infringements	 (but	 commonly	 relating	 to	 issues	 of	 admissibility	 of	 evidence	 or	

































extent	alleged.	Taking	advantage	of	 the	high	 standard	of	proof	 required	 in	 such	 cases,	
defendants	 contest	 the	 Commission’s	 sufficiency	 of	 evidence	 or	 inadmissibility	 of	
evidence.189	
The	aim	of	this	section	is	to	briefly	assess	the	compatibility	of	the	EU	judicial	review	





that	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 in	 setting	 fines.191	The	 following	 assessment	 of	 the	 judicial	




review	 of	 legality	 under	 Article	 263	 TFEU.	 The	 depth	 of	 the	 standard	 of	 review	 varies	
depending	 on	 whether	 legal	 interpretations,	 factual	 assessments	 or	 “complex	 and	
technical	assessments	are	at	issue”.	The	Courts	put	the	correct	appraisal	of	facts	and	the	
correct	 application	 of	 the	 law	 to	 a	 full	 control,	 whereas	 the	 correctness	 of	 the	
Commission’s	appreciation	of	complex	economic	matters	 is	only	subject	to	a	restrained	
control.192	In	the	latter	matters,	the	Courts	grant	the	Commission	a	margin	of	discretion.	
















One	 of	 the	 issues	 in	 the	 recent	Otis	 judgment	 was	 whether	 the	 review	 of	 legality	
carried	 out	 by	 the	 Courts	 under	 Article	 263	 TFEU	 in	 the	 area	 of	 competition	 law	 is	
insufficient,	 inter	 alia	 in	 view	 of	 the	 margin	 of	 discretion	 which	 the	 Courts	 grant	 the	
Commission	 in	 economic	 matters.196	The	 CJ	 in	 this	 case	 relied	 largely	 on	 its	 ruling	 in	
Chalkor.	It	emphasised	that	in	addition	to	establishing	whether	the	evidence	relied	upon	
is	 factually	 accurate,	 reliable	 and	 consistent,	 the	 Courts	 need	 to	 check	 whether	 that	
evidence	 “contains	 all	 the	 information	 which	must	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 order	 to	






manifest	 errors	 of	 assessment.	 The	 principle	 of	 nullum	 crimen	 sine	 lege,	 stipulated	 in	
Article	 7	 ECHR	 and	 Article	 49(1)	 CFR,	 requires	 that	 examining	 the	 existence	 or	 non-
existence	of	the	infringement	found	in	a	fining	decision	cannot	be	a	matter	of	policy	or	of	
administrative	discretion,	but	is	exclusively	a	matter	of	fact	and	of	law.199	On	the	basis	of	



















it	 is	 for	 the	 Court	 to	 verify,	 when	 reviewing	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 fines	 imposed	 by	 the	
contested	decision,	whether	the	Commission	exercised	its	discretion	in	accordance	with	
the	method	 set	out	 in	 the	 Fining	Guidelines	 and,	 should	 it	 be	 found	 to	have	departed	
from	 that	 method,	 to	 verify	 whether	 that	 departure	 is	 justified	 and	 supported	 by	
sufficient	legal	reasoning.204	According	to	the	GC,	the	self-limitation	on	the	Commission’s	
discretionary	 powers	 arising	 from	 these	 guidelines	 does	 not	 exclude	 any	 margin	 of	
discretion,	provided	that	the	Commission	duly	justifies	any	deviations.205	In	areas	where	
the	 Commission	 has	 a	margin	 of	 discretion,	 the	 Court’s	 review	of	 legality	 is	 limited	 to	




criticised	 the	 GC’s	 description	 of	 its	 jurisdiction	 as	 “abstract	 and	 declaratory”.209	In	
clarifying	 the	 review	 of	 legality	 the	 CJ	 mentioned	 three	 aspects,	 which	 it	 recently	
confirmed	in	Telefónica.210	First,	the	CJ	reiterated	that	even	though	the	Commission	has	a	
margin	of	discretion	with	regard	to	economic	matters,	this	does	not	preclude	the	GC	from	
reviewing	 the	 Commission’s	 interpretation	 of	 information	 of	 an	 economic	 nature.	
Secondly,	 it	 pointed	 out	 the	 need	 for	 the	 Commission	 to	 consider	 a	 large	 number	 of	
factors	 in	 carrying	 out	 a	 thorough	 examination.211	Thirdly,	 it	 noted	 that	 the	 GC	 must	
establish	on	its	own	motion	whether	the	Commission	has	complied	with	its	obligation	to	















reason	 weighting	 and	 assessing	 the	 factors	 that	 it	 took	 into	 account.212	The	 GC	 must	
exercise	the	review	of	legality	on	the	basis	of	the	evidence	adduced	by	the	applicant.213	
Moreover,	 it	 cannot	use	 the	Commission’s	margin	of	discretion	–	either	as	 regards	 the	








such,	 the	 GC	 is	 not	 obliged	 to	 conduct	 on	 its	 own	motion	 a	 new	 and	 comprehensive	
investigation	 of	 the	 file.217	In	 conclusion,	 the	 CJ	 held	 that	 the	 combination	 of	 legality	
review	 and	 unlimited	 jurisdiction	 is	 compatible	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 effective	 judicial	
protection.218		
 Compatibility	of	EU	judicial	review	with	the	ECHR	3.
Pursuant	 to	 the	 ECtHR’s	Menarini	 judgment,	 an	 administrative	 body	may	 only	 impose	
‘criminal’	penalties	in	the	sense	of	Article	6	ECHR	as	a	first-instance	tribunal	if	there	is	a	
judicial	body	which	has	full	jurisdiction	to	review	the	decision,	and	which	has	the	power	
to	 quash	 it	 in	 all	 respects,	 including	 factual	 and	 legal	 grounds.	De	 jure	 the	 EU	 judicial	
review	 system	 consisting	 of	 the	 review	 of	 legality	 and	 supplemented	 by	 unlimited	
jurisdiction	of	 the	Court	satisfies	 the	 full	 jurisdiction	standard	 laid	down	 in	ECtHR	case-













law.219	De	 facto,	 however,	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 GC’s	 past	 practice,	 the	 depth	 of	 judicial	
review	appears	 to	be	doubtful.	 The	criticism	 revolves	around	 two	specific	aspects.	The	
first	point	of	criticism	relates	to	the	‘margin	of	appreciation	doctrine’,	which	sits	uneasily	
with	 the	requirement	of	exercising	 full	 jurisdiction,	especially	when	evaluating	complex	
factual	situations.	The	GC	would	only	annul	a	decision	if	the	Commission	made	a	manifest	
error	 in	 its	 assessment.	 Such	 a	 margin	 of	 discretion	 would	 no	 longer	 suffice	 in	 cases	
where	a	sanction	of	a	criminal	nature	 is	challenged.220	However,	the	CJ	has	refuted	the	
criticism	regarding	the	margin	of	appreciation	in	recent	judgments.	It	expressly	distanced	
itself	 from	how	the	GC	described	 its	 jurisdiction	 in	cartel	cases	and	also	refrained	from	
using	 the	 formula	 of	 ‘manifest	 error	 of	 assessment’.221	Wesseling	 and	 van	 der	Woude	
have	 interpreted	 this	 as	 “a	 signal	 that	 things	 must	 change”.222	The	 second	 point	 of	
criticism	 relates	 to	 the	 unlimited	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Court	 and	 the	 insufficient	 or	
ineffective	use	of	this	capacity	in	reviewing	fining	decisions.	Indeed,	some	scholars	have	
noted	 a	 shifting	 away	 from	 deference	 to	 the	 Commission’s	 discretion	 and	 a	 slight	
tightening	up	of	the	manifest	error	test	in	some	recent	GC	judgments.223		
Notwithstanding	the	EU	Courts’	description	of	the	scope	of	their	 judicial	review,	 it	 is	
submitted	 that	 both	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 the	 CJ	 require	 a	 thorough	 review	 of	 the	 facts	 on	
which	they	base	their	decisions.	The	suitability	of	the	sanction	is	assessed	in	light	of	the	
specific	 facts	of	the	case	and	not	 in	 light	of	general	policy	objectives.	As	such,	the	GC’s	

















combination	 of	 the	 investigative,	 prosecutorial	 and	 adjudicative	 functions	 in	 the	
Commission	which	acts	as	investigator,	prosecutor,	judge	and	enforcement	authority.225	




capable	 of	 prepossessing	 the	 actions	 of	 prosecuting	 authorities.	 The	 first	 source	 is	
confirmation	bias,	which	arises	 from	the	natural	 tendency	for	an	 investigator	to	mainly	
seek	evidence	that	confirms	rather	than	refutes	his	belief	that	an	infringement	has	taken	




with	 the	 benefit	 of	 subsequently	 uncovered	 information,	 there	 proves	 to	 be	 no	
infringement.227	The	final	source	of	prosecutorial	bias	is	the	authorities’	desire	to	show	a	
high	level	of	enforcement	activity.	The	risk	according	to	Wils	is	that	weak	cases	might	be	
pursued	 or	 that	 fines	 might	 be	 inflated	 to	 demonstrate	 their	 enforcement	 efforts	 to	
outside	 observers.228	The	 second	 inadequacy	 flowing	 from	 the	 lack	 of	 separation	 of	




Internal	 ‘checks	 and	 balances’	 can	 help	 to	 allay	 the	 concerns	 about	 the	 current	
enforcement	procedure.	They	are	particularly	 important	 in	meeting	the	requirement	of	
the	right	of	defence.	These	internal	control	mechanisms	come	in	the	form	of	procedures	














Regulation	 1/2003	 states	 that	 parties	 concerned	 have	 a	 right	 of	 access	 to	 the	
Commission’s	file,	subject	to	the	legitimate	interest	of	undertakings	in	the	protection	of	
their	business	secrets.	The	provision	also	states	that	the	right	of	access	to	file	shall	not	





A	 conclusion	 drawn	 from	 the	 cartel	 appeals	 studies	 by	 Montag	 (1973-1994)	 and	








are	 the	peer	 review	panels,	 the	Advisory	Committee,	 the	Chief	Economist,	 the	Hearing	
Officer	(HO)	and	the	European	Ombudsman	(EO).235	This	section	limits	itself	to	the	latter	
two	which	have	been	described	as	the	‘guardians	of	the	rights	of	defence’.236		
















therefore	 contributes	 to	 the	objectiveness	of	 the	hearing	 itself	 and	of	 any	 subsequent	
decision.	His	two	main	tasks	are,	first,	to	ensure	that	“the	rights	of	defence	are	respected,	
while	 taking	 account	 of	 the	 need	 for	 effective	 application	 of	 the	 competition	 rules	 in	
accordance	with	the	regulations	 in	 force	and	the	principles	 laid	down	by	the	[CJ]”;	and	
secondly,	 that	 “due	 account	 is	 taken	 of	 all	 the	 relevant	 facts,	 whether	 favourable	 or	




immediate	 role	 in	 the	 competition	proceedings,	namely	 in	 conducting	 the	oral	hearing	






Notably,	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 HO	 have	 been	 expanded	 gradually;	 most	 recently	 in	
October	2011.240	The	terms	of	reference	now	explicitly	state	that	the	HO	shall	safeguard	
the	 effective	 exercise	 of	 procedural	 rights	 throughout	 competition	 proceedings	 before	























enhance	 the	 EU	 institutions’	 accountability	 towards	 EU	 citizens	 by	 guaranteeing	 good	
administration.244	Under	Article	228(1)	TFEU,	the	EO	is	empowered	to	receive,	examine	






Undertakings	 have	 been	more	 consistently	 seeking	 early	 (non-judicial)	 relief	 against	
alleged	procedural	irregularities	concomitantly	with	the	proceedings,	particularly,	where	
such	 relief	 could	not	be	obtained	 from	 the	HO.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	EO	 is	purportedly	 a	
‘second	guardian’	 in	addition	 to	 the	HO,	performing	effective	 internal	 control	over	 the	
Commission’s	 compliance	 with	 the	 rules	 of	 procedure	 and	 the	 principles	 of	 good	




















administration.247	The	 EO	 has	 in	 several	 recent	 competition	 cases	 been	 called	 upon	 in	
matters	of	the	rights	of	defence,	and	access	to	file	in	particular.	In	November	2009,	the	





cross-examine	witnesses.	Pursuant	 to	Article	6(3)(d)	ECHR,	every	accused	has	 the	 right	
“to	examine	or	have	examined	witnesses	against	him	and	to	obtain	the	attendance	and	
examination	of	witnesses	on	his	behalf	under	the	same	conditions	as	witnesses	against	
him.”	 This	 right	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 proceedings	 of	 a	 hard	 core	 criminal	 law	 nature.	 In	
Mantovanelli,	 the	 ECtHR	 held	 that	 parties	 in	 administrative	 proceedings	 “must	 in	
principle	 have	 the	 opportunity	 not	 only	 to	make	 known	 any	 evidence	 needed	 for	 his	
claims	to	succeed,	but	also	to	have	knowledge	of	and	comment	on	all	evidence	adduced	
or	observations	filed	with	a	view	to	influencing	the	court’s	decision.”249	Also	under	Article	
6(1)	 ECHR,	 i.e.	 outside	 hard	 core	 criminal	 law,	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 of	 arms	 is	
applicable.	Pursuant	to	this	principle	parties	in	civil	proceedings	should	for	instance	have	
the	right	to	name	witnesses	and	question	witnesses.	The	requirement	that	a	proceeding	




(SO)	 has	 been	 addressed	 to	 ask	 questions	 during	 the	 hearing.251	This	 provision	 gives	
parties	a	limited	possibility	of	scrutinising	the	Commission’s	analysis,	but	it	does	not	allow	











them	 to	 truly	 cross-examine	 witnesses	 or	 the	 case	 team.252 	It	 has	 therefore	 been	














Article	6	and	 the	notion	of	procedural	 fairness.	From	an	 institutional	perspective	more	





strong	 cartel	 enforcement	 regime	 to	 instigate	 deterrence	 and	 achieve	 a	 high	 clear-up	
rate.	 It	 relies	 on	 a	 fining	 policy	 based	 on	 a	 mixed	 model	 between	 deterrence	 and	
retribution.	Although	the	former	is	the	main	function	and	is	responsible	for	effectiveness,	
the	 latter	 is	 still	 important	 for	 maintaining	 substantive	 fairness.	 In	 establishing	 a	







legitimate	 cartel	 enforcement	 procedure,	 the	 Commission	 has	 also	 balanced	 effective	
enforcement	 against	 an	 adequate	 protection	of	 undertakings’	 fundamental	 rights.	 This	
balance	 is	 exemplified	 by	 the	 legal	 qualification	 and	 proof	 of	 cartels.	 The	 broad	
interpretation	 of	 Article	 101	 TFEU	 and	 the	 use	 of	 presumptions	 facilitate	 the	
Commission’s	legal	qualification	of	various	forms	of	collusion	as	cartels	and	are	therefore	














standard	of	 review	 is	 indeed	 compatible	with	 the	 requirements	of	Article	6	ECHR.	 The	
Courts	therefore	exercise	sufficient	control	over	the	Commission.	The	EU	system	features	
other	 internal	 checks	 and	 balances	 that	 help	 to	 assuage	 concerns	 about	 the	 lack	 of	









This	 chapter	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 ‘preliminary	 investigation	 stage’	 of	 the	 EU	 cartel	
procedure	in	which	the	leniency	policy	has	become	a	crucial	aspect	of.	The	detection	and	
prosecution	 of	 cartels	 is	 a	 notoriously	 difficult	 but	 equally	 important	 part	 in	 cartel	
enforcement,	not	just	because	of	the	high	standard	of	proof	as	discussed	in	the	previous	
chapter.	The	evidence	found	will	be	used	to	establish	the	infringement	and	to	calculate	




their	homes	and	using	code	names	and	code	words	 in	 their	 correspondence.2	The	vast	
majority	of	cartels	arguably	operate	clandestinely	during	their	entire	existence.3	In	cases	
involving	 a	 vertical	 agreement	 or	 an	 abuse	 of	 a	 dominant	 position,	 obtaining	 the	
necessary	 information	 about	 the	 infringements	 is	 relatively	 straightforward	 for	
competition	authorities	as	 it	 is	 in	 the	victims’	 interest	 to	 file	complaints	and	cooperate	




investigation	 instruments.5	The	 most	 prominent	 and	 potent	 instrument	 deployed	 in	
cartel	detection	is	undoubtedly	the	leniency	programme.		













programme	 plays	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 prosecution.	 From	 the	
defendant’s	perspective	the	correct	evaluation	of	evidence	is	ever	more	important	today	
given	the	higher	fines	and	other	possible	legal	consequences	in	cartel	cases.	In	light	of	the	
Commission’s	 strong	 reliance	 on	 its	 leniency	 programme,	 defendants	 nowadays	 rarely	
contest	the	existence	of	an	anti-competitive	agreement	or	concerted	practice,	but	rather	
rely	on	the	lack	of	evidence	to	meet	the	standard	of	proof.6		
	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 analyse	 the	 interplay	 between	 effectiveness	 in	 cartel	
enforcement	 through	 deterrence,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 retributive	 justice	 and	
fundamental	 rights	 protection,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programme	
established	 under	 the	 1996	 Leniency	 Notice	 which	 implemented	 the	 first	 leniency	
programme	under	EU	competition	law.7	Since	the	award	of	leniency	and	the	imposition	
of	 sanctions	 are	 inherently	 connected,	 effects	 on	 deterrence	 and	 retribution	 are	
inevitable	when	 immunity	and	 fine	 reductions	are	awarded.	This	 chapter	also	assesses	
the	 leniency	programme’s	 compliance	with	 two	specific	 fundamental	 rights	 that	are	at	
stake	in	the	gathering	and	evaluation	of	evidence.	It	is	submitted	that	the	Commission’s	
first	leniency	programme	unnecessarily	lowered	the	level	of	deterrence	and	retribution,	







explains	 the	 theory	 and	 effects	 of	 the	 use	 of	 leniency	 in	 cartel	 enforcement.	 The	
remainder	of	the	chapter	focuses	on	the	EU	leniency	policy.	The	second	section	sets	out	
the	Commission’s	early	 leniency	practice.	The	EU	 leniency	programme	 is	 tested	against	
the	theory	and	effects	outlined	in	the	first	section.	The	third	section	analyses	the	impact	








final	 section	 explains	 the	 normative	 framework	 for	 analysing	 certain	 measures	 within	
leniency	 programmes.	 This	 framework	will	 be	 applied	 in	 the	 last	 two	 chapters	 of	 this	
thesis.		
 Leniency	in	Cartel	Enforcement	II.
An	effective	 fight	against	 cartels	necessitates	 the	protection	of	whistleblowers	and	 the	
provision	 of	 sufficient	 incentives	 to	 encourage	 cartel	 members	 to	 cease	 their	 illegal	
conduct	and	cooperate	with	competition	authorities	 in	their	enforcement	efforts.	From	
the	 perspective	 of	 the	 authorities,	 it	 is	 imperative	 that	 at	 least	 one	 cartel	member	 is	




it	 could	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 sanction	 subsequent	 to	 the	 detection	of	 the	 cartel.	 Should	 an	
undertaking	decide	to	withdraw	from	the	cartel,	it	would	prefer	doing	so	silently	without	
defecting	to	the	competition	authorities,	in	order	to	avoid	its	own	prosecution.	Even	if	an	
authority	has	an	 initial	 suspicion	about	 the	ongoing	 cartel	 activity,	 cartel	members	 still	
have	little	incentive	to	cooperate.	Since	all	undertakings	are	likely	to	face	sanctions,	they	
have	an	interest	in	pursuing	a	common	‘defence	strategy’.	Generally	they	will	deny	their	
involvement	 in	 the	 cartel	 and	 exhaust	 their	 right	 of	 defence.	 It	 is	 only	 when	 the	
inspections	are	at	a	more	advanced	stage,	that	the	undertakings’	willingness	to	cooperate	
with	 the	 authorities	 increases.	 However,	 at	 that	 stage,	 the	 authorities	 might	 be	 less	
interested	 in	 seeking	 cooperation	 from	 a	 cartel	 member,	 as	 they	 might	 already	 have	
expensed	resources	and	obtained	much	of	the	required	evidence.				
A	 leniency	 programme	 is	 an	 instrument	 designed	 to	 destabilise	 and	 uncover	 secret	
cartels,	 and	 to	 gather	 crucial	 evidence	 thereof	 with	 the	 cooperation	 from	 insiders.9	It	







stokes	 distrust	 and	 exploits	 the	 natural	 nervousness	 among	 cartel	 members.10 	The	
adoption	 of	 leniency	 is	 touted	 as	 a	 crucial	 step	 and	 a	 great	 success	 in	 cartel	
enforcement.11	The	 concept	of	 leniency,	 its	 underlying	 theory,	 and	 its	 effects	 on	 cartel	
enforcement	are	discussed	in	the	following	three	sections.	
 Concept	and	terminology	A.
Leniency	 in	 the	 context	 of	 cartel	 enforcement	 is	 commonly	 defined	 as	 partial	 or	 total	
exoneration	 from	 the	 sanctions	 that	would	 otherwise	 be	 applicable	 to	 an	 undertaking	
that	 reports	 its	 cartel	membership	 to	a	 competition	authority.12	The	 sanctions	 that	are	
waived	 or	 reduced	 could	 be	 any	 sanctions	 that	 are	 applicable	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	
concerned	such	as	corporate	fines,	fines	on	individuals,	director	disqualification	or	even	




authorities	 is	 not	 a	 novel	 concept.	 Long	 before	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 first	 leniency	




























programme	 in	 the	 antitrust	 context	 in	 1978	 by	 the	 US	 DOJ,	 governmental	 authorities	
around	 the	 world	 had	 for	 instance	 offered	 plea	 bargains,	 a	 kind	 of	 post-detection	
exchange	 of	 lenient	 treatment	 against	 self-reporting,	 in	 the	 fight	 against	 organised	
crime.15	However,	in	those	situations	the	prosecutor	usually	has	wide	discretion	and	plea	
bargain	offers	are	typically	made	on	a	case-by-case	basis.		













A	 cartel	 has	 been	 described	 as	 an	 internally	 nervous	 and	 unstable	 form	 of	 business	
organisation.	Since	the	participants	in	a	cartel	remain	independent	rivals,	such	collusion	
should	rather	be	regarded	as	a	product	of	‘truce’	rather	than	a	‘genuine	alliance’.18	The	
motivation	 behind	 such	 collusions	 is	 based	 on	 self-interest	 and	 contingent	 on	 a	
continuing	belief	 in	that	self-interest.	A	company	will	have	no	incentives	to	continue	its	
cartel	 participation	once	 the	 advantages	of	 collusion	 cease	 to	 exist.19	The	ever-present	









possibility	of	 cheating	 is	 the	main	 cause	of	 instability.20	When	companies,	 for	 instance,	
agree	to	raise	their	prices	to	a	certain	level,	there	is	an	incentive	for	one	cartel	member	
unilaterally	 to	 reduce	 its	 price	 just	 below	 the	 collusive	 price,	 and	 thus	 substantially	
increase	 its	 sales	 and	 profitability.21	Such	 calculations	 concerning	 the	 benefits	 of	 cartel	





own	 individual	 interest.23	When	 for	 example	 both	 companies	 to	 a	 collusive	 agreement	
cheat,	this	will	lead	back	to	the	competitive	outcome	of	both	companies	pursuing	a	low	
price	strategy.	While	firms	have	an	incentive	to	collude,	achieving	and	then	sustaining	a	
collusive	 equilibrium	 can	 be	 extremely	 difficult.24	Cartels	 therefore	 need	 to	 operate	
mechanisms	 for	monitoring	 and	punishing	 such	 “cheating”	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 it	 from	
undermining	the	cartel.	Designing	an	effective	monitoring	mechanism	is	often	an	onerous	
and	 costly	 task,	 which	 is	 why	 many	 cartels	 are	 inherently	 unstable.25 	Competition	
authorities	can	actively	affect	the	stability	of	an	existing	cartel	by	creating	incentives	for	
companies	 to	 inform	 on	 collusive	 agreements,	 thereby	 manipulating	 the	 ability	 of	
cartelists	to	trust	each	other.		
The	 classic	 Prisoner’s	 Dilemma	 faced	 by	 the	 two	 players	 is	 best	 illustrated	 by	 the	
following	scenario:26	two	suspects,	who	have	both	committed	a	crime,	are	questioned	by	
the	police.	There	 is	 sufficient	evidence	to	convict	both	suspects	 for	a	minor	crime.	The	
authorities,	 however,	 ideally	 want	 to	 charge	 them	with	 a	major	 crime	 for	 which	 they	















need	more	evidence.	Both	 suspects	are	 interrogated	 separately	about	 their	 role	 in	 the	
major	 crime.	 Neither	 of	 them	 has	 confessed,	 but	 the	 confession	 of	 either	 would	 be	



























is	 better	 off	 confessing	 than	 remaining	 silent.	 Confessing	 is	 the	 dominant	 strategy.	
However,	the	sentence	obtained	when	both	confess	is	worse	for	each	than	the	sentence	
they	 would	 have	 obtained	 had	 both	 remained	 silent.	 Thus	 the	 mutual	 pursuit	 of	 the	
dominant	strategy	leads	to	a	Pareto	inferior	outcome.		
	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 differences	 between	 the	 theoretical	 model	 and	 cartel	
enforcement	 in	 practice.	 The	 key	 difference	 is	 that	 in	 the	 theoretical	 model	 the	
authorities	have	leverage.	They	have	enough	evidence	to	convict	and	punish	the	suspects	

























In	 contrast	 to	 the	 situation	with	 leverage	 there	 is	 no	 dominant	 strategy.	 The	worst	
































Yet,	 in	 the	 real	 world,	 suspects	 do	 not	 make	 decisions	 in	 defined	 iterations.	 If	 all	
confessions	 are	 treated	 the	 same,	 each	 suspect	 can	 take	 a	wait-and-see	 approach.	 As	
soon	 a	 suspect	 learns	 that	 his	 partner	 is	 cooperating,	 he	 can	 confess	 in	 exchange	 for	
leniency	at	 that	point.	By	only	 rewarding	 the	 first	 confessor	with	 immunity,	 a	 leniency	
programme	 precludes	 such	 a	 wait-and-see	 strategy.	 Unlike	 in	 the	 classic	 Prisoner’s	
Dilemma,	it	is	no	longer	sufficient	to	confess	–	a	cartel	member	must	confess	before	any	
of	its	co-offenders	does.30		
The	decision	 to	 come	 forward	 can	be	 finely	balanced	and	depends	on	a	number	of	
commercial	and	strategic	factors.	A	crucial	factor	is	whether	the	cartel	has	already	been	
discovered	 by	 any	 competition	 authority.	 If	 so,	 then	 there	 is	 no	 scope	 to	 consider	
whether	the	collusion	will	remain	undetected,	so	any	strategic	considerations	of	this	type	
are	 rendered	 irrelevant.31	A	 similarly	 important	 factor	 is	 whether	 another	 undertaking	
has	 already	made	 a	 leniency	 application	 in	 the	 case.	 There	 are	many	 other	 significant	
considerations	 such	 as	 whether	 a	 leniency	 application	 is	 going	 to	 compromise	 the	
defence	of	the	claim;	whether	it	might	result	in	negative	publicity	or	matters	for	which	it	
is	 crucial	 that	 confidentiality	 is	maintained;	what	 the	 chances	of	 a	 leniency	application	
being	 successful	 are;	 and	 what	 risks	 the	 undertaking	 is	 exposed	 to	 if	 it	 makes	 an	
unsuccessful	 application.32	Some	 of	 these	 factors	 applicable	 in	 the	 EU	 context	 will	 be	
dealt	with	in	this	thesis.		














risky	 than	 remaining	 silent.	 This	 awareness	 shared	 by	 all	 cartel	 members	 makes	 a	
common	strategy	of	remaining	silent	perfectly	rational	despite	a	certain	degree	of	mutual	
distrust.33	In	order	to	contravene	such	a	strategy,	a	leniency	programme	should	create	a	
payoff	 structure	where	 the	 subsequent	 confessor	 also	 receives	 leniency.	However,	 the	
highest	 leniency	reward	is	only	granted	to	the	first	confessor.	Knowing	this,	each	cartel	
member	may	distrust	 its	 co-offenders	given	 that	each	has	a	 strong	 incentive	 to	be	 the	
first	 to	 blow	 the	 whistle.34	Leniency	 programmes	 hence	 create	 a	 so-called	 ‘race	 for	
confession’	situation	which	is	triggered	by	distrust.		
The	 rationale	 of	 leniency	 programmes	 is	 to	 stoke	 distrust	 and	 to	 exploit	 the	
nervousness	among	the	cartel	members,	thereby	destabilising	the	cartel	and	increasing	
the	 likelihood	of	having	one	member	defect	 from	 the	 cartel.35	As	will	 be	elaborated	 in	






cartels	 in	 the	 real	 world	 involve	 more	 than	 two	 members.	 The	 higher	 number	 of	
participants	 translates	 into	 greater	 distrust	 within	 the	 cartel.37	Finally,	 as	 will	 be	 dealt	
with	 in	detail	 in	the	next	two	chapters,	certain	factors	might	affect	the	effectiveness	of	









leniency	programmes,	 such	as	 the	severity	of	 fines	and	 the	eligibility	 for	 immunity	 (so-
called	 ‘internal	 factors’)	 or	 private	 actions	 for	 damages	 and	 criminal	 sanctions	 against	
individuals38	(so-called	 ‘external	 factors’	 or	 ‘interface	 issues’39).	 The	 involvement	 of	
authorities	 and	 private	 parties	 in	 other	 jurisdictions	 in	 the	 enforcement	 of	 an	




enforcement.	Nonetheless,	 there	may	also	be	 some	negative	effects.	 The	benefits	 and	
shortcomings	and	their	respective	magnitude	generally	depend	on	the	design	of	a	specific	
leniency	 programme,	 as	will	 be	 seen	 by	 the	 example	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programmes	
established	 under	 the	 three	 versions	 of	 the	 Leniency	 Notice	 in	 this	 chapter	 and	 the	
following.	As	opposed	to	the	previous	section,	the	benefits	of	leniency	expounded	on	in	
this	 section	are	derived	 from	 the	practical	 application	of	 leniency	programmes	 such	as	
the	successful	US	Corporate	Leniency	Program	of	1993.	The	identification	of	the	benefits	
and	shortcomings	of	leniency	from	a	theoretical	perspective	in	this	section	is	relevant	for	




and	 efficiency	 of	 cartel	 enforcement	 and	 can	 thus	 have	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	welfare.	
Penetrating	the	cloak	of	secrecy	and	creating	a	race	for	confession	are	often	described	as	













the	 main	 objectives	 of	 leniency	 programmes.	 Yet,	 such	 descriptions	 are	 in	 fact	 too	
simplistic.	 The	 benefits	 of	 leniency	 programmes	 are	much	more	 profound	 and	 can	 be	
traced	 back	 to	 the	 objectives	 of	 cartel	 enforcement	 stated	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 Leniency	
programmes	can	 in	several	ways	contribute	towards	achieving	and	maintaining	a	more	
effective	 cartel	 enforcement	 system.41	A	 leniency	 programme	 can	 help	 a	 competition	




Cartel	 victims	 are	 often	 not	 aware	 of	 ongoing	 collusions.	 Before	 the	 deployment	 of	
leniency,	 competition	 authorities	 primarily	 gathered	 cartel	 intelligence	 through	market	
monitoring,	 from	 third	 parties	 (such	 as	 disgruntled	 former	 employees),	 and	 through	
surprise	 inspections	 (so-called	 ‘dawn	 raids’)42	and	 requests	 for	 information.43	Screening	
markets	to	detect	collusion	is	however	resource-intensive	and	economic	evidence	alone	
generally	lacks	probative	value	to	convict	cartel	members.44	The	drawback	of	dawn	raids	
is	 that	 authorities	 need	 to	 have	 at	 least	 a	 slight	 suspicion	 about	 the	 infringement.45	
However,	even	with	an	initial	suspicion	it	would	be	a	rather	onerous	task	for	authorities	
to	find	any	relevant	evidence.46	Cartel	members	are	nowadays	typically	aware	of	the	risk	
of	 dawn	 raids	 and	 therefore	 attempt	 to	 produce	 as	 little	 documentary	 evidence	 as	
possible	about	the	cartel	in	the	first	place.		
An	 effective	 leniency	 programme	 will	 enhance	 the	 investigative	 and	 adjudicative	
competences	 of	 a	 competition	 authority.	 The	 prospect	 of	 obtaining	 leniency	 will	
encourage	cartel	members	to	keep	internal	documents	that	may	later	serve	as	evidence.	
Due	to	the	higher	quality	of	evidence	provided	by	the	cartel	insider,	the	authority	will	be	













are	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 successfully	 appealed	 as	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 cartel.48	Higher	
sanctions	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 improvement	 in	 terms	 of	 detection	 and	 prosecution	 will	
consequently	lead	to	greater	deterrence.	This	again	will	render	the	leniency	programme	
even	 more	 effective,	 hence	 creating	 a	 virtuous	 circle.	 The	 more	 effective	 a	 leniency	
programme	 is,	 the	more	 likely	 it	 is	 that	 cartel	members	will	 take	 advantage	 of	 it.49	In	
other	words,	the	success	of	a	leniency	programme	generates	even	more	success.50		
 
This	 virtuous	 circle	 is	 further	 reinforced	 through	 a	 psychological	 component:	 there	
might	be	an	inhibition	threshold	among	undertakings	that	have	formed	a	cartel	(for	many	
years	maybe)	to	blow	the	whistle	on	each	other.51	If,	however,	an	undertaking	has	been	
betrayed	by	 another	undertaking	before	 (in	 a	previous	 cartel),	 it	may	 subsequently	be	
more	inclined	to	blow	the	whistle	on	anyone	else.52	
	 Moreover,	 a	 single	 leniency	 application	 might	 trigger	 subsequent	 applications.	 An	
undertaking,	which	 is	 involved	 in	 several	 cartels,	 has	 to	 decide	whether	 it	 should	 self-




















cartels.	 From	 a	 psychological	 perspective,	 the	 latter	 option	 appears	 to	 be	 more	
favourable.	 If	 that	undertaking	confesses	a	single	 infringement,	 it	might	not	 just	betray	
the	trust	of	the	ones	directly	affected	by	that	particular	leniency	application,	but	also	the	
trust	of	all	its	co-offenders	in	the	other	cartels.	As	soon	as	any	of	these	other	co-offenders	






Besides	 facilitating	 the	detection	and	prosecution	of	 cartels,	 leniency	programmes	also	
have	a	preventative	function.	The	availability	of	leniency	dilutes	the	mutual	trust	among	
potential	cartel	members	which	is	indispensible	for	forming	and	maintaining	cartels.	This	







likelihood	 of	 detection	 due	 to	 leniency,	 is	 clearly	 a	 negative	 factor	 in	 the	 cost-benefit	
analysis	of	the	cartel.54	Secondly,	leniency	alters	the	payoff	structure	of	cheating.	Without	
the	 availability	 of	 leniency,	 a	member	 can	 only	 deviate	 from	 the	 cartel	 arrangements.	
With	the	availability	of	leniency	a	member	can	deviate	from	the	cartel	arrangements	and	









in	 addition	apply	 for	 leniency.	 The	payoff	of	 cheating	 is	 larger	as	 the	deviator	 receives	
leniency	 while	 its	 rivals	 are	 punished.55 	An	 effective	 leniency	 programme	 increases	




The	 clandestine	 operation	 of	 illegal	 collusions	 makes	 cartel	 enforcement	 resource-
intensive	and	costly.	The	use	of	 leniency	programmes	 in	cartel	enforcement	 is	 justified	
because	 it	 is	 the	 most	 effective	 and	 least	 expensive	 mechanism	 for	 detecting	 and	
prosecuting	 cartels.57	Leniency	programmes	cause	cartels	 to	break	down	 faster.	Armed	
with	 the	 confession	 and	 evidence	 from	 the	 leniency	 applicant,	 competition	 authorities	
have	 enough	 leverage	 to	 convince	 other	 cartel	 members	 to	 cooperate	 with	
investigations.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 reduces	 the	 time	 and	 cost	 for	 completing	 investigations.58	




can	use	 the	 resources	 saved	at	 the	 investigative	and	adjudicative	 stages	 to	detect	 and	
























panacea	 for	 curing	 detection	 deficits	 altogether.	 Since	 the	 dark	 figure	 of	 undetected	
collusions	 is	unknown,	 the	detected	cartels	might	 just	be	 the	 tip	of	 the	 iceberg.	 Three	
potential	 risks	 relating	 to	 the	use	of	–	or	exclusive	 reliance	on	–	 leniency	programmes	
have	been	identified.	First,	depending	on	its	design,	a	leniency	programme	can	cause	the	
penalty	 level	to	decrease	and,	 in	certain	circumstances,	even	facilitate	the	creation	and	
maintenance	 of	 cartels.	 Secondly,	 leniency	 programmes	 are	 sometimes	 criticised	 for	
being	 ineffective	 against	 well-organised	 cartels.	 And	 lastly,	 the	 success	 of	 a	 leniency	





a	 cartel	 offender	 escaping	 punishment	 may	 be	 difficult	 to	 reconcile	 with	 retributive	
justice.63	It	is	essential	that	the	aforementioned	positive	effects	of	a	leniency	programme	
outweigh	these	negative	effects	and	that	no	more	 leniency	 is	awarded	than	absolutely	























creation	 and	maintenance	 of	 collusion.65	In	 their	 seminal	 paper,	Motta	 and	 Polo	 have	
demonstrated	that,	by	reducing	the	expected	fines,	leniency	programmes	may	incentivise	
undertakings	to	collude	as	they	decrease	the	potential	costs	of	colluding.66	The	increase	
of	 pro-collusive	 effects	 seems	 to	 be	 problematic	 in	 leniency	 programmes	where	more	
than	one	undertaking	can	qualify	for	leniency.	The	possibility	of	cutting	ones’	losses	even	
if	another	cartelist	has	already	applied	for	leniency	could	stall	a	race	for	confession.	The	
risk	 is	 that	 undertakings	 may	 not	 come	 forward	 if	 they	 know	 that	 a	 substantial	 fine	
reduction	would	still	be	available	later	in	the	hope	that	the	cartel	will	not	collapse	at	all.	
Another	 pitfall,	 contrary	 to	 the	 first,	 but	 equally	 worrying,	 would	 be	 to	 deny	 any	
possibility	for	late	arrivals.	Undertakings	would	be	less	inclined	to	come	forward	as	time	
passes,	 if	 they	 believe	 that	 a	 co-cartelist	 has	 applied	 first.67	In	 leniency	 programmes	
where	only	a	single	undertaking	is	eligible	for	leniency	the	first	risk	does	not	arise.68			
There	are	other	perverse	effects	that	may	be	triggered	by	 leniency.	For	 instance,	an	




undertaking	 could	 use	 the	 retention	 of	 evidence	 as	 a	 means	 to	 enforce	 the	 cartel	




























leniency	 applications).71	Once	 an	 authority	 operates	 a	 successful	 leniency	 programme,	
there	is	the	risk	that	it	may	over-rely	on	that	particular	instrument.72	If	the	authority	does	
not	detect	and	prosecute	cartels	on	its	own	anymore,	it	may	lose	its	capacity	to	do	so,	or	
at	 least	 give	 cartel	 members	 the	 impression	 that	 it	 is	 dependent	 on	 leniency	
applications.73	It	 is	 thus	 advisable	 that	 competition	 authorities	 occasionally	 detect	 and	
punish	 cartels	 without	 the	 help	 of	 leniency.74	In	 light	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 leniency	
programmes,	authorities	have	started	to	supplement	the	use	of	reactive	methods	such	as	
leniency	 programmes	with	 the	 deployment	 of	 screening	 tools.	 A	 screen	 is	 a	 proactive	
approach	to	detecting	cartels	and	uses	statistical	tests	to	identify	industries	for	which	the	















their	 success	 is	arguably	 limited	 to	 cartels	 that	are	 relatively	easy	 to	detect.76	Leniency	
programmes	are	said	to	have	a	higher	detection	rate	when	it	comes	to	cartels	that	are	in	
the	 late	 stages	 of	 their	 life	 cycle,	 whereas	 the	 most	 secretive	 cartels	 tend	 to	 remain	
undetected.77	Experience	has	shown	that	cartel	organisation	is	becoming	more	and	more	
sophisticated,	 and	 cartel	 members	 will	 presumably	 try	 to	 adapt	 their	 organisation	 to	
leniency	policies.78	This	would	obviously	make	 it	more	difficult	 for	authorities	 to	detect	
well-organised	cartels	with	the	help	of	leniency.	On	the	one	hand,	even	without	empirical	
data,	 the	 assumption	 that	 cartels	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 collapse	 are	 more	 prone	 to	 being	
exposed	by	whistleblowing	is	plausible.	A	cartel	is	likely	to	unravel	in	just	a	matter	of	time	
due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 trust	 once	 the	 appraisal	 of	 the	members’	 own	 economic	 situation	
suggests	that	cooperation	is	no	longer	advantageous.79	The	possibility	to	obtain	leniency	
may	serve	as	an	additional	incentive	for	an	undertaking	to	end	its	cartel	participation.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 this	 critique	 fails	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 leniency	 programmes	 not	 only	
detect	 cartels	 but	 also	 discourage	 collusion	 from	 taking	 place.	 Moreover,	 without	















interrelated.	 The	 first	 dilemma	 concerns	 the	 formation	 and	 operation	 of	 a	 cartel.	
Members	of	a	cartel	may	be	tempted	by	the	prospect	of	gaining	profits	at	the	expense	of	
their	 co-offenders	 by	 undercutting	 the	 price	 fixed	 by	 the	 cartel.	 The	 second	 dilemma	
concerns	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 cartel	 as	 a	 result	 of	 leniency	 programmes.	 By	 offering	
cartel	 members	 immunity	 or	 substantial	 leniency,	 competition	 authorities	 attempt	 to	
incentivise	 at	 least	 one	 member	 to	 defect.	 Provided	 these	 incentives	 are	 sufficiently	
attractive,	a	race	for	confession	would	be	sparked	amongst	cartel	members.	Overall,	the	
benefits	of	leniency	outweigh	the	drawbacks,	allowing	competition	authorities	to	achieve	
better	 deterrence,	 detection	 and	 prosecution	 of	 cartels,	 and	 therefore	 render	 cartel	
enforcement	more	efficient.	At	the	same	time,	 leniency	programmes	may	also	increase	
the	level	of	retribution.	There	is	a	higher	likelihood	that	cartels	are	brought	to	light	and	







Following	 the	 success	 of	 the	 revised	 US	 Corporate	 Leniency	 Policy	 in	 1993,	 other	
jurisdictions	 like	 Canada	 and	 the	 EU	 quickly	 followed	 suit	 and	 decided	 to	 incorporate	
leniency	 in	 their	 enforcement	 arsenal.	 Since	 all	 leniency	 programmes	 share	 the	 same	
aims,	their	basic	principles	also	tend	to	be	similar.	Nonetheless,	there	are	some	important	
differences	in	the	details	of	individual	programmes.80		
Even	 before	 the	 formal	 implementation	 of	 the	 first	 Leniency	 Notice	 in	 1996	 the	
Commission	 had	 regularly	 awarded	 reductions	 in	 the	 fine	 to	 cartel	members	 that	 had	
come	forward.	The	leniency	policy	supplemented	the	Commission’s	investigation	powers	
under	Regulation	17/62.	Article	14	of	that	Regulation	enabled	the	Commission	to	conduct	









17/62	 to	 reward	 undertakings	 with	 fine	 reductions	 for	 their	 cooperation	 in	 the	
proceedings.81	In	 French-West	 African	 shipowners’	 committees,	 the	 Commission	 even	
abstained	from	imposing	any	fine	against	four	undertakings	involved	in	the	infringement	
as	they	had	drawn	the	Commission	to	the	anti-competitive	practice.82	The	Commission’s	
informal	 leniency	 practice	 was	 also	 accepted	 by	 the	 Courts.	 In	 Polypropylene,	 the	
Commission	rewarded	ICI	with	a	10%	fine	reduction	for	its	cooperation.	In	the	appeal,	the	
GC	found	that	this	reduction	was	insufficient	in	light	of	ICI’s	highly	detailed	information	




In	 its	 informal	 leniency	 practice	 the	 Commission	 distinguished	 between	 active	 and	
passive	 cooperation.84	Cooperation	 was	 deemed	 to	 be	 active	 when	 an	 undertaking	
voluntarily	 provided	 the	 Commission	 with	 evidence	 and	 thus	 appreciably	 assisted	 the	
latter	 in	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 infringement.	 In	 those	 cases	 undertakings	 could	 get	
substantial	 fine	 reductions.	 The	 GC	 held	 that	 an	 undertaking’s	 proposal	 for	 ending	 a	
procedure	cannot	be	regarded	as	active	cooperation	justifying	a	reduction	in	the	fine.85	
On	the	other	hand,	for	passive	cooperation	to	exist	it	sufficed	that	an	undertaking	did	not	
contest	the	veracity	of	the	Commission’s	allegations	against	 it	 in	the	SO.	 In	such	a	case	
the	Commission	reduced	the	fine	slightly.	An	undertaking’s	waiver	of	a	right	to	bring	an	












The	 gradation	 in	 awarding	 leniency	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 early	 practice	 was	 well	
displayed	 in	 the	 Cartonboard	 decision.87 	The	 two	 cartel	 members	 Stora	 and	 Rena	
admitted	 the	 allegation	 concerning	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	 cartonboard	 cartel	 and	




not	 contest	 the	 essential	 factual	 allegations	 on	 which	 the	 Commission	 based	 its	
statement	of	objection.	The	Commission	rewarded	this	passive	cooperation	by	reducing	
their	 fines	by	one-third.90	The	gradation	 in	 the	reduction	of	 the	 fine	 illustrates	 that	 the	
amount	of	leniency	depended	on	the	extent	to	which	the	cooperation	contributed	to	the	
completion	 or	 expedition	 of	 the	 proceeding. 91 	The	 Commission	 hence	 applied	 the	
principle	of	proportionality	in	awarding	leniency.	
Yet,	 the	 Cartonboard	 decision	 also	 revealed	 the	 difficulties	 in	 operating	 a	 leniency	
policy	that	is	effective	and	fair	at	the	same	time.	First,	the	manner	of	awarding	leniency	
may	 have	 contravened	 the	 notion	 of	 retributive	 justice	 despite	 the	 respect	 for	 the	






even	 forced	 other	 undertakings	 to	 join	 the	 cartel.	 After	 all,	 the	 cartel	would	 not	 have	
existed	but	of	the	actions	of	the	ringleader.	In	practice,	however,	the	identification	of	a	















Commission	 considered	 aggravating	 and	 mitigating	 circumstances.	 The	 role	 as	 a	
ringleader	 was	 treated	 as	 an	 aggravating	 factor.93	Stora’s	 fine	 accordingly	 had	 been	
higher	 than	 for	 a	 cartel	 member	 who	 did	 not	 act	 as	 a	 ringleader	 ceteris	 paribus.	




The	 second	 critical	 aspect	 about	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 practice	 (and	 to	 some	
extent	related	to	the	first)	concerns	the	issue	of	undeserved	leniency.	In	its	decision	the	
Commission	explained	that:	
“[a]lthough	 there	was	 already	 strong	 documentary	 evidence	 to	 prove	 the	 existence	 of	 a	
cartel,	Stora’s	spontaneous	admission	of	the	infringement	and	the	detailed	evidence	which	
it	provided	to	the	Commission	has	contributed	materially	to	the	establishment	of	the	truth,	
reduced	 the	 need	 to	 rely	 upon	 circumstantial	 evidence	 and	 no	 doubt	 influenced	 other	
producers	who	might	otherwise	have	continued	to	deny	all	wrongdoing.	Rena	for	 its	part	
provided	important	documentary	evidence	to	the	Commission	on	a	voluntary	basis.”95	
Given	 that	 the	 Commission	 already	 had	 strong	 documentary	 evidence	 to	 prove	 the	
existence	of	the	cartel	and	the	fact	that	Rena	provided	important	documentary	evidence	
it	can	be	questioned	whether	Stora’s	fine	reduction	was	too	generous.	Lenient	treatment	
without	 a	 sufficient	basis	 threatens	 to	undermine	 the	destabilising	effect	of	 a	 leniency	
policy.96	Awarding	 fine	 reductions	 in	 exchange	 for	 insignificant	 evidence	would	 reduce	
the	overall	level	of	deterrence	and	thus	the	effectiveness	of	the	leniency	policy.	In	Stora’s	
case	 the	 evidence	 it	 provided	 was	 not	 necessary	 to	 prove	 the	 existence	 of	 the	
cartonboard	cartel	since	the	Commission	already	gathered	enough	information	on	that.	











fair	 to	 grant	 Stora	 leniency	 but	 it	 was	 probably	 effective.	 The	 relevance	 of	 Rena’s	
evidence	was	likely	to	affirm	Stora’s	information.	If	anything,	the	fact	that	Rena	obtained	
the	same	degree	of	 leniency	could	be	questioned.	Offering	the	highest	reward	to	more	
than	 just	 the	 first	 undertaking	 to	 come	 forward	 does	 not	 create	 as	much	distrust	 and	
urgency	to	confess	as	in	a	situation	where	only	the	first-in	can	obtain	the	highest	reward.	
Before	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 first	 Leniency	 Notice,	 the	 significance	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 leniency	 practice	 was	 clearly	 an	 ex	 post	 instrument	 to	 expedite	 the	




purposes	 of	 experimenting	 as	 well	 as	 codifying	 the	 Commission’s	 informal	 leniency	
practice.98	The	 Commission	 acknowledged	 that	 undertakings	 shied	 away	 from	 blowing	
the	whistle	due	to	imminent	fines	and	that	they	could	only	be	encouraged	to	apply	for	
leniency	by	providing	more	legal	certainty.99	The	Notice	was	modelled	on	the	successful	
US	 and	 Canadian	 leniency	 policies,	 but	 was	 adjusted	 to	 suit	 the	 specific	 European	
situation.100	
 Content	1.











In	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	Notice	 (Section	 A)	 the	 Commission	 explicitly	 states	 that	 the	
interest	of	consumers	in	having	cartels	detected	and	punished	outweighs	the	interest	in	
fining	 those	undertakings	which	cooperate	with	 the	Commission.101	The	material	 scope	
was	limited	to	‘secret	cartels’	between	undertakings	aimed	at	fixing	prices,	production	or	
sales	quotas,	 sharing	markets	or	banning	 imports	or	exports,	 (i.e.	hard	core	cartels).102	
The	leniency	policy	was	restricted	to	these	types	of	cartels	as	they	are	amongst	the	most	
serious	restrictions	of	competition	and	particularly	harmful	to	consumer	welfare.	Section	
E	 of	 the	 Notice	 contained	 two	 additional	 limitations.	 First,	 the	 personal	 scope	 of	 the	
Notice	 was	 clearly	 limited	 to	 undertakings,	 and	 did	 not	 cover	 individuals.103	Secondly,	







(Section	B).	 In	 addition	 to	 this	main	 condition,	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 also	 had	 to	 fulfil	
three	other	cumulative	conditions.	The	undertaking	had	to	cease	its	 involvement	in	the	
cartel,	as	well	as	provide	the	Commission	with	all	the	relevant	information	and	maintain	





leniency	 it	 could	qualify	 for	 the	 third	degree	of	 leniency	 that	consisted	of	a	 ‘significant	
reduction’	 of	 10-50%	 (Section	 D).	 This	 reduction	 was	 available	 in	 two	 situations.	 The	
undertaking	 had	 to	 provide	 the	 Commission	 with	 evidence	 that	 could	 materially	
contribute	to	establishing	the	existence	of	the	cartel	before	the	statement	of	objections	








had	 been	 sent	 to	 the	 undertaking.	 Alternatively,	 if	 the	 statement	 of	 objections	 had	








failed	 to	meet	 any	 of	 the	 conditions	 stipulated	 in	 Sections	 B	 or	 C	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	









too	 much	 undeserved	 leniency.	 Hence,	 the	 Commission	 introduced	 many	 changes	 in	
terms	 of	 the	 temporal	 and	 qualitative	 requirements	 to	 obtain	 immunity	 or	 fine	
reductions	 vis-à-vis	 its	 informal	 leniency	 practice.	 In	 order	 to	 qualify	 for	 immunity,	 an	
undertaking	 had	 to	 blow	 the	 whistle	 before	 the	 commencement	 of	 a	 Commission	
investigation	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 cartel	 in	 question.	 The	 high	 threshold	 for	 obtaining	
immunity	 diminished	 the	 incentives	 for	 potential	 whistleblowers	 resulting	 in	 a	 sub-
optimal	level	of	deterrence.	A	more	detailed	assessment	of	the	incentives	will	be	done	in	
Section	IV.A.	below.	






The	 principle	 of	 proportionality	 requires	 that	 regulatory	 action	 strives	 for	 a	 legitimate	





on	 the	 individual	 that	 is	 excessive	 in	 relation	 to	 its	 objective.109	The	 objective	 of	 the	
Leniency	 Notice	 was	 to	 enhance	 the	 detection	 and	 general	 deterrence	 of	 hard	 core	
cartels.110	The	 Commission	 is	 entrusted	 with	 the	 detection	 and	 punishment	 of	 illegal	
collusions	as	part	of	the	aims	of	the	EU	stipulated	under	Article	3	TEU	and	Protocol	No	27	




success	 of	 the	 US	 Corporate	 Leniency	 Policy	 confirms	 this	 as	 well.	 The	 leniency	




prerequisites	 of	 threat	 of	 sanctions,	 high	 risk	 of	 detection,	 and	 transparency	 and	 legal	
certainty,	 as	well	 as	 external	 factors.112	Provided	 that	 these	 factors	do	not	 significantly	
impair	the	effectiveness,	there	is	little	reason	to	question	the	suitability	of	leniency.113		











	 The	 1996	 Notice	 also	 met	 the	 necessity	 requirement	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 less	
restrictive	alternatives.114	Without	the	existence	of	the	EU	Leniency	Notice	more	cartels	
in	Europe	would	probably	have	gone	undetected	 forever.	The	Commission	would	have	
had	 to	 rely	 on	 its	 inspection	 powers	 under	 Regulation	 17/62115 	as	 well	 as	 market	
monitoring.	The	main	advantage	of	all	these	instruments	over	the	leniency	programme	is	
in	terms	of	retribution,	as	they	do	not	result	in	the	lowering	of	the	penalty	level.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 these	 instruments	 besides	 lacking	 deterrence	 are	 also	 very	 resource-
intensive	 and	 require	 the	 Commission	 to	 have	 at	 least	 a	 suspicion	 of	 an	 ongoing	
collusion.116	None	 of	 these	 instruments	 was	 as	 effective	 and	 efficient	 as	 the	 leniency	





by	 a	measure	 are	 proportional	 to	 its	 objective.	 This	 proportionality	 assessment	 in	 the	
narrow	sense,	which	is	touched	upon	in	Section	IV.A.	of	this	chapter,	is	deemed	to	be	the	





treated	 unequally,	 unless	 there	 is	 an	 objective	 justification.	 Several	 cases	 in	which	 the	
1996	 Notice	 was	 applied	 were	 subject	 to	 appeal	 before	 the	 GC	 due	 to	 alleged	












Notice,	 the	 Courts	 held	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 leniency	 practice	 complied	 with	 the	




Two	 main	 instances	 of	 unequal	 treatment	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 application	 of	 the	
Leniency	 Notice	 arise.120	First,	 leniency	 applicants	 are	 treated	 differently	 compared	 to	
those	undertakings	 that	do	not	cooperate	with	the	Commission.121	Although	a	 leniency	
applicant	was	a	party	to	the	same	anti-competitive	agreement	as	its	co-offenders,	it	still	
might	 end	 up	with	 a	 significant	 fine	 reduction	 or	 even	 immunity.	 The	 Leniency	Notice	











sufficiently	 high	 financial	 reward.	 Those	 cartel	 members	 that	 cooperate	 with	 the	



















penalty	 reduction	 awardable	 under	 the	 leniency	 programme	 as	 it	 makes	 the	 most	
significant	 contribution	 to	 cartel	 enforcement.	Without	 its	 confession	 the	 cartel	would	





members	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 additional	 information	 which	 may	 help	 to	 expedite	 the	
prosecution	 of	 the	 cartel.127	Offering	 discounts	 based	 on	 the	 order	 of	 application	 or	
degree	of	cooperation	 is	a	necessary	measure	 to	 institute	a	 race	among	the	remaining	
cartel	members.		
c. Shortcomings	of	the	1996	Leniency	Notice		
Apart	 from	 the	 insufficiency	 of	 incentives	 for	 potential	 immunity	 applicants	 the	 1996	
Notice	 exposed	 potential	 applicants	 to	 a	 great	 deal	 legal	 uncertainty.128	There	was	 no	
guarantee	 of	 automatic	 immunity,	 even	 if	 an	 undertaking	 was	 the	 first	 to	 blow	 the	
whistle.129	Practice	showed	that	it	was	not	enough	for	an	undertaking	to	blow	the	whistle	
before	an	 investigation	had	been	 initiated,	but	 the	cooperation	also	had	 to	be	entirely	
spontaneous,	i.e.	before	the	Commission	had	sent	out	requests	for	information.130	In	the	
majority	of	 cases,	 the	 first	undertaking	 to	 confess	only	 received	a	very	 substantial	 fine	














reduction	 instead	 of	 immunity.	 In	 principle,	 a	 cartelist	 is	 much	 less	 likely	 to	 blow	 the	
whistle	and	thereby	forego	cartel	profits	(as	well	as	exposing	itself	to	private	liability)	if	it	
is	unsure	whether	or	not	it	will	actually	receive	immunity.131	Moreover,	the	1996	Notice	
contained	 only	 sparse	 explanations	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 procedure	 to	 assess	 leniency	
applications.132	There	 was	 no	 certainty	 for	 undertakings	 about	 the	 outcome	 of	 their	
leniency	 application	 until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 administrative	 procedure.133	Also	 the	 term	
‘decisive	evidence’	was	unclear	and	rather	subjective.134	Another	problem,	which	will	be	
addressed	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 was	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 fines	
lacked	severity	and	foreseeability.135	In	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century,	the	level	of	fines	
clearly	started	to	pick	up.	However,	the	Commission’s	fining	procedure	suffered	from	a	
lack	 of	 transparency	 in	 the	 calculation	 of	 fines.	 The	 cumulative	 effect	 of	 a	 lack	 of	




which	 the	Notice	was	 in	 force	 the	Commission	 received	188	applications.136	Only	 three	
undertakings	received	immunity137	and	two	others	received	a	very	substantial	reduction	
of	their	fines.138	These	awards	at	the	higher	end	of	the	scale	were	awarded	towards	the	


























activity	and	 that	 the	1996	Notice	had	been	a	decisive	contributor	 to	 this	 success.141	At	
first	 sight,	 the	 relatively	high	number	of	 cartel	decisions	and	 the	 total	 amount	of	 fines	
suggests	that	this	was	indeed	the	case.	However,	one	has	to	take	into	account	that	the	
majority	of	 leniency	 applications	were	derivative	 cases.142	In	 an	empirical	 study	on	 the	
early	leniency	notices,	Stephan	argues	that	where	cartels	were	uncovered	first	in	the	US	
either	by	investigations	or	through	the	corporate	leniency	policy,	applications	under	the	
1996	 Notice	 were	 a	 ‘natural	 consequence’.	 Even	 in	 the	 case	 of	 US	 –	 EU	 parallel	
investigations,	it	was	the	US	enforcement	activities	that	will	have	played	the	lead	role	in	
inducing	 cartel	members	 to	 cooperate	 since	 the	 incentives	 to	 apply	 for	 leniency	 have	
been	much	greater	in	the	US	than	in	the	EU.143	Stephan	also	claims	that	almost	half	of	the	
cartels	revealed	through	the	1996	Notice	concerned	closely	related	infringements	in	the	
chemicals	 industry,	 and	 that	 all	 these	 cases	 leniency	 applications	were	made	after	 the	



















In	 attempting	 to	 avoid	 the	 mistake	 committed	 in	 the	 pre-1996	 practice	 of	 awarding	
leniency	too	generously,146	the	1996	Notice	set	the	threshold	for	obtaining	immunity	so	
high	 that	 it	 eventually	 proved	 to	 deter	 potential	 applicants.	 In	 addition,	 the	 Leniency	
Notice	 exposed	 applicants	 to	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 legal	 uncertainty.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	






in	 fining	 those	 enterprises	which	 cooperate	with	 the	 Commission,	 thereby	 enabling	 or	
helping	 it	 to	detect	and	prohibit	a	cartel.”147	A	challenging	task	 is	 to	balance	the	public	
interest	 in	 detecting	 and	 sanctioning	 the	 anti-competitive	 violation	 with	 the	 overall	
impact	 on	 cartel	 enforcement	 and	 the	 treatment	 and	 consequences	 for	 the	 parties	
involved.	 Jephcott	 submits	 that	 “the	 more	 successful	 such	 a	 leniency	 programme	 is	
practiced,	the	less	those	concerns	about	the	erosion	of	the	benefit	of	doubt	as	a	general	
principle	 of	 law,	 and	 indeed	 those	 about	 the	 morality	 of	 competition	 authorities	
cooperating	with	offenders	will	be	entertained	in	the	relevant	communities.”148	Thus,	in	
order	to	safeguard	the	legitimacy	of	the	EU	leniency	programme,	the	programme	must	
not	only	 be	effective	but	 the	 achievement	of	 effectiveness	must	 also	not	 come	at	 the	
expense	of	substantive	and	procedural	fairness.	As	explained	at	the	outset	of	this	thesis,	

















the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 leniency	 programme	 is	 associated	 with	 deterrence,	 while	 the	
substantive	fairness	 is	expressed	 in	terms	of	retribution.	The	procedural	 fairness	of	 the	
leniency	programme	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 impact	 it	 has	on	 the	 fundamental	 rights	of	
parties	 affected	 by	 it.	 In	 this	 chapter	 and	 the	 following,	 the	 parties	 affected	 by	 the	
leniency	programme	are	cooperating	(i.e.	recipients	of	immunity	and	reductions	of	fines)	
and	 non-cooperating	 cartel	members	 (i.e.	 incriminated	 undertakings).	 The	 last	 chapter	
discusses	the	potential	adverse	effect	of	 leniency	on	cartel	victims	(i.e.	third	parties).	 In	
analysing	the	impact	of	the	EU	leniency	programme	on	cooperating	and	non-cooperating	
cartel	 members,	 the	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 public	 interest	 of	 having	 effective	 cartel	





to	 distort	 competition.	 Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 justifiable	 to	 prioritise	 the	 interest	 of	 having	
more	effective	detection	over	the	interest	of	imposing	sanctions.	Leniency	programmes	
enhance	 detection	 and	 allow	 competition	 authorities	 to	 detect	 and	 subsequently	
prosecute	and	punish	cartels	in	the	first	place.150	Thus,	the	public	interest	in	sanctioning	
cartels	 is	 contingent	 on	 the	 detection	 of	 cartels.	 An	 effective	 leniency	 programme	
requires	 that	 potential	 leniency	 applicants,	 besides	 legal	 certainty,	 also	 need	 sufficient	
incentives	 in	 order	 to	 come	 forward.	 However,	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 deterrence	 and	
retribution	 it	 is	 important	 that	 the	penalty	 level	 is	not	 reduced	disproportionately.	The	
incentives	may	 produce	 competitive	 disadvantages	 for	 those	 undertakings	 that	 do	 not	
benefit	 from	the	 leniency	programme	relatively	 to	others.	Those	might	be,	on	 the	one	
hand,	undertakings	that	did	not	participate	 in	 the	cartel	but	suffer	 from	a	distortion	of	
competition	 given	 that	 a	 cartelist,	 who	 gained	 supra-competitive	 profits,	 has	 its	 fine	
lowered	or	even	waived	and,151	on	 the	other	hand,	undertakings	 involved	 in	 the	cartel	









procedural	 fairness.	 Companies	 (or	 rather	 their	 corporate	 actors)	 are	 generally	 risk-
averse.	For	a	leniency	programme	to	be	successful,	potential	applicants	not	only	need	to	
be	 offered	 adequate	 incentives	 to	 come	 forward	 but	 they	 also	 require	 certainty	 as	 to	
their	 legal	 protection.	 Any	 risk	 of	 a	 fundamental	 rights	 transgression	 might	 therefore	
discourage	 cartel	 members	 from	 blowing	 the	 whistle	 and	 therefore	 diminish	 the	





and	 retribution,	 as	well	 as	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 protection	 of	 cooperating	 and	 non-
cooperating	 cartel	 members.	 The	 provisions	 in	 1996	 leniency	 programme	 serve	 as	
benchmark	for	evaluating	its	reform	in	2002	and	2006	as	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.		





functions	 of	 cartel	 sanctions.	 The	 adverse	 effect	 on	 deterrence	 is	 that	 the	 award	 of	
immunity	 and	 penalty	 reductions	 lowers	 the	 overall	 deterrence	 level	 (or	 ‘net	
deterrence’),153	whereas	 the	 negative	 impact	 on	 retribution	 is	 that	 an	 otherwise	 guilty	
undertaking	escapes	punishment	despite	 its	 involvement	 in	the	cartel.	 In	designing	and	
applying	a	leniency	programme,	it	is	important	that	immunity	and	penalty	reductions	are	






not	 awarded	 too	 generously.	 The	 deterrence	 level	 prior	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 leniency	
programme	 instituted	 through	 high	 sanctions	 and	 a	 high	 risk	 of	 detection	 and	
prosecution	 may	 not	 be	 unreasonably	 lowered.	 In	 order	 to	 benefit	 from	 a	 leniency	
programme,	 the	 ‘net	 deterrence’154	as	 a	 result	 of	 its	 adoption	 must	 remain	 at	 least	






is	 difficult.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 authority	 should	 not	 award	 more	 leniency	 than	 an	
applicant	actually	deserves	for	its	cooperation.	On	the	other	hand,	the	potential	benefit	
of	 applying	 for	 leniency	 should	 be	 attractive	 enough	 to	 persuade	 cartel	 members	 to	
cooperate	with	the	authority.156	Much	to	the	detriment	of	effectiveness,	the	drafters	of	
the	1996	Notice	opted	 to	 set	 the	 threshold	 for	obtaining	 immunity	 rather	high	and	 to	




The	 most	 striking	 feature	 of	 the	 leniency	 programme	 established	 under	 the	 1996	
Notice,	other	than	the	lack	of	automatic	immunity	that	distinguished	the	EU	programme	
from	 the	 successful	US	Corporate	 Leniency	Policy,	was	 the	number	of	 eligible	 leniency	
recipients.	 In	the	US	 leniency	programme	only	the	first	confessor	can	receive	 immunity	
while	 all	 subsequent	 leniency	 applicants	 go	 away	 empty-handed.	 The	 EU	 leniency	
programme,	on	the	other	hand,	until	today	continues	to	grant	leniency	to	more	than	one	











applicants	 can	 at	 least	 qualify	 for	 fine	 reductions.	 The	 degree	 of	 the	 fine	 reduction	
depends	on	the	undertaking’s	rank	in	the	race	for	leniency	and	its	level	of	cooperation.	





give	out	more	 leniency	 than	 to	one	undertaking.	The	penalty	 level	 is	not	 superfluously	
reduced.159	This	leniency	model	also	comes	closer	to	the	traditional	Prisoner’s	Dilemma.	
Since	 the	 competition	 authority	 only	 rewards	 one	 undertaking,	 more	 deterrence	 is	
instigated	and	the	race	to	the	door	leads	to	faster	break-ups	of	cartels.	It	may	be	argued	
that	 to	 some	 extent	 plea	 bargains	 can	 reward	 those	 undertakings	 that	 were	 not	
successful	in	applying	for	immunity	and	that	therefore	subsequent	applicants	are	indeed	
rewarded.	 However,	 unlike	 under	 a	 leniency	 programme	 where	 fine	 reductions	 are	
expressly	stipulated	and	therefore	create	legal	certainty,	plea	bargains	are	entirely	at	the	
discretion	 of	 the	 prosecutor.	 Both	 the	 purpose	 and	 procedure	 of	 plea	 bargaining	 are	
different	from	leniency.				
The	 leniency	 model	 opted	 by	 the	 EU	 is	 nonetheless	 not	 entirely	 unwarranted.	 A	




applicant	 and	a	 fine	 reduction	 for	one	 subsequent	 applicant	 appears	 to	be	 justified.160	
Moreover,	 in	consideration	of	the	lack	of	safeguards	in	the	EU	cartel	procedure	against	
false	or	misleading	leniency	statements	the	granting	of	leniency	to	a	second	applicant	is	










justified.	 However,	 offering	 leniency	 to	 any	 subsequent	 applicant	 leads	 to	 further	
reductions	of	the	penalty	level	is	more	difficult	to	justify.		
In	general,	a	penalty	reduction	only	seems	to	be	acceptable	 if	a	 leniency	applicant’s	
cooperation	 effectively	 advances	 an	 ongoing	 investigation.	 Under	 the	 1996	 Notice	 all	
subsequent	undertakings	could	obtain	a	 ‘significant	reduction’	of	10-50%.	Compared	to	
the	high	threshold	for	immunity,	the	possibility	of	getting	a	reduction	of	50%	seemed	to	
be	 disproportionate	 and	 therefore	 unfair.	 A	 first	 confession	 is	 undoubtedly	 the	 most	
crucial	element	in	unravelling	a	cartel.	Accordingly	the	threshold	for	obtaining	immunity	
should	 be	 relatively	 low.	 The	 threshold	 for	 all	 subsequent	 awards,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
must	be	higher	 in	order	 to	 avoid	 that	 leniency	 is	 given	out	 too	easily.	 Similar	 criticism	
applies	 to	 the	nolo	contendere	provision161.	Under	 this	provision,	an	undertaking	could	
obtain	a	10%	fine	reduction	for	not	objecting	to	the	facts	outlined	in	the	SO.	This	lenient	
treatment	was	excessively	 generous	 considering	 that	 the	non-contestation	of	 the	 facts	
had	 no	 effect	 on	 establishing	 or	 terminating	 the	 infringement.162	The	 nolo	 contendere	
provision	thus	unnecessarily	lowered	the	level	of	deterrence	and	retribution.	Overall,	the	




one	 hand	 creates	 deterrence	 by	 relying	 on	 legal	 presumptions	 that	 facilitate	 the	 legal	
qualification	 of	 cartel	 infringements	 and	 imposing	 heavy	 fines	 but	 on	 the	 other	 hand	
guarantees	 defendants	 the	 protection	 of	 their	 fundamental	 rights.	 Despite	 the	
compliance	with	the	provisions	in	Article	6	ECHR	it	has	shown	that	better	compliance	is	
possible	and	desirable	in	terms	of	the	oral	hearings.	Even	though	the	broad	interpretation	
of	 Article	 101	 TFEU	 and	 the	 treatment	 of	 cartels	 as	 restrictions	 by	 object	 increases	
deterrence	 and	 adds	 to	 the	 pressure	 for	 undertakings	 to	 apply	 for	 leniency,	 the	






safeguards	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 burden	 and	 standard	 of	 proof	 are	 sufficiently	 high.163	This	
section	 focuses	 on	 certain	 fundamental	 rights	 that	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 EU	 leniency	
programme	in	the	preliminary	investigation	stage.	
The	use	of	leniency	in	cartel	enforcement	has	had	a	dramatic	impact	on	the	strategic	
decisions	 that	 undertakings	 need	 to	 consider	 when	 they	 face	 investigations.	 Leniency	
programmes	have	urged	undertakings	and	their	 legal	advisors	to	rethink	the	traditional	
legal	 strategy	 of	 systematically	 disputing	 the	 allegations	 of	 collusion	 by	 competition	
authorities.164	The	 EU	 leniency	 programme	has	 a	 significant	 influence	on	undertakings’	
defence	strategies	but	potentially	also	on	their	right	of	defence.	One	of	the	questions	that	
have	surrounded	the	EU	Leniency	Notice	since	its	adoption	is	whether	filing	for	leniency	
implies	 the	 admission	of	 guilt	 on	 the	part	 of	 the	 leniency	 applicant.	 If	 it	 did,	 then	 this	
would	have	serious	implications	for	the	right	of	defence,	not	just	of	the	leniency	applicant	
itself,	but	also	for	the	incriminated	cartel	members.165	On	the	one	hand,	both	the	burden	
and	 the	 standard	 of	 proof	 for	 finding	 a	 cartel	 infringement	 would	 be	 significantly	
lightened	 if	 the	 Commission	 were	 to	 rely	 more	 heavily	 on	 leniency	 applications	 to	
investigate	cartel	activities.	On	the	other	hand,	there	would	be,	from	the	very	beginning	




Already	 before	 the	 1996	 Notice	 had	 entered	 into	 force,	 the	 CJ	 had	 to	 rule	 on	 the	
compatibility	of	the	Commission’s	informal	leniency	practice	with	the	fundamental	rights.	
It	 has	 frequently	 been	 argued	 that	 there	 are	 potential	 conflicts	 between	 the	 Leniency	
Notice	 and	 the	 right	 of	 defence	 in	 Article	 6	 ECHR	 (and	 Article	 47	 CFR).	 This	 section	
concerns	 the	 right	 of	 defence	 of	 leniency	 recipients	 and	 incriminated	 cartel	members,	
whereas	Chapter	4	 looks	at	 cartel	victims’	 right	 to	an	effective	 remedy.	 It	 is	 submitted	










here	 that	 the	 rights	of	defence	of	 leniency	 recipients	and	 incriminated	cartel	members	
have	 been	 potentially	 affected	 in	 different	 ways	 since	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 Leniency	
Notice.	 Different	 corollaries	 of	 that	 right	 are	 at	 stake	 depending	 on	 whether	 the	
undertaking	concerned	is	a	cooperating	or	non-cooperating	cartelist.		
 Compatibility	with	the	privilege	against	self-incrimination		1.
This	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination	 stems	 from	 the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 and	
constitutes	a	substantial	element	of	 the	right	of	defence.167	It	 sets	out	 that	no	accused	
must	be	forced	to	provide	evidence	against	himself.	It	aims	to	protect	defendants	against	
improper	 compulsion	by	 the	prosecution	 and	 ensures	 that	 the	 latter	 seek	 to	 prove	 its	
case	against	 the	defendant.	The	privilege	against	 self-incrimination	 is	 recognised	under	
both	 ECHR	 and	 EU	 competition	 law	 but	 notably	 subject	 to	 different	 standards	 under	
those	legal	orders.	The	scope	of	protection	attributed	to	the	privilege	is	essential	to	the	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 competition	 authorities’	 power	 of	 inquiry,	 as	 an	 overprotective	
application	 for	 instance	 could	 considerably	 limit	 the	 possibility	 of	 interrogating	 key	
witnesses	 and	 accessing	 important	 evidence. 168 	The	 privilege	 is	 arguably	 adversely	
affected	by	the	leniency	procedure	and	threatens	to	put	potential	leniency	applicants	at	a	
disadvantage	vis-à-vis	non-cooperating	cartel	members.	
a. Interpretation	 of	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 ECHR	 legal	
order	
The	principle	against	 self-incrimination	 is	not	expressly	 stipulated	 in	 the	Convention	or	
the	 Charter.	 It	 was	 also	 omitted	 in	 Regulation	 17/62.169	The	 absence	 of	 any	 explicit	
reference	 in	 either	 framework	may	explain	why	 this	 principle	 applies	only	 to	 a	 limited	
















and	 the	 ECtHR	 in	 the	 criminal	 law	 context,	which	 ultimately	might	 have	 an	 impact	 on	
undertakings’	right	of	defence	in	competition	proceedings.		
i. The	privilege	against	self-incrimination	in	the	EU	legal	order	
The	CJ	established	 the	privilege	against	 self-incrimination	 in	Orkem.171	In	 this	appeal	of	
the	Polyethylene	decision,	the	Court	held	that:	
“whilst	 the	Commission	 is	entitled	 […]	 to	compel	an	undertaking	to	provide	all	necessary	
information	concerning	such	facts	as	may	be	known	to	it	and	to	disclose	to	it,	if	necessary,	
such	documents	relating	thereto	as	are	in	its	possession,	even	if	the	latter	may	be	used	to	
establish,	 against	 it	 or	 another	undertaking,	 the	existence	of	 anti-competitive	 conduct,	 it	
may	not,	by	means	of	a	decision	calling	for	information,	undermine	the	rights	of	defence	of	
the	undertakings	concerned”	[and	therefore]	“may	not	compel	an	undertaking	to	provide	it	
with	 answers	 which	 might	 involve	 an	 admission	 on	 its	 part	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 an	
infringement	which	it	is	incumbent	upon	the	Commission	to	prove.”172	
It	 follows	 from	this	 that	 the	Commission	may	not	 induce	undertakings	 to	engage	 in	
‘direct	 incrimination’	 by	 asking	 ‘leading	 questions’,	 i.e.	 questions	 that	 could	 only	 be	
reasonably	 answered	 by	 implying	 an	 admission.173	The	 Commission’s	 questioning	must	
be	 limited	 to	 factual	 questions.	 It	 may	 also	 not	 request	 the	 undertaking	 to	 produce	
documents	to	which	it	would	otherwise	have	had	no	access.174		
Despite	the	developments	in	ECtHR	case-law	in	the	aftermath	of	Orkem,	the	CJ	did	not	
reconsider	 its	position.	 In	Mannesmannröhren-Werke,175	the	GC	 followed	the	 judgment	
in	 Orkem.	 The	 Court	 reasoned	 that	 although	 the	 right	 of	 defence	 should	 not	 be	
irremediably	 impaired	 during	 the	 preliminary	 investigation	 procedures,	 undertakings	













have	 no	 right	 to	 evade	 the	 Commission’s	 investigation. 176 	The	 Court	 stated	 that	
acknowledging		
“the	 existence	of	 an	 absolute	 right	 to	 silence	 […]	would	 go	beyond	what	 is	 necessary	 in	
order	to	preserve	the	rights	of	defence	of	undertakings,	and	would	constitute	an	unjustified	
hindrance	 to	 the	 Commission's	 performance	 of	 its	 duty	 […]	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 rules	 on	
competition	within	the	common	market	are	observed.”177	
An	undertaking	 therefore	has	a	 right	 to	silence	“only	 to	 the	extent	 that	 it	would	be	
compelled	 to	 provide	 answers	 which	 might	 involve	 an	 admission	 on	 its	 part	 of	 the	
existence	of	an	 infringement	which	 it	 is	 incumbent	upon	 the	Commission	 to	prove.”178	
The	 decision	was	 criticised	 as	 the	 GC,	 by	 confirming	 the	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 the	
privilege	against	self-incrimination	only	confined	the	Commission’s	 investigative	powers	
to	 leading	 questions,	 thus	 falling	 short	 of	 affording	 undertakings	 an	 effective	 right	 of	
defence.179	In	PVC	 II,180,	 the	 CJ	 took	 into	 account	 its	 decision	 in	Orkem	 as	well	 as	 the	
ECtHR’s	 judgments	 in	 Funke, 181 ,	 Saunders 182 	and	 JB 183 	when	 it	 elaborated	 on	 the	
conditions	that	need	to	be	established	to	prove	an	infringement	of	the	privilege	against	
























autonomous	meaning	 of	 Article	 6	 ECHR.186	In	Funke,	 the	 applicant	 complained	 that	 by	
ordering	 production	 of	 documents	 on	 pain	 of	 criminal	 sanctions,	 the	 French	 customs	




authorities	 secured	Mr	 Funke’s	 conviction	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 certain	 documents	which	
they	could	not	obtain	by	other	means	and	therefore	attempted	to	compel	the	applicant	





of	 material	 which	 may	 be	 obtained	 from	 the	 accused	 through	 the	 use	 of	 compulsory	
powers	but	which	has	an	existence	independent	of	the	will	of	the	suspect	such	as,	inter	alia,	
documents	 acquired	pursuant	 to	 a	warrant,	 breath,	 blood	 and	urine	 samples	 and	bodily	
tissue	for	the	purpose	of	DNA	testing.”189	

















In	 summary,	 both	 the	 CJ	 and	 the	 ECtHR	 have	 found	 that	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-
incrimination	protects	the	accused	from	having	to	provide	evidence	and	information	that	
has	 been	 obtained	 through	 coercion	 and	 is	 subsequently	 used	 against	 the	 accused.	
However,	 the	 ECtHR	 imposes	wider	 protection	 to	 the	 notion	 against	 self-incrimination	
than	 the	 CJ.191	Pursuant	 to	 the	 case-law	 of	 the	 ECtHR,	 the	 protection	 from	 forced	
disclosure	 extends	 to	 all	 evidence	 originating	 from	 the	 accused	 and	 obtained	 through	
compulsive	interrogation	methods,	but	not	to	evidence	that	exists	independently	of	the	





the	 competition	 rules,	 with	 the	 only	 exception	 of	 answers	 to	 questions	 which	 could	
potentially	 involve	 an	 admission	 of	 responsibility	 for	 an	 infringement	 which	 is	 for	 the	
Commission	 to	 prove.192	A	 wider	 application	 of	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination	
might	overly	restrict	the	Commission’s	investigative	powers.	
	 Supporters	of	the	narrow	interpretation	of	the	privilege	in	Orkem	argue	that	the	right	
to	 access	 to	 justice	 is	 not	 absolute	 and	 may	 be	 limited	 to	 pursue	 legitimate	 aims,	
provided	 that	 the	 limitation	does	not	 reduce	 the	access	 left	 to	 the	 individual	 in	 such	a	
way	 or	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 the	 very	 essence	 of	 the	 right	 is	 impaired,	 and	 is	
proportional	 to	 the	objective	sought.193	A	similar	view	seems	to	have	been	adopted	by	
the	GC	 in	Mannesmannröhren-Werke	 in	 limiting	 the	scope	of	 the	privilege	against	 self-
incrimination	 to	 safeguard	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 investigations.	 The	
effective	enforcement	of	the	competition	rules	can	be	considered	to	be	a	legitimate	aim	
also	within	the	meaning	of	the	Convention.	Yet,	it	might	be	more	difficult	to	argue	that	
the	 limitation	 is	 proportional.194	In	 light	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 case-law,	 the	 public	 interest	 in	












“Mannesmannröhren-Werke	 could	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 signal	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 [EU]	
Courts’	interpretations	of	certain	rights	in	competition	proceedings	did	not	have	to	coincide	
exactly	with	 those	of	 the	ECtHR	when	the	 latter	deals	with	criminal	procedures	 involving	
natural	persons.”196		
Such	a	solution	might	indeed	be	consistent	with	the	more	lenient	standard	of	review	
adopted	by	the	ECtHR	with	respect	 to	commercial	matters	 involving	 legal	persons.197	It	
can	thus	be	concluded	that	the	narrow	scope	of	 the	privilege	against	self-incrimination	
against	 legal	 persons	 in	 competition	 proceedings	 could	 be	 viewed	 as	 legitimate	
interference	with	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 promoting	
the	economic	welfare	of	the	EU,	and	therefore	may	be	reconciled	with	the	Convention.198	
b. Assessment	of	the	Leniency	Notice	under	ECHR	standards	
Irrespective	 of	 whether	 the	 CJ’s	 narrow	 interpretation	 of	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-
incrimination	can	be	reconciled	with	the	broader	interpretation	by	the	ECtHR,	this	section	
shall	 analyse	 whether	 the	 Leniency	 Notice	 is	 compatible	 with	 this	 broader	
interpretation.199	For	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis,	 as	 established	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 the	 ECHR	
standard	of	protection	is	used	as	a	proxy	for	procedural	fairness.		
In	 applying	 the	 Jalloh	 factors	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 privilege	
against	 self-incrimination	 is	 breached,	 the	 ECtHR	 focuses	 on	 the	 nature	 and	 degree	 of	
compulsion	used	to	obtain	evidence.200	From	the	outset,	it	should	be	pointed	out	that	the	
Commission	 imposes	 a	 certain	 type	 of	 ‘compulsion’	 on	 addressees	 of	 requests	 for	
information	since	undertakings	can	be	sanctioned	if	they	remain	silent	or	give	misleading	

















could	amount	 to	compulsion	 for	 the	undertaking.202	This	 triggers	 the	question	whether	
the	 offer	 of	 fine	 reductions	 or	 even	 immunity	 in	 the	 Leniency	 Notice	 constitutes	 a	
‘financial	compulsion’	within	the	meaning	of	the	ECHR.		
Already	 in	 1994,	 undertakings	 complained	 about	 the	 coercive	 nature	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 leniency	 practice.	 In	 Kartonfabriek,	 the	 applicant	 argued	 that	 an	
undertaking	under	investigation	must	be	able	to	decide	freely	upon	its	system	of	defence,	
which,	however,	would	no	longer	be	possible	if	the	Commission	could	impose	a	heavier	
fine	 on	 an	 undertaking	 which	 defends	 itself. 203 	Similarly	 in	 Mayr-Melnhof	
Kartongesellschaft,	 the	 applicant	 complained	 that	 the	 pressure	 on	 undertakings	 to	
acknowledge	 the	 factual	 allegations	 in	 the	 statement	 of	 objections	 in	 return	 for	 a	
reduction	 of	 their	 fine	was	 in	 breach	 of	 their	 right	 of	 defence.204	The	 Court,	 however,	
rejected	 both	 claims.	With	 regard	 to	 the	 former	 claim,	 the	 Court	 found	 that	 the	 fine	
reduction	for	undertakings	that	adopted	a	cooperative	attitude	cannot	be	considered	as	





















for	 undertakings	 to	 apply	 for	 leniency	 and	 therefore	 encourages	 the	 submission	 of	
material,	 some	of	which	may	be	self-incriminating.	There	 is	as	 such	some	tension	with	
respect	to	the	principle	against	self-incrimination.	However,	it	must	be	emphasised	that	it	
is	 a	 cartel	 member’s	 voluntary	 decision	 to	 apply	 for	 leniency.	 A	 leniency	 programme	









questions	 that	 seek	 to	 elicit	 admissions,	 it	 could	 always	 refrain	 from	 answering	 those	
questions,	at	the	risk,	admittedly,	of	not	having	a	reduction	in	the	fine	applied	to	it	on	the	
basis	of	the	Leniency	Notice.210	Furthermore,	it	needs	to	be	emphasised	that	leniency	is	
granted	 in	 exchange	 of	 evidence,	 not	 in	 exchange	 for	 an	 admission	 of	 guilt.211	An	
undertaking	 applying	 for	 leniency	 is	 only	 required	 to	 submit	 information	 and	evidence	
enabling	 the	 Commission	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 targeted	 inspection.	 The	mere	 submission	 of	
certain	 facts	 without	 prejudice	 to	 their	 legal	 appraisal	 should	 be	 possible	 under	 the	
Leniency	 Notice.212	Given	 the	 voluntary	 nature	 of	 the	 cooperation	 under	 the	 Leniency	
Notice,	 undertakings	 are	 not	 subject	 to	 compulsion	 within	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 ECtHR	





















identity	 of	 defendants	 in	 competition	 proceedings	 does	 not	 justify	 denying	 them	 any	
procedural	 fairness,	 the	 fact	 that	 such	 defendants	 are	 normally	 well-resourced	
organisations	with	access	to	the	best	legal	advice	money	can	buy	suggests	that	they	are	




defendant’s	 consent	 than	 might	 be	 the	 case	 with	 leniency	 submissions	 of	 individuals	
accused	of	traditional	crimes.214	
For	the	sake	of	completeness,	the	compatibility	of	the	Leniency	Notice	with	the	other	
three	 criteria	 laid	 out	 in	 Jalloh	 shall	 be	 briefly	 examined	 as	well.	 The	 second	 criterion	
concerns	 the	weight	 of	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 the	 investigation	 and	 punishment	 of	 the	
offence.	 From	an	economic	welfare	perspective,	 the	 investigation	of	 cartels	 serves	 the	
public	interest	which	the	ECtHR	would	normally	take	into	consideration	in	the	context	of	
a	holistic	appreciation	to	justify	the	application	of	coercive,	but	proportional,	measures	so	
as	 to	 narrow	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination.215	In	Marttinen,	 the	
ECtHR	held	 that	 “the	obligation	 to	disclose	 income	and	capital	 for	 the	purposes	of	 the	
calculation	 and	 assessment	of	 tax	 […]	 is	 a	 common	 feature	of	 the	 taxation	 systems	of	
Contracting	 States	 and	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 envisage	 them	 functioning	 effectively	
without	 it.”216	It	 can	 similarly	be	argued	 that	 it	would	be	difficult	 to	 investigate	 cartels	
without	 leniency	applications.	The	public	 interest	 in	effective	cartel	 investigations	could	




relevant	 provisions,	 evidence	 acquired	 can	 only	 be	 used	 for	 the	 purpose	 it	 has	 been	









requested,	 and	 cannot	 be	 used	 as	 exculpatory	 evidence	 in	 other	 infringement	
proceedings.218	This	seems	to	be	in	accordance	with	the	ECtHR	case-law.		
	 Summing	up,	the	above	assessment	shows	that	the	incentives	offered	by	the	Leniency	
Notice	 do	 not	 constitute	 ‘financial	 compulsion’	 as	 undertakings	 cooperate	 with	 the	





(and	Article	 48(1)	 CFR).	 This	 principle	 sets	 out	 that	 the	burden	of	 proof	 rests	with	 the	
prosecutor.	Referring	to	ECtHR’s	judgment	in	Öztürk,219	the	CJ	confirmed	that	given	the	





co-offenders	 through	 one	 or	 several	 whistleblowers.	 The	 risk	 for	 incriminated	 cartel	
members	is	that	their	presumption	of	innocence	is	compromised	if	the	Commission	were	
to	 take	 leniency	 statements	on	 face	 value	 instead	of	putting	 them	under	any	 scrutiny,	
possibly	 leading	 to	 a	 greater	 incrimination	 or	 even	 a	 false	 incrimination.	 Leniency	
statements	are	of	 significant	 importance	as	 they	are	often	used	by	 the	Commission	as	
important	pieces	of	evidence	to	prove	the	existence	of	a	cartel	in	proceedings	before	the	
EU	Courts.221	












reduction	 but	 possibly	 also	 for	 strategic	 reasons	 on	 the	 market	 post-prosecution,	 an	
immunity	applicant	might	have	an	interest	in	exaggerating	about	its	competitors’	role	in	
the	cartel	while	playing	down	its	own	involvement.	Furthermore,	there	have	been	cases	
in	 other	 jurisdictions	 where	 leniency	 applicants	 have	 provided	 false	 or	 misleading	
evidence.222	In	 light	 of	 this	 risk,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 information	 provided	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 leniency	 policy	 should	 have	 limited	 evidential	 value	 and	 that	 the	
Commission	 should	 not	 blindly	 trust	 those	 statements	 without	 corroboration	 through	
other	sources.	
The	 case-law	 of	 the	 EU	 Courts	 has	 nonetheless	 acknowledged	 the	 importance	 of	
leniency	statements.	They	found	that	leniency	statements	“have	a	probative	value	that	is	
not	insignificant,	since	they	entail	considerable	legal	and	economic	risks.”223	Although	the	







It	 is	 settled	 case-law	 that	 a	 statement	 by	 one	 undertaking	 accused	 of	 having	
participated	in	a	cartel,	the	accuracy	of	which	is	contested	by	several	of	its	co-offenders,	
cannot	 be	 regarded	 as	 constituting	 adequate	 proof	 of	 an	 infringement	 unless	 it	 is	














supported	 by	 other	 evidence.226	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 has	 been	 put	 forward	 by	 de	 la	
Torre	 that	 some	 judgments227	suggest	 that,	 save	 for	 the	 contestation	 by	 the	 other	
undertakings	 during	 the	 administrative	 procedure,	 the	 EU	 Courts	 may	 deem	 the	
contestation	 of	 the	 probative	 value	 of	 certain	 statements	 inadmissible,	 “as	 the	
Commission	in	such	a	situation	would	be	confident	that	it	did	not	require	corroboration	




the	 need	 for	 corroboration	 of	 statements	 supplied	 by	 an	 accomplice	 who	 is	 offered	
beneficial	 treatment	 in	 return	 for	 his	 declaration.	 According	 to	 its	 case-law,	 the	 use	
during	a	 trial	of	evidence	obtained	 from	an	accomplice	 in	exchange	 for	 immunity	 from	
prosecution	may	put	into	question	the	fairness	of	the	hearing	and	therefore	contravene	
the	 right	 of	 defence. 229 	Arguably	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 effective	 enforcement	 is	




in	 parts	 not	 corroborated	 by	 contemporaneous	 documents.230	The	 Commission	 may	
possibly	verify	the	testimony	and	evidence	provided	by	an	immunity	applicant	with	the	
submissions	 of	 subsequent	 leniency	 applicants.	 Moreover,	 the	 GC’s	 scrutiny	 of	 the	























assessed	 the	 evidence	 the	 Commission	 relied	 on	 in	 a	 meticulous	 manner.	 In	 several	
judgments	it	upheld	a	defendant’s	plea	that	the	Commission	failed	to	meet	the	requisite	
standard	 of	 proof	 in	 determining	 the	 duration	 of	 a	 defendant’s	 participation	 in	 the	
infringement	or	 the	existence	of	 an	SCI	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Commission	 relied	on	
uncorroborated	leniency	statements.231		
Nonetheless,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 more	 extensive	 procedural	
safeguards	 such	 as	 the	 cross-examination	 of	 witnesses	 are	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	
guarantee	more	protection	 to	defendants	at	 the	prosecution	 stage	 rather	 than	 rely	on	
the	Court’s	 judicial	review	in	subsequent	appeals.	Faced	with	the	difficulty	of	collecting	
evidence	 and	 the	 scarcity	 of	 resources	 in	 detecting	 and	 prosecuting	 cartels,	 the	
Commission	 may	 be	 tempted	 to	 rely	 largely	 on	 material	 supplied	 by	 leniency	
applicants.232	It	is	warned	that	the	standard	of	proof	and	the	burden	of	proof	for	finding	
an	 infringement	would	 diminish	 or	would	 at	 least	 be	 lessened	 if	 leniency	 applications	
were	 to	 become	 an	 increasingly	 common	 tool	 to	 investigate	 cartels.233	In	 EU	 cartel	
proceedings	 the	 risk	of	 false	 statements	 is	not	as	 contained	as	 in	national	proceedings	
due	to	the	lack	of	any	statutory	provision	designed	to	ensure	the	reliability	of	evidence.234	
Although	an	undertaking	that	is	falsely	incriminated	by	a	leniency	applicant	can	challenge	
the	 latter’s	 statement	 in	 its	 own	 statements	 or	 its	 response	 to	 the	 SO,	 there	 is	 no	
possibility	 to	 subject	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 to	 cross-examination.235	The	 limitation	 of	
being	able	to	challenge	a	complaint	or	SO	to	just	one	hearing	is	not	sufficient	as	at	this	
stage	 of	 the	 proceedings	 the	 SO	 has	 already	 been	 formulated	 and	 notified	 to	 the	

































a	 framework	 that	 shall	help	 to	analyse	 (or	 rather	approximate)	 the	 level	of	deterrence	
and	 retribution	 in	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programme.	 This	 framework	
incorporates	 retributive	 constraints	 in	 the	 economic	 analysis	 of	 leniency	 not	 only	 to	
rectify	 some	 of	 the	 normative	 flaws	 of	 conventional	 approaches	 such	 as	 cost-benefit	
analyses	 but	 also	 as	 a	 predictive	 tool,	 without	 considerably	 compromising	 the	
methodological	rigor.238	It	may	identify,	on	the	one	hand,	the	lack	of	incentives	to	blow	
the	 whistle	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 instances	 of	 unjustified	 leniency.	 The	 framework	
developed	in	this	section	adopts	a	two-layered	hierarchy	of	norms.	The	first	layer	looks	at	















effectiveness	 and	 substantive	 fairness	 of	 certain	 measures	 in	 the	 EU	 leniency	
programme.239		
 Deterrence	and	effectiveness	criteria		A.




the	unsuccessful	 first	US	corporate	 leniency	programme,	and	are	based	on	the	 insights	
from	 the	 Prisoner’s	 Dilemma.241	Interestingly,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 same	 criteria	
could	also	have	been	derived	 following	the	above	analysis	of	 the	unsuccessful	 leniency	




collusion.	 Secondly,	 undertakings	 must	 perceive	 a	 high	 risk	 of	 detection	 by	 the	
competition	 authority	 operating	 the	 leniency	 programme,	 if	 they	 fail	 to	 self-report.	 As	


















deterrence	 theory.	 However,	 in	 the	 leniency	 context,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 regard	 the	




rule	 and	 the	 permissible	 use	 of	 presumptions	 can	 facilitate	 the	 legal	 qualification	 of	
collusions	 and	 is	 therefore	 deterrence-based.	 Especially	 cartel	members	 that	 played	 a	


























Commission	 award	 generous	 discounts	 in	 fines,	 and	 thus	widen	 the	 gap	 between	 the	





in	exchange	 for	having	a	 three-year	prison	sentence	reduced	by	 just	one	week,	but	he	
would	much	more	 likely	 do	 so	 in	 exchange	 for	 no	 prison	 time.	 The	 knowledge	 that	 a	
prosecutor	is	offering	an	attractive	deal	should	give	all	players	cause	for	concern	leading	





sufficiently	high,	 it	will	be	rational	 to	distrust	 the	other	players	and	forego	cooperation	
even	though	cooperation	would	yield	higher	gains	than	confessing.	Applying	the	cost	of	
betrayal	 in	the	cartel	context,	 it	 is	obvious	that	the	 incentive	to	confess	 is	higher	 if	 the	
collaborative	payoff	exceeds	the	collusive	payoff.	In	other	words,	the	higher	the	cost	of	
betrayal,	the	higher	the	distrust	among	the	cartel.		













Even	 assuming	 the	 probability	 of	 another	 undertaking	 confessing	 is	 very	 low,	 if	 the	
penalty	imposed	for	incorrectly	predicting	that	the	other	undertaking	will	not	confess	is	












them.253 	Competition	 authorities	 must	 therefore	 institute	 an	 environment	 in	 which	
undertakings	sense	a	material	 risk	of	detection.254	The	risk	of	detection	does	not	solely	
depend	on	the	leniency	programme.	Detection	efforts	through	the	leniency	programme	
should	 ideally	 be	 supplemented	by	other	 inspection	powers.	 The	more	 intrusive	 these	
powers	 are	 the	more	 undertakings	 have	 to	 fear	 that	 competition	 authorities	 will	 find	
inculpatory	evidence.		
 Sufficient	transparency	and	certainty	3.








a	 leniency	 programme.255	An	 effective	 leniency	 programme	 should	 be	 transparent	 and	




exploiting	 the	 Prisoners’	 Dilemma	 faced	 by	 cartel	 members.	 In	 order	 to	 modify	 the	
economic	 and	 social	 behaviour	 of	 undertakings	 involved	 in	 a	 cartel	 they	 need	 reliable	
guidance	 as	 to	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 cartel	 legislation,	 the	 consequences	 of	 non-
compliance,	 and	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 leniency	 application.	 Only	 when	 a	 potential	
whistleblower	 is	 able	 to	 foresee	 the	 consequences	 of	 its	 application	 to	 the	 greatest	
extent	possible,	will	 it	be	prepared	to	consider	cooperating	with	 the	authorities.257	The	
codification	and	publication	of	an	authorities’	 leniency	policy	and	 the	education	of	 the	
public	are	not	sufficient.	More	 importantly	the	authorities	must	 limit	their	discretion	 in	










leniency	 at	 all.	 This	 advantage	 would	 be	 unfair	 if	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	 competition	










authority’s	 investigation	 was	 not	 more	 significant	 than	 any	 of	 its	 co-offenders’	
contribution.	 In	 such	 a	 case	 there	 would	 not	 only	 be	 unequal	 treatment	 but	 also	
unjustified	leniency.	In	order	to	uphold	notions	of	substantive	fairness	it	is	important	that	
no	more	leniency	is	granted	than	absolutely	necessary.	The	reduction	of	the	fine	must	be	
proportionate	 to	 the	 leniency	applicant’s	 contribution	 to	 the	 investigation.	Sacrifices	 in	
terms	 of	 retribution	 are	 justified	 if	 they	 lead	 to	more	 deterrence.	 The	 higher	 level	 of	








also	 entail	 negative	 effects.	 If	 immunity	 and	 penalty	 reductions	 are	 awarded	 too	
generously,	 the	overall	 level	of	deterrence	and	 retribution	might	be	disproportionately	
lowered	 compared	 to	 the	 benefits	 realised,	 and	may	 thus	 adversely	 affect	 the	 public	
interest.	Even	worse,	an	overly	generous	leniency	programme	might	be	at	risk	of	being	
abused	 by	 potential	 cartelists.	 A	 leniency	 programme	 should	 therefore	 be	 designed	 in	
such	a	way	that	no	more	leniency	is	accorded	than	absolutely	necessary.		
Since	 the	 inception	 of	 its	 leniency	 policy,	 the	 Commission	 was	 grappling	 with	 the	
difficulty	 of	 reconciling	 deterrence	 and	 retribution.	 It	 wanted	 to	 incentivise	 cartel	
members	 to	 come	 forward	whilst	 avoiding	 the	 award	 of	 undeserved	 leniency.	 After	 it	




These	 two	 criteria	 not	 only	 set	 the	 threshold	 for	 immunity	 very	 high	 but	 were	 also	
unclear.	The	prospect	of	a	very	substantial	 fine	 reduction	 rather	 than	 the	assurance	of	
 	
141	
immunity	 did	 not	 instigate	 the	 necessary	 deterrence	 to	 start	 a	 race	 for	 confession.	






be	 in	 compliance	with	 fundamental	 rights.	 The	 question	 dealt	with	 here	was	whether	
collaborating	 and	 non-collaborating	 cartel	 members’	 fundamental	 rights	 have	 been	
adversely	affected	by	the	leniency	programme.	With	respect	to	the	privilege	against	self-
incrimination,	 any	 concern	 is	 uncalled	 for	 as	 the	 leniency	 programme	 merely	 offers	
collaborating	 cartel	 members	 an	 incentive	 to	 cooperate	 with	 the	 Commission	 on	 a	
voluntary	basis	without	shifting	the	burden	of	proof	or	exercising	any	undue	pressure	to	
provide	 self-incriminating	material.	 Non-collaborating	 cartel	 members’	 presumption	 of	




chapters	 in	 order	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 developments	 in	 terms	 of	 deterrence	 and	





CHAPTER	 4:	 INTERNAL	 FACTORS	 AFFECTING	 THE	 EFFECTIVENESS	 AND	
FAIRNESS	OF	THE	EU	LENIENCY	POLICY	
 Introduction		I.
In	order	 to	enhance	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	EU	 leniency	programme,	 the	Commission	
revised	the	Leniency	Notice	twice	–	first	in	2002	and	then	again	in	2006.	The	1996	Notice	
was	significantly	amended	by	making	some	key	changes	which	are	referred	to	throughout	
this	 thesis	 as	 the	 so-called	 ‘internal	 factors’	 (as	 opposed	 to	 ‘external	 factors’	 such	 as	
private	actions	for	damages,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	chapter).	The	revisions	
were	accompanied	by	the	publication	of	the	1998	and	2006	Fining	Guidelines	respectively	






on	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 fairness	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programme.	 In	 light	 of	 the	
significance	of	sanctions	for	the	functioning	of	leniency	programmes,	the	aim	is	to	further	
analyse	the	interplay	between	the	two	concepts	of	effectiveness	and	fairness	in	light	of	
the	 legislative	 developments	 since	 1998.	 From	 a	 procedural	 fairness	 perspective,	 the	
chapter	analyses	the	adherence	of	the	EU	fining	policy	to	the	principle	of	legality	under	
Article	7	ECHR.	In	analysing	the	impact	on	substantive	fairness,	the	chapter	analyses	the	
impact	 of	 the	 internal	 factors	 on	 deterrence	 and	 retribution	 under	 the	 normative	
framework.	 It	 is	submitted	that	the	foreseeability	of	the	EU	cartel	 fines	 is	not	merely	a	
necessary	 requirement	 stemming	 from	 the	 principle	 of	 legality,	 but	 that	 it	 is	 also	 of	
importance	 for	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	 leniency	programme.	The	 internal	 factors	have	
significantly	 raised	 deterrence	 without	 unduly	 affecting	 retribution.	 The	 current	 2006	







have	 shown	how	 retribution	and	due	process	 counterbalance	deterrence.	 This	 chapter	
seeks	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 retribution	 and	 due	 process	 may	 potentially	 even	 raise	
deterrence,	 and	 thus	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 concept	 that	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 referred	 to	 as	
‘effectiveness	through	fairness’.	






















In	 order	 to	 fix	 the	 most	 striking	 deficiencies	 of	 the	 1996	 Notice,	 the	 Commission	
published	a	revised	version	of	the	Notice	in	February	2002.2	This	revision	followed	after	
extensive	consultations	with	the	legal	and	business	communities.	In	revising	the	Leniency	
Notice,	 the	 Commission	 held	 on	 to	 the	 principles	 governing	 its	 predecessor,	 but	
acknowledged	 that	 the	 “effectiveness	 would	 be	 improved	 by	 an	 increase	 in	 the	
transparency	 and	 certainty	 of	 the	 conditions	 on	 which	 a	 reduction	 of	 fines	 will	 be	
granted.”3	The	changes	were	quite	far-reaching.		
1. Content	
Compared	 to	 the	 1996	 Notice,	 the	 2002	 Notice	 made	 a	 clearer	 distinction	 between	
immunity	 (Section	 A)	 and	 reductions	 in	 fines	 (Section	 B).4	The	 Commission	 granted	
immunity	in	two	situations.	An	undertaking	could	qualify	for	immunity	if	it	was	the	first	to	
submit	evidence	sufficient	 to	enable	 the	Commission	 to	carry	out	an	 investigation	 into	
the	 alleged	 cartel. 5 	Alternatively,	 in	 case	 the	 Commission	 had	 already	 started	 an	
investigation,	 immunity	 was	 still	 awardable	 if	 an	 undertaking	 was	 the	 first	 to	 submit	
evidence	that	could	enable	the	Commission	to	find	an	infringement	of	Article	101	TFEU.6	
The	common	denominator	of	both	situations	was	that	the	immunity	applicant	must	have	
been	the	 first	 to	provide	 the	Commission	with	evidence	 that	 it	did	not	otherwise	have	
and	that	enabled	it	to	initiate	an	investigation	and/or	prove	an	infringement.7	In	addition	
to	 either	 of	 the	 paragraph	 8	 criteria,	 the	 immunity	 applicant	 had	 to	 satisfy	 the	 three	
cumulative	 criteria	 in	 paragraph	 11.	 First,	 the	 applicant	 had	 to	 cooperate	 fully,	
continuously	and	expeditiously	throughout	the	Commission’s	administrative	procedure.8	
Secondly,	the	applicant	must	have	immediately	ended	its	involvement	in	the	cartel.9	And	















thirdly,	 the	 applicant	 must	 not	 have	 taken	 steps	 to	 coerce	 other	 undertakings	 to	
participate	in	the	cartel.10	
	 In	 the	 2002	Notice,	 the	 Commission	 held	 on	 to	 the	model	 of	 awarding	 leniency	 to	




SAV,	 the	 Commission	 considered	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 evidence	 strengthened	 its	
ability	 to	 prove	 the	 infringement.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 Commission	 treated	
contemporaneous	written	evidence	and	evidence	directly	relevant	to	the	infringement	as	
having	greater	value	 than	evidence	 that	post-dates	 the	 infringement	and/or	which	has	
only	 indirect	 relevance.12	The	 Commission	 also	 adjusted	 the	 leniency	 bands	 for	 fine	
reductions.	 Successive	 applicants	 became	 eligible	 for	 progressively	 narrower	 leniency	
bands.	 The	 first	 successful	 subsequent	 leniency	 applicant	 (i.e.	 the	 second-in	 confessor)	
would	benefit	 from	a	 reduction	of	 30-50%,	while	 the	 third-in	 confessor	would	 enjoy	 a	
reduction	of	20-30%.	All	other	subsequent	leniency	applicants	would	receive	a	reduction	
of	 up	 to	 20%.13	The	 nolo	 contendere	 provision	 of	 the	 1996	 Notice	 was	 deleted.14	The	
exact	percentage	within	each	of	the	 leniency	bands	depended	on	the	timing,	quality	of	
the	information	as	well	as	the	extent	and	continuity	of	the	applicant’s	cooperation.		






	 Lastly,	 the	 Commission	 also	 amended	 the	 procedure	 for	 obtaining	 leniency.	 The	
revised	 Notice	 offered	 conditional	 immunity.	 An	 immunity	 applicant	 would	 be	











existing	 application. 16 	With	 respect	 to	 applications	 for	 reductions	 in	 fines,	 the	
Commission	 would	 inform	 the	 applicants	 whether	 they	 qualify,	 and	 if	 so	 for	 which	
leniency	band,	no	later	than	the	date	on	which	the	SO	is	notified.17	The	2002	Notice	also	






the	 revision	was	 to	make	 the	Notice	more	effective	with	 respect	 to	 several	 issues.19	In	
particular,	 it	 addressed	 one	 of	 the	 major	 flaws	 of	 its	 predecessor	 by	 rendering	 the	
leniency	 procedure	 more	 certain	 and	 predictable.20	Compared	 to	 the	 old	 Notice	 the	
priorities	have	clearly	shifted	 in	the	2002	version.	 In	hindsight,	 the	1996	Notice	was	an	
instrument	 to	 facilitate	 the	 investigation	 of	 detected	 cartels.	 Pursuant	 to	 Commission	
officials	it	had		
“proved	 to	 be	 particularly	 effective	 when	 combined	 with	 the	 Commission’s	 other	

















The	 new	 Leniency	 Notice	 was	 therefore	 conceived	 to	 become	 an	 instrument	 to	
uncover	 cartels	 and	 subsequently	 initiate	 investigations.22	The	 2002	 Notice	 rebalanced	
the	public	 policy	 interest	 of	 detecting	 cartels,	 on	 the	one	hand,	 and	 sanctioning	 cartel	







semantic	 but	may	 be	 crucial	 for	 potential	 whistleblowers	 by	 instilling	 confidence	 that	
promises	 made	 early	 on	 will	 be	 honoured.24 	There	 are	 two	 main	 reasons	 for	 the	
enhancement	 of	 legal	 certainty	 for	 immunity	 applicants.	 First,	 in	 contrast	 to	 its	
predecessor,	the	award	of	immunity	is	mandatory	rather	than	optional	if	an	applicant	has	
satisfied	all	the	requirements.	Moreover,	the	Commission	emphasised	that	the	Leniency	
Notice	 will	 create	 legitimate	 expectations	 on	 which	 undertakings	 may	 rely. 25 	The	
Commission	 hence	 limited	 its	 discretion	 to	 some	 extent	 by	 making	 the	 new	 Notice	








did	 not	 have	 a	 ‘smoking	 gun’	 of	 the	 cartel	 at	 issue.	 In	 recognition	 that	 the	 ‘decisive	
















by	 introducing	the	priority	principle	with	respect	 to	this	 type	of	 leniency.	The	 idea	was	
that	 undertakings	would	 give	 up	 their	 wait-and-see	 approach	 once	 immunity	was	 not	







while	 the	 percentage	 of	 the	 fine	 reduction	 was	 decreased	 to	 a	 maximum	 of	 20%	
compared	 to	 50%	 in	 the	 old	 Notice.	 The	mere	 non-contestation	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
allegations	 in	 the	 SO,	which	would	usually	 lead	 to	 a	 10%	 reduction,	was	not	 sufficient	




evidence	 provided	 strengthens,	 by	 its	 very	 nature	 and/or	 its	 level	 of	 detail,	 the	
Commission’s	 ability	 to	 prove	 the	 facts	 in	 question”.29 	The	 threshold	 continued	 to	
increase	 for	 every	 subsequent	 leniency	 applicant	 as	 the	 standard	 of	 significance	 was	
measured	 against	 all	 evidence	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 possession.	 Thus,	 with	 every	
successful	 application	 for	 a	 fine	 reduction,	 it	 became	 increasingly	 difficult	 to	 submit	
evidence	that	could	meet	the	SAV	standard.	The	Commission	determined	the	significance	
of	 evidence	 and	 information	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis,	 and	 therefore	 enjoyed	 large	
discretion.	 Given	 that	 the	 SAV	 standard	 was	 contingent	 on	 the	 evidence	 in	 the	






the	 standard	 ex	 ante.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 Commission	 could	 have	 reasonably	 been	
expected	to	provide	more	guidance	as	 to	when	evidence	could	be	considered	to	be	of	
‘significant	added	value’.		
	 The	 1996	Notice	 excluded	 ringleaders	 and	 coercers	 from	 the	 scope	 of	 immunity.	 It	
stated	 that	 an	 undertaking	 was	 eligible	 for	 immunity,	 very	 substantial	 or	 substantial	
reduction	in	the	fine	if	it	had	not	compelled	another	undertaking	to	take	part	in	the	cartel	
and	 had	 not	 acted	 as	 an	 instigator	 or	 played	 a	 determining	 role	 in	 the	 cartel.30	This	
provision	was	rather	broad	and	potentially	ruled	out	many	cartel	members	to	qualify	for	
immunity.	 For	 instance,	 acting	 as	 one	 of	 several	 ringleaders	 would	 have	 rendered	 an	
undertaking	 ineligible.	 The	 ringleader	 concept	 was	 also	 considered	 to	 be	 insufficiently	
precise	and	subjective.31	The	2002	Notice	took	a	more	relaxed	approach	and	narrowed	
the	 class	 of	 cartel	 members	 which	 were	 to	 be	 ineligible	 for	 immunity.	 The	 new	
requirement	 stated	 that	 the	 applicant	 must	 not	 have	 taken	 “steps	 to	 coerce	 other	
undertakings	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 infringement”.32	Transparency	 was	 increased	 as	 this	
new	 requirement	was	 less	 subjective.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	concepts	of	 ‘determining	 role’	
and	 ‘instigator’,	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘coercion’	 could	 be	 established	 more	 objectively.33	
Immunity	 eligibility	 for	 ringleaders	was	 justified	 since	 the	public	 interest	of	uncovering	
and	 terminating	 cartels	 is	 considered	 greater	 than	 any	 ethical	 considerations	 about	
punishing	 each	 and	 every	 active	 cartel	 member.34	Finally,	 the	 introduction	 of	 partial	
immunity	was	very	 important	 in	 terms	of	providing	 incentives	 for	undertakings	 to	 fully	
cooperate	 with	 the	 Commission.	 Partial	 immunity	 is	 in	 adherence	 with	 the	 privilege	
against	 self-incrimination,	 since	 the	 information	 about	 the	 longer	 duration	 or	 larger	
gravity	of	the	infringement	provided	by	the	leniency	applicant	will	not	be	used	against	it.		
Without	partial	 immunity,	applicants	might	have	cooperated	to	the	extent	necessary	to	








corroborate	 the	 evidence	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 file	 but	 might	 not	 have	 provided	 any	
information	that	would	reveal	the	actual,	more	severe	gravity	of	the	cartel.35		
	 In	 terms	 of	 increasing	 transparency	 the	 2002	 Notice	 made	 highly	 welcomed	
procedural	amendments.	First,	 the	Commission	would	notify	 leniency	applicants	earlier	
about	 the	 outcome	 than	 it	 used	 to	 do	 under	 the	 old	 Notice.	 Secondly,	 applicants	 for	
immunity	could	make	a	hypothetical	submission.	Both	these	amendments	increased	the	













and	 only	 withdrawn	 in	 one	 case.40	Nonetheless,	 the	 Commission	 officials	 noted	 that	



























enhancing	 transparency	 and	 certainty	 further.43	In	 between	 the	 two	 revisions	 of	 the	
Leniency	Notice,	the	Commission	also	implemented	Regulation	1/2003	which	expanded	
the	 Commission’s	 arsenal	 to	 investigate	 and	 punish	 competition	 infringements.	 It	 now	
has	 two	 additional	 powers	 of	 investigation.	 Pursuant	 to	 Article	 19(1),	 the	 Commission	
may	 interview	 any	 natural	 or	 legal	 person	 who	 consents	 to	 be	 interviewed	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 collecting	 information	 relating	 to	 the	 subject-matter	 of	 an	 investigation.44	
Regulation	1/2003	broadened	the	Commission’s	power	 to	conduct	unannounced	dawn	
raids	under	Article	20,	a	power	frequently	used	to	collect	further	evidence	in	addition	to	
the	 evidence	 presented	 by	 leniency	 applicants. 45 	Commission	 officials	 may	 enter	
premises,	 examine	 physical	 and	 electronic	 records	 and	 question	 any	 representative	 or	
member	 of	 staff	 of	 the	 undertaking.46	Case-law	 suggests	 that	 legal	 privilege	may	 only	
cover	documents	 involving	external	 counsel,	 and	not	 in-house	 lawyer.47	There	are	 thus	
very	few	 limits	to	records	the	Commission	can	access.48	In	addition,	under	Article	21(1)	
























The	 Commission’s	 broader	 inspection	 powers	 clearly	 play	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 leniency	
programme.	Cartels	have	arguably	adapted	to	the	existence	of	leniency	programmes	by	
avoiding	any	paper	trails.	It	is	however	more	challenging	to	do	so	the	more	complex	the	
cartel	 arrangement	 and	 the	 greater	 the	 need	 for	 monitoring	 is.	 Rather	 ironically,	
documentary	evidence	is	sometimes	retained	by	undertakings	with	the	intention	to	use	it	













ante,	 i.e.	without	 taking	 into	 account	whether	 a	 given	 inspection	 has	 or	 has	 not	 been	
successful	 or	 whether	 or	 not	 an	 inspection	 has	 or	 has	 not	 been	 carried	 out.	 The	







assessment	 will	 be	 made	 exclusively	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 type	 and	 quality	 of	 the	
information	submitted	by	the	applicant.52		
	 Experience	 has	 shown	 that	 potential	 immunity	 applicants	 under	 paragraph	 8(a)	
needed	further	guidance	as	to	what	type	of	information	and	evidence	is	required	to	meet	
the	 threshold.	 Paragraph	 9	 of	 the	 new	 Notice	 therefore	 lays	 down	 that	 immunity	
applicants	need	to	submit	a	corporate	statement	setting	out	the	functioning	and	duration	
of	the	cartel	as	well	as	its	participants.	They	must	also	provide	all	relevant	explanations	
on	 the	 pieces	 of	 evidence	 submitted	 and	 all	 contemporaneous	 evidence	 available	 to	
them	at	the	time	of	their	application.53	The	evidence	and	information	listed	in	paragraph	
9	 are	 supposed	 to	 allow	 for	 inspections	 to	 be	 better	 targeted.54	The	 applicant	 must	
provide	them,	to	the	extent	that	this,	in	the	Commission’s	view	would	not	jeopardise	its	
inspection.	
	 The	 threshold	 for	 immunity	 under	 paragraph	 8(b)	 (i.e.	 after	 the	 Commission	 has	
carried	 out	 an	 inspection	 concerning	 the	 alleged	 cartel	 or	 has	 already	 sufficient	
information	 in	 its	possession	 to	 carry	out	 an	 inspection),	 has	 remained	unchanged.	An	
applicant	needs	to	be	the	first	undertaking	to	provide	the	Commission	with	information	
and	 evidence	 that	 will	 allow	 it	 to	 find	 an	 infringement	 of	 Article	 101	 TFEU.	 Since	
applicants	under	the	previous	Leniency	Notice	were	uncertain	about	the	kind	of	evidence	
needed	to	be	provided	in	a	post	inspection	scenario,	the	2006	Notice	now	clarifies	that	an	
undertaking	must	 be	 the	 first	 to	 provide	 contemporaneous,	 incriminating	 evidence,	 as	
well	 as	 a	 corporate	 statement	 containing	 the	 kind	 of	 information	 specified	 under	
paragraph	9(a).55	
The	threshold	for	fine	reduction	was	not	altered	in	the	2006	Notice.	Applicants	for	fine	
reductions	 still	 need	 to	 submit	 evidence	 of	 significant	 added	 value	 compared	 to	 the	
evidence	 already	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 possession	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 application.56	The	
new	 Notice	 further	 elucidates	 the	 SAV	 standard,	 and	 is	 also	 more	 explicit	 than	 its	










predecessor.57	The	 Commission	 highlights	 the	 value	 of	 ‘incriminating’	 and	 ‘compelling’	
evidence.	Concerning	the	latter,	the	Leniency	Notice	specifies	that	this	type	of	evidence	
will	be	considered	more	valuable	than	evidence	that	require	corroboration	if	contested.58		
The	 conditions	 for	 obtaining	 immunity	 and	 fine	 reductions	 have	 been	 refined	 and	
clarified	 as	well.	 The	 first	 three	 conditions	 apply	 to	 both	 applicants	 for	 both	 forms	 of	
leniency,	whereas	the	fourth	condition	is	only	mandatory	for	immunity	applicants.	With	
respect	to	the	first	condition,	the	Commission	has	added	that	the	cooperation	must	be	
genuine	 and	 that	 the	 applicant	 provides	 “accurate,	 not	 misleading	 and	 complete	
information”.59	The	 second	 condition	 has	 been	 altered	 notably.	 Paragraph	 12(b)	 states	
that	the	applicant	must	have	ended	its	involvement	in	the	alleged	cartel,	unless	doing	so	
would	jeopardise	the	Commission’s	inspection.	The	third	condition	in	paragraph	12(c)	is	
novel	 and	 sets	 out	 that	 the	 applicant	must	 not	 have	 destroyed,	 falsified	 or	 concealed	
evidence	 of	 the	 alleged	 cartel,	 and	 not	 disclosed	 the	 fact	 or	 any	 of	 the	 content	 of	 its	
contemplated	 application,	 except	 to	 other	 competition	 authorities.	 Finally,	 the	 new	
Notice	still	excludes	coercers	from	the	scope	of	immunity,	but	explicitly	states	that	they	
could	nevertheless	qualify	for	a	reduction	of	fines.60		
	 A	 new	 key	 feature	 of	 the	 2006	 Notice	 is	 the	 marker	 system.	 A	 so-called	 ‘marker’	
affords	an	 immunity	applicant	 the	opportunity	 to	 save	 its	place	 in	 the	queue	ahead	of	
other	applicants.61	Within	a	short,	but	reasonable	period	of	time	the	applicant	must	then	
collect	 all	 the	 necessary	 information	 to	 perfect	 the	 marker.	 The	 period	 of	 time	 is	
determined	by	the	Commission	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	Another	noteworthy	feature	in	
the	new	Notice	is	the	specific	procedure	to	protect	corporate	statements	from	discovery	
in	 civil	 damage	proceedings.	 This	 procedure	 applies	 to	 voluntary	 corporate	 statements	
supplied	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Leniency	 Notice.	 Corporate	 statements	 may	 be	
submitted	orally,	unless	the	applicant	has	already	disclosed	the	content	of	its	statement	
to	third	parties.62	Oral	statements	will	 form	part	of	the	Commission’s	 file,	and	access	 is	













The	 2006	 Notice’s	 paragraph	 8(a)	 requirement	 of	 having	 to	 provide	 information	 and	
evidence	which	will	allow	the	Commission	to	conduct	a	targeted	inspection	has	arguably	
raised	 the	 threshold	 compared	 to	 the	 2002	 Notice.	 Although	 the	 Commission	 merely	
mentions	that	it	has	provided	more	clarity	with	respect	to	the	threshold,	it	can	be	argued	
that	 the	 threshold	 in	 fact	 has	 been	 raised.	A	 potential	 immunity	 applicant	 now	has	 to	










for	 immunity.	 Under	 both	 previous	 Notices	 an	 undertaking	 must	 have	 ended	 its	
participation	in	the	infringement	by	the	time	of	 its	 leniency	application.	Under	the	new	
Notice,	 an	 undertaking	 enjoys	 more	 flexibility.	 The	 Commission	 will	 not	 mandate	 the	
applicant	 to	 terminate	 its	 cartel	 participation	 if	 this	 would	 put	 the	 Commission’s	
inspection	 at	 risk.	 If	 the	 applicant	 ceases	 its	 cartel	 activities	 abruptly,	 the	 other	 cartel	
members	might	take	this	as	a	sign	that	this	particular	undertaking	might	have	blown	the	
whistle.	They	might	then	destroy	potential	incriminating	evidence	before	the	Commission	
could	 launch	a	dawn	raid.	 In	such	a	case,	 it	would	be	difficult	to	prosecute	those	other	







The	 Commission	 has	 also	 attempted	 to	 increase	 legal	 certainty	with	 respect	 to	 the	
threshold	for	obtaining	fine	reductions	by	further	clarifying	the	SAV	standard.	However,	
the	Commission	has	not	entirely	succeeded	to	do	so.	The	significance	of	added	value	is	
still	 determined	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 and	 therefore	 leaves	 the	 Commission	 a	 large	
degree	 of	 discretion. 65 	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 categories	 of	 ‘incriminating’	 and	
‘compelling’	evidence	provide	further	guidance	and	transparency	for	potential	applicants.	
The	applicant	and	the	Commission	can	determine	whether	a	particular	piece	of	evidence	
is	 contemporaneous	 and	 incriminating	 in	 a	 rather	 accurate	 and	objective	manner.	 Yet,	
whether	 a	piece	of	 evidence	 is	 compelling	or	not	 is	 less	 straightforward.	What	 initially	






the	 moment	 of	 its	 application.	 The	 possibility	 to	 secure	 a	 marker	 increases	 both	 the	
incentive	and	certainty	in	the	leniency	process.66	An	applicant	will	be	aware	of	its	position	
vis-à-vis	 the	other	applicants	as	 the	Commission	will	 inform	 it	whether	 it	 is	 the	 first	 to	




conduct	 if	 it	 knows	 that	 it	 is	 the	ﬁrst	 cartel	member	 to	approach	 the	Commission	and	
therefore	is	guaranteed	immunity.	Similarly,	if	an	undertaking	learns	that	it	is	not	the	ﬁrst	
to	approach	the	Commission	but	only	the	second	or	third,	then	there	will	also	be	a	strong	







incentive	 to	 try	 and	 secure	 the	 next	 available	 beneﬁt	 under	 the	 leniency	 programme,	
rather	than	to	deny	its	cartel	membership	in	the	ensuing	infringement	proceeding.	That	is	







more	 clarity	 of	 process	 and	 ﬁrm	 expectations	 as	 to	 the	 outcome	 of	 its	 leniency	
application	subject	to	it	fulﬁlling	its	part	of	the	leniency	bargain.68		
The	 Commission’s	 marker	 system,	 however,	 contains	 some	 deficiencies	 that	 might	
undermine	 its	 effectiveness,	 and	 eventually	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 entire	 Leniency	
Notice.	To	begin	with,	the	 immunity	applicant	 is	required	to	provide	a	 large	amount	of	
information,	namely	the	applicant’s	name	and	address,	the	parties	to	the	alleged	cartel,	
the	affected	products	and	territories,	the	estimated	duration	of	the	cartel	and	the	nature	
of	 the	 cartel	 conduct.	 The	 amount	 of	 information	 necessary	 to	 secure	 a	 marker	 is	
relatively	 high.	 This	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 US	 leniency	 programme	 which	 only	 requires	
applicants	 to	 name	 the	 affected	 product	 and,	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	 the	
applicant’s	name.69	The	Commission	imposes	a	higher	burden	on	applicants	to	secure	a	





would	 affect	 an	 undertaking’s	 sincerity	 about	 its	 leniency	 application. 72 	Rather,	
undertakings	will	more	likely	only	decide	to	apply	for	leniency	if	they	know	that	they	can	

















The	 procedure	 to	 protect	 corporate	 statements	 is	 a	 very	 important	 innovation	
compared	to	its	predecessor.	The	2002	Notice	merely	stated	that	the	written	statements	
made	 in	 the	 leniency	 procedure	 vis-à-vis	 the	 Commission	 will	 form	 part	 of	 the	
Commission’s	 file	 and	 may	 not	 be	 disclosed	 or	 used	 for	 any	 other	 purpose	 than	 the	
enforcement	 of	 Article	 101	 TFEU.77	Even	 before	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 new	 Notice,	 the	
Commission	had	allowed	the	submission	of	oral	statements	in	several	cases	following	the	
US	 example.	 The	 2006	 Notice	 has	 now	 formally	 implemented	 this	 procedure	 thus	
enhancing	 legal	 certainty.	 Given	 that	 this	 procedure	 was	 implemented	 in	 relation	 to	
discovery	 in	private	enforcement,	the	detailed	assessment	will	not	be	dealt	with	 in	this	




of	both	revisions	was	to	 increase	the	 incentives	to	apply	 for	 immunity	and	 leniency,	as	
well	 as	 improve	 transparency.	 The	 2002	Notice	 introduced	more	 automatic	 immunity,	
thus	 reducing	 the	Commission’s	discretion	and	 raising	 certainty	 for	potential	 immunity	
applicants.	 Undertakings	 were	 also	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 make	 hypothetical	









submissions.	 The	 current	 2006	 Notice	 continued	 to	 increase	 transparency	 and	
predictability	for	applicants	by	further	refining	and	clarifying	the	conditions	for	immunity	
and	fine	reductions.	Immunity	applicants	now	also	have	the	possibility	to	secure	a	marker	
which	 similar	 to	 hypothetical	 submissions	 increases	 undertakings’	 certainty	 in	 the	
application	process.	Moreover,	 the	current	Leniency	Notice	stipulates	the	protection	of	




submitted	 leniency	 evidence,80	as	well	 as	 the	equal	 treatment	of	 leniency	 applicants.81	
Following	 the	 revisions	 to	 the	 Leniency	Notice	 and	 the	 Fining	Guidelines	 (and	 also	 the	
introduction	 of	 the	 settlement	 procedure),	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 has	 become	
increasingly	 effective.82	Indeed,	 based	 on	 the	 three	 effectiveness	 criteria	 as	 analysed	
below	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programme	 established	 under	 the	 2006	 Notice	 can	 now	
considered	to	be	an	improvement.	It	is	thought	to	receive	an	average	of	two	applications	
per	months.83	

































policy.	 The	 concepts	 of	 sanctioning	 and	 leniency	 are	 inextricably	 linked	 and	 work	 in	








be	 detected	 are	 they	 able	 to	 fully	 understand	 the	 benefits	 under	 the	 leniency	
programme.	 The	 conflict	 between	 deterrence	 and	 fundamental	 rights	 in	 the	 fining	
procedure	 might	 take	 two	 forms.	 First,	 the	 principle	 of	 legality	 (nullum	 crimen,	 nulla	
poena	sine	lege),	anchored	in	Article	7	ECHR	and	Article	49	CFR,	might	sit	uneasily	with	








that	 due	 process	 complements	 deterrence	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 unfair	 outcomes	 for	







defendants.	 This	 section	 will	 explain	 how	 the	 interplay	 between	 fundamental	 rights	
protection	and	effectiveness	under	certain	circumstances	can	be	taken	even	further.		
 The	principle	of	legality	in	the	ECHR	and	EU	legal	order	A.
The	 principle	 of	 legality,	 provided	 for	 in	 Article	 7(1)	 ECHR,	 commands	 that	 criminal	
liability	and	punishment	be	based	only	upon	a	prior	enactment	of	a	prohibition	 that	 is	
expressed	with	 adequate	 precision	 and	 clarity	 so	 as	 to	 enable	 individuals	 to	 ascertain	
which	 conduct	 constitutes	 a	 criminal	 offence.87 	However,	 absolute	 precision	 is	 not	
required.88	In	Margareta,	the	ECtHR	reasoned	that	the	fact	that	a	law	confers	discretion	
is	 not	 in	 itself	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 requirement	 of	 foreseeability	 “provided	 that	 the	
scope	of	the	discretion	and	the	manner	of	its	exercise	are	indicated	with	sufficient	clarity,	





strictly	 in	 the	case	of	 rules	 liable	 to	entail	 financial	 consequences.	This	will	allow	those	
concerned	 to	 know	precisely	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 obligations	 that	 those	 rules	 impose	 on	


















satisfied.94 	This	 discretion	 is	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 Commission’s	 case	 prioritisation	 and	
leniency	practice.	The	Commission	may	choose	 to	grant	 fine	 reductions	or	even	not	 to	
impose	any	fine	at	all	against	undertakings	that	have	infringed	Articles	101	or	102	TFEU.95	
Secondly,	the	degree	of	discretion	pertains	to	the	determination	of	the	level	of	fines.	The	
Commission	 may	 take	 into	 consideration	 a	 “number	 of	 factors,	 the	 nature	 and	
importance	 of	 which	 vary	 according	 to	 the	 type	 of	 infringement	 in	 question	 and	 the	
particular	circumstances	of	the	case.”96	According	to	the	Court	in	Graphite	electrodes,	the	










number	 of	 appeals	 against	 the	 level	 of	 fines	 in	 the	 following	 two	 decades.	 In	 three	
appeals	 in	1995	 concerning	 the	Welded	 steel	mesh	 cartel,	 the	GC	 criticised	 the	 lack	of	

























were	 self-binding	 on	 the	 Commission	 and	 provided	 more	 transparency	 and	 therefore	
legal	certainty	 for	undertakings.	The	new	approach	to	determine	the	calculation	of	 the	
fine	relied	on	a	number	of	factors	rather	than	a	mathematical	formula.		




Guidelines	 stated	 that	 in	 assessing	 the	 gravity,	 the	 Commission	 needs	 to	 take	 into	
account	the	nature	of	the	infringement,	its	actual	impact	on	the	market,	where	this	can	
be	 measured,	 and	 the	 size	 of	 the	 relevant	 geographic	 market.	 Infringements	 were	
delineated	 into	 three	categories,	namely	minor	 infringements	 (with	 fines	between	EUR	
1,000	and	EUR	1	million),	 serious	 infringements	 (with	 fines	between	EUR	1	million	and	
EUR	20	million),	and	very	serious	infringements	(with	fines	above	EUR	20	million).	Hard	
core	cartels	were	commonly	treated	as	very	serious	infringements.	The	Fining	Guidelines	
explicitly	 stated	 that	 it	would	be	“necessary	 to	 take	account	of	 the	effective	economic	
capacity	 of	 offenders	 to	 cause	 significant	 damage	 to	 other	 operators,	 in	 particular	
consumers,	and	to	set	the	fine	at	a	level	which	ensures	that	it	has	a	sufficiently	deterrent	
effect”. 105 	Additionally,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 cartels,	 the	 Commission	 could	 differentiate	
between	the	undertakings	 to	 reflect	“the	real	 impact	of	 the	offending	conduct	of	each	










undertaking	 in	 competition,	 particularly	where	 there	 is	 considerable	disparity	 between	
the	sizes	of	the	undertakings”.106		
Having	determined	the	gravity,	an	assessment	of	the	duration	was	undertaken.	Again	
the	 Commission	 relied	 on	 a	 distinction	 into	 three	 categories,	 namely	 infringements	 of	
short,	medium	 and	 long	 duration.	 For	 infringements	 of	medium	 duration	 the	 amount	
determined	for	gravity	was	increased	up	to	50%	and	for	infringements	of	 long	duration	
the	amount	was	increased	up	to	10%	per	year.	The	second	step	in	fixing	the	fine	involved	
the	 modification	 of	 the	 basic	 amount	 to	 account	 for	 aggravating	 or	 attenuating	
circumstances.	
	 The	 1998	 Fining	 Guidelines	 were	 implemented	 with	 the	 objective	 to	 ensure	 the	
transparency	and	impartiality	of	the	Commission’s	decisions.	Whether	this	objective	had	
been	achieved	is	doubtful	in	light	of	the	numerous	appeals	against	cartel	fines	before	the	
GC	 since	 their	 introduction.107	The	 Fining	 Guidelines	 were	 criticised	 for	 a	 number	 of	
reasons.	The	main	point	of	criticism	concerned	the	calculation	of	the	start	amount.	They	
merely	 provided	 a	 very	 rough	 indication	 as	 to	 how	 the	 basic	 amount	 was	 to	 be	
determined	with	no	reference	to	an	economic	test	which	was	to	be	used	when	assessing	





















Fining	Guidelines	 it	has	acquired	sufficient	experience	 to	 further	develop	and	 refine	 its	
fining	policy.109	The	new	Fining	Guidelines	still	state	that	the	Commission	enjoys	a	wide	
margin	of	discretion	in	exercising	its	power	to	impose	fines.110	However,	the	calculation	
method	 of	 the	 basic	 amount	 has	 been	 comprehensively	 revised,	 partly	 in	 response	 to	
calls	 for	greater	 transparency.111	The	new	Guidelines	calculate	 the	basic	amount	of	 the	
fine	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 the	 value	 of	 sales	 during	 the	 last	 full	 business	 year	 of	 the	
undertaking’s	 participation	 in	 the	 infringement,	 multiplied	 by	 the	 number	 of	 years	 of	




for	 hard	 core	 cartels,	 the	 Commission	 usually	 includes	 in	 the	 basic	 amount	 a	 sum	
between	15-25%	of	the	value	of	sales	(a	so-called	‘entry	fee’),	irrespective	of	the	duration	
of	the	undertaking’s	participation.112	As	a	second	step,	like	in	the	1998	Fining	Guidelines,	





noted	 that	 even	 if	 Article	 7(1)	was	 applicable,	 ECtHR	 case-law	 provides	 that	 “it	 is	 not	
necessary	 for	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 provisions	 pursuant	 to	 which	 those	 sanctions	 are	
imposed	to	be	so	precise	that	the	consequences	which	may	flow	from	an	infringement	of	











the	 absence	 of	 anything	 that	would	 justify	 a	 different	 interpretation,116	the	 EU	 Courts	





transparent	 than	 in	 its	predecessor.	Taking	 the	value	of	 sales	and	multiplying	 it	by	 the	
number	of	years	of	participation	in	the	infringement	is	more	straightforward	than	relying	
on	the	three	categories	for	the	gravity	or	the	duration	respectively.		There	is	nonetheless	
still	 some	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 level	 of	 fines.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 the	
provision,	which	allows	for	a	departure	from	the	general	methodology	for	the	setting	of	
fines	in	particular	cases,118	this	uncertainty	largely	pertains	to	the	use	of	presumptions	in	
the	determination	of	 the	 fine.	 In	 the	Fining	Guidelines	 the	Commission	 follows	 the	 so-
called	 traditional	 approach	 to	 fixing	 the	 basic	 amount	 of	 fines	 which	 is	 based	 on	 the	
gradation	 of	 infringements	 according	 to	 their	 gravity.119	Under	 this	 approach	 some	
infringements	 are	deemed	 to	be	per	 se	more	harmful	 to	 competition	 than	others	 and	
fining	provisions	should	be	reflective	of	that	in	order	to	ensure	proportionality,	coherence	
and	non-discrimination.	Owing	to	the	difficulty	of	having	accurate	data	and	of	modelling	




















each	 product’s	 market,	 in	 calculating	 the	 basic	 amount,	 the	 Commission	 uses	
presumptions	or	variables	that	can	serve	as	proxies	in	relation	to	the	geographic	market	
(in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 value	 of	 sales),	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 infringement	 and	 its	
implementation.120	Arguably,	 the	combined	market	shares	of	the	undertakings	 involved	
in	a	 cartel	 is	 the	most	 important	determinant	 in	 lifting	 the	gravity	percentage	 from	 its	
minimum	of	15%	up	to	25%.121		
In	 contrast	 to	 the	basic	 amount,	 the	adjusted	amount	aims	 to	 reflect	 the	gravity	of	
each	 individual	 undertaking’s	 participation	 in	 the	 infringement.	 The	 calculation	 of	 the	
adjusted	amount	 follows	 the	economic	approach	which	demands	an	estimation	of	 the		
offender’s	gain	from	the	infringement.122	The	adjusted	amount	is	by	its	very	nature	more	
fact-based,	and	therefore	the	foreseeability	of	the	adjusted	amount	is	more	defeasible.	
However,	 this	 does	 not	 necessarily	 denote	 that	 the	 adjusted	 amount	 is	 less	
predictable. 123 	Indeed,	 the	 three	 adjustment	 factors	 in	 the	 non-exhaustive	 list	 of	
aggravating	circumstances,	namely	recidivism,	failure	to	cooperate	or	obstruction	of	the	
Commission’s	 investigation,	 and	 playing	 a	 particularly	 active	 role	 in	 the	 cartel,	 are	 less	
subjective	and	hence	more	predictable	than	the	factors	determinant	of	the	basic	amount.	
Growing	decisional	practice	regarding	these	factors	as	well	as	the	two	factors	for	specific	
deterrence	 (large	 undertakings	 and	 improper	 gains)	 also	 contribute	 to	 more	
foreseeability.124		
Overall,	given	the	common	complexities	of	calculating	fines,	the	general	methodology	
in	 the	 Fining	 Guidelines	 provides	 reasonable	 foreseeability.	 The	 use	 of	 per	 se	 rules	 in	
determining	the	basic	amount	has	benefits	in	terms	of	legal	certainty	and	deterrence	but	
shortcomings	 in	 terms	of	 flexibility	and	retribution,	as	 the	economic	harm	of	 individual	
offenders	 is	 not	 always	 considered.125	To	make	 up	 for	 the	 latter,	 the	 Commission	 in	 a	
second	 step	 adjusts	 the	 fine	 by	 taking	 an	 economic	 perspective.	 It	 reverts	 to	 the	
traditional	 per	 se	 approach	 and	 increases	 the	 basic	 amount	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 most	





















the	 reasons	 for	 its	 findings,	particularly	with	 regard	 to	 the	amount	of	 the	 fine	and	 the	
method	of	calculation.	The	statement	of	reasons	must	show	the	Commission’s	reasoning	











full	 predictability	 about	 fines	 in	 all	 cases.	Attempts	 to	 achieve	 full	 predictability	would	
only	 lead	 to	 ineffectively	 low	 fines	 in	 some	 cases	 or	 disproportionately	 high	 fines	 in	







others.130	The	 GC	 noted	 that	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 unforeseeability	 as	 to	 fines	must	 be	
permitted	 in	order	 to	avoid	excessive	prescriptive	 rigidity.	A	 fine	 subject	 to	 sufficiently	
circumscribed	 variation	 between	 the	 minimum	 and	 the	 maximum	 amounts	 may	
therefore	 render	 the	penalty	more	effective	both	 from	the	viewpoint	of	 its	application	
and	its	deterrent	effect.131	Even	if	it	was	possible	to	provide	full	predictability	in	the	Fining	
Guidelines,	 the	Commission	should	nonetheless	 retain	a	certain	degree	of	discretion	 in	
order	 to	 safeguard	deterrence.	The	 risk	of	 full	predictability	of	 fines	was	highlighted	 in	
Degussa.	The	Court	explained	that:	
“due	to	the	gravity	of	the	infringements	which	the	Commission	is	required	to	penalise,	the	
objectives	of	punishment	and	deterrence	 justify	preventing	undertakings	 from	being	 in	a	
position	 to	 assess	 the	 benefits	 which	 they	 would	 derive	 from	 their	 participation	 in	 an	
infringement	 by	 taking	 account,	 in	 advance,	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 fine	 which	 would	 be	
imposed	on	them	on	account	of	that	unlawful	conduct.”132	
This	 rationale	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	







expected	 illicit	 gain,	 but	 rather	 that	 the	 expected	 fine	 exceeds	 the	 expected	 gain	 by	 a	
sufficient	 safety	margin.	 Secondly,	 because	 the	marginal	 harm	 of	 fines	 increases	 with	
their	 amount,	 particularly	 when	 bankruptcy	 or	 severe	 financial	 distress	 becomes	 a	
possibility,	undertakings	tend	to	be	risk	averters.133	Moreover,	differentiation	of	penalties	
depending	on	the	role	played	by	each	of	the	conspirators	has	the	effect	of	raising	the	cost	













of	 creating	 and	maintaining	 cartels.	 Uncertainty	 as	 to	 the	 precise	 amount	 of	 the	 fines	
increases	 this	 effect,	 as	 it	 becomes	more	 difficult	 for	 the	 conspirators	 to	 come	 to	 an	
agreement	 on	 who	 should	 bear	 what	 risks	 and	 for	 what	 reward. 134 	Hence,	
unpredictability	 as	 to	 the	 fine	 may	 increase	 distrust	 within	 a	 cartel.	 Nonetheless,	 the	
unpredictability	 should	 be	 limited	 to	 a	 reasonable	 degree.	 A	 fine	 can	 only	 have	 a	
deterrent	 effect	 if	 potential	 whistleblowers	 are	 able	 to	 approximately	 estimate	 the	
expected	amount	of	 the	 fine.	A	 gross	 lack	of	 transparency	 in	 the	 fining	process	would	




twenty	 times	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 preceding	 decade.136	A	 study	 by	 Conner	 and	 Miller	
observed	a	107%	increase	in	the	level	of	fines	after	the	implementation	the	2006	Fining	
Guidelines.137	This	development	 is	not	altogether	 incidental	given	that	 the	rationale	 for	
revising	 the	 Fining	Guidelines	was	not	only	 to	 ensure	 greater	 transparency	but	 also	 to	
empower	 the	Commission	 to	 impose	higher	 fines.138	Compared	 to	 the	1998	Guidelines	
the	2006	Fining	Guidelines	appear	to	adhere	more	strongly	to	the	deterrence	theory	than	
to	 notions	 of	 retributive	 justice. 139 	The	 2006	 Guidelines	 most	 notably	 allow	 the	
Commission	to	depart	from	the	normal	fining	methodology	and	impose	uplifts	to	ensure	
that	 the	 fine	 has	 a	 deterrent	 effect.140	The	 Commission	 may	 increase	 the	 fine	 to	 be	
imposed	on	undertakings	with	particularly	large	turnovers	beyond	the	sales	of	goods	or	
services	to	which	the	infringement	relates.	 It	may	also	 increase	the	fine	 in	excess	of	an	
undertaking’s	illicit	gains	where	it	is	possible	to	estimate	that	amount.141		














less	 than	 in	 its	 predecessor,	 the	 1998	 Guidelines.	 In	 the	 current	 Guidelines,	 the	 basic	
amount	of	 the	 fine	 is	 set	according	 to	 the	gravity	of	 the	violation	and	aggravating	and	
mitigating	 circumstances	 may	 increase	 or	 reduce	 the	 fine	 respectively.	 For	 cartel	
agreements,	 being	 among	 the	 most	 serious	 competition	 law	 violations,	 the	 gravity	
percentage	is	set	at	or	close	to	30%	which	is	the	maximum	percentage	stipulated	in	the	




coercers,	 ringleaders,	 and	 recidivists.143	The	 1998	 Guidelines	 established	 a	 tariff-based	
system	by	reference	to	 the	gravity	of	 the	 infringement.	While	emphasis	was	placed	on	
the	‘nature’	of	the	infringement	as	being	a	crucial	element	in	the	analysis,	no	reference	
was	made	to	the	economic	value	of	the	market	concerned.144	Since	the	objective	of	the	
revised	 Guidelines	 was	 to	 increase	 deterrence,	 this	 method	 was	 replaced	 by	 a	 more	
deterrence-based	method.		
 Concluding	remarks	E.
The	Commission’s	power	to	 impose	fines	and	to	award	 leniency	are	 intrinsically	 linked.	
Both	the	amount	of	fines	and	the	fining	procedure	affect	the	effectiveness	and	fairness	of	
the	 EU	 leniency	 programme.	 The	 difficulty	 for	 potential	 applicants	 to	 understand	 the	
severity	of	fines	on	the	one	hand,	and	the	benefits	of	leniency	on	the	other,	constituted	a	
major	flaw	of	the	EU	leniency	programme	established	under	the	1996	Leniency	Notice.	
The	 inadequate	 predictability	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 fines	 was	 not	 only	 unfair	 but	 also	
diminished	 the	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 fines	 and	 therefore	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 EU	
leniency	programme.	In	reaction	to	growing	criticism,	the	Commission	adopted	the	1998	
Fining	 Guidelines.	 However,	 since	 these	 Guidelines	 failed	 to	 provide	 sufficient	
transparency,	 the	 Commission	 replaced	 them	with	 the	 current	 2006	 Fining	Guidelines.	







The	 calculation	method	of	 the	basic	 amount	 has	 been	 comprehensively	 revised	 and	 is	
now	 more	 transparent.	 The	 Commission	 still	 enjoys	 a	 wide	 margin	 of	 discretion	 but	
overall	 the	 general	 methodology	 in	 the	 Fining	 Guidelines	 provides	 reasonable	
foreseeability.	 The	 retention	 of	 some	 discretion	 prevents	 potential	 applicants	 from	
abusing	 the	 leniency	 programme	 by	 doing	 a	 cost-benefit	 analysis.	 The	 Commission’s	
margin	of	discretion	is	therefore	not	only	in	accordance	with	the	principle	of	legality	but	
is	 also	 important	 for	 the	 proper	 functioning	 of	 its	 leniency	 programme.	 The	 further	
compatibility	of	the	fine	with	view	to	the	principle	of	legality	is	therefore	beneficial	both		
from	 a	 fundamental	 rights	 perspective	 and	 for	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 leniency	
programme.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 leniency,	 higher	 fundamental	 rights	 protection	 and	
deterrence	 have	 become	 internalised	 since	 the	 2006	 Fining	 Guidelines.	 Rather	 than	
merely	 complementing	 effectiveness	 in	 counterbalancing	 deterrence	 and	 thereby	
preventing	 unfair	 procedures	 for	 defendants	 the	 internalisation	 of	 fundamental	 rights	
and	 effectiveness	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 concept	 that	 can	 be	 called	 ‘effectiveness	 through	




main	 risks,	 namely	 cheating	 on	 cartel	 arrangements	 and	 whistleblowing.	 Both	 risks	
increase	and	decrease	with	the	level	of	trust	among	the	cartel	members.	The	higher	the	
level	of	 trust,	 the	more	 stable	 the	 cartel	will	 be.	 In	order	 to	 suppress	 cheating,	 cartels	
often	employ	trust	substitutes	such	as	monitoring	and	punishment.	It	is	more	difficult	to	
use	 trust	 substitutes	 to	 prevent	 whistleblowing	 since	 most	 of	 them	 are	 illegal.	 For	
instance,	an	agreement	not	to	cheat	on	a	price-fixing	agreement	is	unenforceable	given	
that	the	latter	itself	is	illegal	and	therefore	unenforceable	in	court.	Distrust	with	respect	
to	whistleblowing	 is	 therefore	higher	 than	compared	to	cheating.	Traditionally,	distrust	
caused	by	cheating	has	led	to	the	silent	unravelling	of	cartels.	This	has	changed	with	the	
implementation	 of	 leniency	 programmes.	 Competition	 authorities	 nowadays	 foment	





The	 development	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 fining	 and	 leniency	 policies	 shows	 that	 the	
Commission	 has	 been	 constantly	 striving	 to	 increase	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 its	 cartel	
enforcement	 system.	 The	 Commission	 has	 predominantly	 tried	 to	 enhance	 the	
effectiveness	 of	 its	 leniency	 programme	 by	 increasing	 deterrence	 and	 transparency.	
Deterrence	 can	 be	 increased	 by	 either	 raising	 the	 level	 of	 fines	 or	 the	 likelihood	 of	
detection.	 In	 contrast	 to	 deterrence,	 retribution	 has	 only	 played	 a	 secondary	 role	 by	
ensuring	that	the	leniency	programme	does	not	deviate	from	common	notions	of	justice	
and	fairness.146	Both	the	Fining	Guidelines	and	the	Leniency	Notice	appear	to	be	primarily	
based	 on	 the	 deterrence	 model	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 enhancing	 effectiveness,	 while	
retribution	acts	as	a	constraint	on	effectiveness	in	order	to	safeguard	legitimacy.		
	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 section	 is	 to	 test	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 that	 can	 affect	 the	






after	 the	 start	of	Commission	 investigations;	 (3)	 immunity	eligibility	 for	 ringleaders;	 (4)	
flexibility	as	to	the	immediate	termination	of	the	cartel	activities;	and	(5)	the	availability	
of	 ‘immunity-plus’.	148	Of	 these	 five	 factors,	 the	 first	 four	were	actually	 implemented	 in	
the	two	revisions	of	the	Leniency	Notice.		
 Higher	fines	and	more	transparent	calculation	of	fines	A.













same	 time,	 the	2006	Fining	Guidelines	have	 significantly	 increased	 the	 transparency	of	





leniency	programme.	Both	 the	1998	and	2006	Fining	Guidelines	have	 stressed	 the	 link	
between	an	increase	in	fines	and	the	effectiveness	of	the	leniency	programme.	The	1998	
Fining	Guidelines	specifically	stated	that		
“the	 increase	 in	 the	 fine	 for	 long-term	 infringements	 represents	 a	 considerable	









in	 time.	 The	Commission	 therefore	 arguably	 increased	 the	 significance	of	 the	duration	
criterion	 in	 order	 to	 enhance	 the	 incentive	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 EU	 Leniency	
Notice.151		
The	2006	Fining	Guidelines	have	provided	more	transparency	and	impartiality	to	the	
Commission’s	 fining	 decisions	 and	 therefore	 indirectly	 made	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	














the	 likelihood	 of	 cartel	 offenders	 getting	 caught	 and	 being	 stripped	 of	 their	 unfair	
advantage	 increases,	which	 in	 turn	 raises	 the	 chances	of	 justice	 being	done.	 Secondly,	
higher	 fines	 are	 justified	 as	 cartels	 go	 to	 greater	 lengths	 to	 subterfuge	 their	 illegal	
conduct.	 The	 Commission	 has	 to	 account	 for	 the	 fact	 that	 cartels	 have	 adjusted	 to	 its	
leniency	programme.	These	are	legitimate	reasons	for	increasing	the	level	of	fines.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 constantly	 increasing	 the	 level	 of	 fines	 may	 also	 lead	 to	 illegitimate	
outcomes.	 The	 illegitimacy	may	primarily	 relate	 to	 the	 infringement	of	 the	principle	of	
proportionality.	 There	 are	 valid	 reasons	 against	 imposing	 excessive	 fines	 such	 as	 the	
reduction	 of	 consumer	welfare.	 For	 example,	 if	 in	 a	worst-case	 scenario	 one	 or	more	
undertakings	go	bankrupt,	thus	weakening	the	competitive	structure	of	the	market	and	
adversely	 affecting	 employees	 and	 shareholders.	 In	 such	 a	 case	 the	 public	 interest	 in	
sanctioning	might	actually	lead	to	anti-competitive	outcomes.152	
However,	 the	 level	of	 the	Commission’s	 cartel	 fines	does	not	 seem	to	be	excessive.	
From	a	substantial	 increase	 in	 the	 level	of	 fines	alone,	 it	cannot	be	concluded	that	 the	
recent	 level	 is	 excessive	 as	 it	may	well	 be	 that	 the	 previous	 lower	 level	 has	 been	 too	
low. 153 	There	 are	 three	 indications	 that	 the	 level	 of	 fines	 at	 EU	 level	 is	 not	
disproportionately	 high.	 First,	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 statistics 154 	reveal	 that	 the	
Commission	 applied	 the	 10%	 cap	 on	 fines	 only	 in	 few	 cases	 (less	 than	 8%	 of	 all	 fines	







imposed	since	 the	publication	of	 the	2006	Fining	Guidelines).	 In	over	half	of	 the	 fining	
decisions	 the	Commission	 imposed	a	 fine	of	only	up	 to	1%	of	 the	undertaking’s	 global	
turnover.	Secondly,	the	race	for	confession	does	not	suggest	that	the	fines	are	excessive.	
This	indication	directly	relates	to	the	effectiveness	of	the	EU	leniency	programme.	If	the	
level	 of	 fines	 is	 indeed	 the	 foremost	 internal	 effectiveness	 criteria	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	












had	already	 initiated	an	 inspection	 into	 the	 infringement,	 the	 chance	of	 immunity	was	
foreclosed	and	the	maximum	benefit	was	limited	to	a	75%	reduction	in	the	fine.	Since	the	
2002	Notice	 this	 so-called	 ‘ongoing	 investigation	 rule’	was	 removed	 and	 immunity	 has	
become	more	automatic.	According	to	paragraph	8(b)	of	the	2006	Notice,	immunity	can	
also	 be	 awarded	 if	 an	 undertaking	 is	 the	 first	 to	 provide	 information	 that	 allow	 the	
Commission	to	find	an	 infringement	of	Article	101	TFEU	 in	connection	with	the	alleged	
cartel.	Immunity	may	still	be	available	after	the	Commission	has	started	an	investigation.	




















first	may	no	 longer	 impose	much	discouragement	 if	 the	cartel	will	be	exposed	anyway.	
The	 fear	 of	 investigations	 stokes	 distrust	 that	 might	 eventually	 lead	 to	 a	 race	 for	
confession.	The	race	for	confession	is	more	intense	since	cartel	members	must	not	only	
race	against	each	other	but	also	against	competition	authorities.160		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 removing	 the	 ongoing	 investigation	 rule	 may	 help	 to	 increase	
distrust	among	cartel	members.	If	immunity	was	not	available	once	an	investigation	has	
started,	all	cartel	members	might	collectively	agree	not	to	defect	and	instead	take	the	risk	
of	 being	 exposed	by	 the	 competition	 authority.161	They	might	 even	destroy	 all	 existing	
documentation	 about	 the	 cartel	 to	 discourage	 any	 leniency	 applications.	 The	 cartel	
























private	 actions	 for	 damages.	 Distrust	 is	 therefore	 reduced	 once	 an	 investigation	 has	
started.					
Overall,	 even	 if	 the	 Commission	 has	 already	 launched	 an	 investigation	 the	 first	
leniency	applicant	should	be	eligible	for	immunity.	It	may	still	be	rational	to	reward	the	
first	confessor	with	immunity	as	this	undertaking	may	provide	evidence	that	is	essential	
for	 the	 Commission	 to	 successfully	 investigate	 and	 prosecute	 the	 cartel.	 Typically	 an	
immunity	 applicant’s	 insider	 information	 and	 evidence	 are	 more	 substantial	 than	 the	
Commission’s	evidence.	The	 removal	of	 the	ongoing	 investigation	 rule	also	encourages	
cartel	members	not	to	destroy	documents	that	could	serve	later	as	evidence.		
Removing	 the	 ongoing	 investigation	 exception	 to	 immunity	 has	 also	 enhanced	 the	
transparency	 and	 certainty	 in	 the	 Leniency	 Notice.	 Under	 the	 1996	Notice,	 even	 if	 an	
undertaking	 had	 known	 that	 it	 would	 be	 the	 first	 confessor,	 it	 might	 not	 have	 had	
sufficient	incentive	to	confess	unless	immunity	was	guaranteed.	If	a	cartel	member	needs	
to	worry	that	it	would	not	get	immunity	even	if	it	were	the	first	to	confess,	then	this	may	





appear	 less	 deserved	 when	 the	 Commission	 has	 already	 single-handedly	 gathered	









the	 Commission	 after	 the	 latter	 has	 started	 an	 investigation,	 the	 decision	 to	 come	
forward	is	less	out	of	the	undertaking’s	own	motion	and	more	due	to	the	added	pressure	
by	 the	 investigation.	 The	 deterrence	 level	 would	 be	 unnecessarily	 reduced	 if	 the	
Commission	awards	immunity	for	insufficient	or	needless	cooperation	in	return.		
To	some	extent,	the	Commission	has	already	attempted	to	limit	the	negative	impact	
on	 retribution.	 Paragraph	 11	 of	 the	 2006	 Notice	 states	 that	 immunity	 pursuant	 to	
paragraph	8(b)	will	only	be	granted	on	the	cumulative	conditions	that	the	Commission	did	
not	have	enough	evidence	to	find	an	infringement	of	Article	101	TFEU	at	the	time	of	the	
leniency	 application,	 and	 that	 no	 undertaking	 had	 been	 granted	 conditional	 immunity	
from	 fines	 under	 paragraph	 8(a).	 It	 is	 hence	 slightly	more	 difficult	 to	 obtain	 immunity	
under	paragraph	8(b)	than	under	paragraph	8(a).	Moreover,	in	light	of	the	Commission’s	
reliance	on	 its	 leniency	programme,165	a	situation	where	 it	will	not	have	to	rely	on	any	
cooperation	from	cartel	insiders	is	rather	exceptional.	After	all,	the	detection	of	hard	core	
cartels	 is	 extremely	 difficult	 without	 whistleblowers	 thus	 justifying	 the	 operation	 of	 a	
leniency	programme	in	the	first	place.	Finally,	the	possibility	of	immunity	despite	ongoing	

















tional	 cartel	member	 is	much	more	 likely	 to	 trust	 its	 co-offender	not	 to	 confess	when	
confession	yields	no	significant	benefit	to	the	latter	than	to	trust	a	co-offender	who	could	
escape	 sanctions	 by	 confessing.168	Ringleader	 ineligibility	 is	 a	 particular	 strong	 selling	
point	for	an	undertaking	in	a	duopolised	market	planning	to	persuade	its	competitor	to	









by	 immunity	eligibility	 for	 ringleaders	as	 rival	 firms	will	have	 to	consider	 the	possibility	
that	its	competitor	is	setting	up	a	cartel	only	to	take	an	antitrust	fall.170		
The	 removal	of	 the	 immunity	 restriction	 for	 ringleaders	 since	 the	2002	Notices	was	
also	welcomed	in	terms	of	transparency	and	certainty.	The	1996	Notice	did	not	explicitly	
use	 the	 term	 ‘ringleader’	 and	 merely	 stated	 that	 an	 undertaking	 which	 “played	 a	




can	qualify	 for	 immunity.	By	removing	ringleader	 ineligibility,	certainty	and	distrust	has	
been	enhanced	as	well	as	the	effectiveness	of	the	EU	leniency	programme.		










retribution.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 cartel	 offender	 escaping	 sanctions	 for	 its	
illegal	 activities	 is	difficult	 to	 reconcile	with	 common	notions	of	 retributive	 justice.	 The	
ringleader	 of	 a	 cartel	 by	 definition	 played	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 the	 cartel.	 Being	 more	
responsible	 for	 organising	 the	 cartel,	 it	 is	 hence	 guiltier	 of	 committing	 an	 antitrust	
violation	than	cartel	members	who	merely	assumed	a	passive	role.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	 same	 general	 rationale	 for	 having	 a	 leniency	 programme	 in	 the	 first	 place	 can	 be	
extended	 to	 offer	 immunity	 to	 ringleaders.	 The	 Commission	 justifies	 its	 leniency	
programme	 by	 stating	 that	 the	 “interests	 of	 consumers	 and	 citizens	 in	 ensuring	 that	
secret	 cartels	 are	 detected	 and	 punished	 outweigh	 the	 interest	 in	 fining	 those	
undertakings	that	enable	the	Commission	to	detect	and	prohibit	such	practices.”172		





than	a	member	who	played	only	a	minor	role.	 In	consideration	of	all	 these	effects,	 the	
chance	 of	 successful	 cartel	 detection	 and	 prosecution	 is	 enhanced	 due	 to	 immunity	
eligibility	 for	 ringleaders.	Therefore	 the	 initial	 assumption	 that	 retribution	 is	 reduced	 is	
not	valid.	It	seems	more	important	that	at	least	coercers	are	still	excluded	from	the	scope	
of	 immunity.	 A	 coercer	 compelled	 other	 undertakings	 to	 join	 the	 cartel,	 thus	 causing	
greater	harm	than	a	ringleader.	It	can	also	be	argued	that	a	coercer	committed	more	than	
just	an	antitrust	infringement	since	it	used	some	form	of	(economic)	duress.		
Leslie	claims	that	ringleader	 ineligibility	 focuses	more	on	short-term	spite	than	 long-
term	 deterrence.175 	He	 suggests	 that	 the	 proper	 way	 of	 signalling	 the	 competition	
regime’s	 contempt	 for	 ringleaders	 is	 to	 impose	 more	 severe	 penalties	 on	 them.	 This	







allows	 punishment	 to	 reflect	 the	 gravity	 of	 their	 role	 in	 the	 cartel.	 This	 is	 indeed	 the	
practice	 under	 the	 current	 Fining	 Guidelines.176	To	 the	 extent	 that	making	 ringleaders	
eligible	 for	 immunity	may	 reduce	 the	 expected	 cost	 of	 cartelisation	 (and	 thus	 reduce	
deterrence),	 increasing	 penalties	 for	 ringleaders	 compensates	 for	 this	 effect	 and	
therefore	maintains	the	level	of	deterrence.	This	also	gives	ringleaders	a	greater	incentive	
to	be	the	first	to	defect	as	they	have	more	to	lose	in	case	someone	else	confesses	first.	






their	 cartel	 participation	when	 it	 started	 cooperating	 with	 the	 Commission	 unless	 the	
ongoing	 participation	 is	 reasonably	 necessary	 to	 safeguard	 the	 integrity	 of	 the	
inspections.178	In	other	words,	the	Commission	may	allow	a	leniency	applicant	to	resume	
its	cartel	activities	 if	 it	believes	 that	 the	applicant’s	sudden	termination	might	alert	 the	
other	 cartel	 members.	 If	 the	 other	 cartel	 members	 are	 suspicious	 that	 one	 of	 their	
members	 might	 have	 denounced	 the	 cartel,	 there	 is	 a	 plausible	 risk	 that	 they	 might	
destroy	 important	pieces	of	evidence	before	the	Commission	can	conduct	a	dawn	raid.	
The	 new,	 flexible	 approach	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 allows	 the	 Commission	 to	 employ	 a	
leniency	applicant	as	an	‘insider’	on	the	cartel	in	order	to	collect	valuable	information	and	
evidence	to	successfully	prosecute	the	rest	of	the	cartel.	Hence,	a	flexible	rule	on	leniency	
applicant’s	 cartel	 termination	 can	 be	 more	 effective	 in	 proving	 the	 infringement	 and	
punishing	the	other	cartel	members.		
The	 flexible	 termination	 rule	 entails	 a	 slightly	 negative	 impact	 on	 retribution.	 The	
immunity	 recipient’s	 continued	 participation	 in	 the	 infringement	 allows	 it	 to	 continue	
earning	cartel	profits	for	some	time.	Since	no	fine	is	imposed	against	the	undertaking,	this	






would	mean	 that	 in	 contrast	 to	 all	 the	 other	 cartel	members	 its	 illegal	 profits	 are	 not	
partially	 or	 fully	 disgorged	 by	 a	 fine.	 These	 profits	 will	 only	 be	 disgorged	 if	 successful	




Finally,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 completeness,	 this	 section	 shall	 discuss	 the	 absence	 of	 an	
immunity-plus	provision	in	the	current	EU	leniency	programme.	Under	such	a	provision,	
an	undertaking	that	is	late	to	obtain	immunity	in	relation	to	a	cartel	in	one	market	but	the	
first	 to	 denounce	 a	 cartel	 in	 a	 second	market,	will	 receive	 immunity	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
latter,	 and	 will	 also	 receive	 more	 favourable	 treatment	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 former.	
Undertakings	therefore	have	an	additional	incentive	to	seek	leniency.	 In	contrast	to	the	
US	and	the	UK	 leniency	programmes,	 the	Commission	did	not	seize	 the	opportunity	 to	
follow	suit	 in	 the	 last	 revision	of	 the	Leniency	Notice.	While	 some	commentators	have	





an	 ongoing	 investigation	 unveiled	 information	 of	 cartel	 activities	 in	 an	 unrelated	




















those	that	 lost	out	 in	the	race	for	 immunity	 in	the	first	cartel.	The	impact	of	 immunity-
plus	 on	 deterrence	 can	 be	 further	 enhanced	 by	 also	 implementing	 its	 mirror	 image	
known	as	‘penalty-plus’.	The	latter	is	also	applied	by	the	US	DOJ	in	its	corporate	leniency	
programme.	 If	 in	 the	 course	 of	 its	 current	 investigation	 the	 DOJ	 discovers	 an	 earlier	
conspiracy	to	which	the	undertaking	belonged	and	which	has	not	been	disclosed,	it	will	
argue	 strongly	 in	 court	 that	 this	 amounts	 to	 an	 aggravating	 factor	 and	 that	 the	
undertaking’s	punishment	should	therefore	be	towards	the	upper	end	of	the	range	set	
out	in	the	Sentencing	Guidelines.185	Immunity-plus	and	penalty-plus	hence	illustrate	the	
carrot	and	 stick	approach	perfectly.	 Immunity-plus	provision	also	helps	 to	 increase	 the	
distrust	among	cartel	members.	Players	 in	a	Prisoner’s	Dilemma	are	more	distrusting	 if	





award	 amounts	 to	 granting	 more	 than	 100%	 leniency	 for	 the	 second	 cartel.187	The	
additional	reduction	in	the	fine	is	akin	to	a	positive	financial	reward.	Despite	the	stronger	
incentive	 to	cooperate	 there	are	concerns	 that	 the	negative	effects	are	also	 increased.	
Immunity-plus	 would	 lower	 the	 penalty	 level	 even	 further,	 and	 might	 be	 difficult	 to	







reconcile	 with	 retribution	 and	 equal	 treatment.188 	Immunity-plus	 is	 also	 sometimes	




more	 likely	 to	 also	 be	 participating	 in	 other	 cartels.189 	Thus,	 rewarding	 a	 leniency	
applicant	 in	relation	to	a	second	cartel190	for	evidence	which	the	competition	authority	
could	 obtain	 by	 conducting	 a	 surprise	 inspection	 in	 a	 related	 market	 may	 constitute	
undeserved	 leniency.	 However,	 justification	 for	 immunity-plus	 can	 be	 enhanced	 by	
pairing	 it	 with	 penalty-plus.	 In	 light	 of	 a	 penalty-plus	 provision	 an	 immunity	 applicant	
must	 deliver	 cooperation	 beyond	 the	 threshold	 for	 “normal”	 immunity	 in	 order	 to	
absolutely	 deserve	 its	 immunity.	 Immunity-plus	 is	 thus	 not	 only	 produces	 more	
deterrence	 but	 is	 also	 more	 fair	 from	 a	 retributive	 perspective	 if	 it	 is	 combined	 with	
penalty-plus.		
 Concluding	remarks	F.
The	 changes	 to	 four	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 internal	 factors	 in	 the	 2002	 and	 2006	
revisions	 of	 the	 Leniency	 Notice	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 increased	 distrust	 among	 potential	
cartelists,	 thus	 raising	 the	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programme.	 The	 most	
significant	 changes	 have	 been	 the	 increased	 level	 of	 fines	 and	 the	 enhanced	
foreseeability	in	the	calculation	of	fines.	Distrust	has	been	further	raised	by	widening	the	
pool	of	eligible	immunity	applicants.	The	changes	to	the	internal	factors	raised	the	level	
of	 deterrence	 without	 unduly	 reducing	 the	 level	 of	 retribution.	 The	 enhanced	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 leniency	 programme	 due	 to	 higher	 deterrence	 may	 even	 have	 a	
positive	impact	on	retribution.	Cartel	offenders	are	now	more	likely	to	get	exposed	and	
punished.	 Both	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 lower	 threshold	 for	 immunity	 and	 the	 immunity	
eligibility	 for	 ringleaders	 the	gains	 in	 terms	of	 retribution	outweigh	 the	 initial	 sacrifices	
which	 are	 therefore	 justified.	 Furthermore,	 the	 higher	 thresholds	 for	 all	 subsequent	















each	 revision	 of	 the	 Leniency	 Notice.191	The	 2002	 and	 2006	 Notices	 have	 increased	
transparency	 and	 certainty	 inter	 alia	 by	 making	 immunity	 more	 automatic,	 allowing	
hypothetical	 leniency	 applications,	 and	 adding	 a	 marker	 system.	 Importantly,	
transparency	has	also	been	enhanced	in	respect	of	the	EU	fining	policy	by	publishing	and	
later	 revising	 the	 Fining	 Guidelines.	 Being	 able	 to	 better	 estimate	 the	 amount	 of	





the	 Commission	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 immunity	 has	 become	 more	 automatic.	 The	 2002	




become	eligible	 for	 immunity.	 These	 changes	 are	 likely	 to	 increase	 the	distrust	 among	
cartel	members	and	therefore	make	defection	a	more	lucrative	strategy.		










	 The	 higher	 level	 of	 deterrence	 has	 been	 achieved	 without	 unnecessarily	 forfeiting	
retribution.	 The	 2002	 Notice	 introduced	 more	 gradation	 and	 narrowed	 the	 leniency	
bands	for	subsequent	leniency	recipients.	At	the	same	time,	the	threshold	for	obtaining	
leniency	 vis-à-vis	 immunity	 has	 been	 raised	 due	 to	 the	 SAV	 standard	 of	 evidence.	 In	
addition,	the	unnecessary	nolo	contendere	provision	was	removed	in	the	2002	revision.	
Moreover,	 the	 slight	 sacrifices	 in	 terms	 of	 retribution	 due	 to	 immunity	 eligibility	 for	
ringleaders	and	confessions	after	the	start	of	investigations	are	not	only	compensated	by	
the	 higher	 level	 of	 fines	 and	 higher	 threshold	 for	 fine	 reductions	 but	 are	 also	
counterbalanced	 by	 the	 increase	 in	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 leniency	 programme.	 The	






the	 Commission	 may	 search	 private	 premises	 and	 find	 inculpatory	 evidence	 may	 add	
urgency	 to	 the	race	 for	confession.	Regulation	1/2003	also	 reinforced	the	 fundamental	
rights	protection	in	EU	cartel	enforcement.	In	conjunction	with	the	Charter	it	sets	out	a	
number	 of	 procedural	 guarantees	 on	 which	 undertakings	 may	 rely	 during	 the	
investigation	 stage,	 and	which	must	 be	 interpreted	 and	 applied	with	 respect	 to	 those	
rights	and	principles.	As	already	established	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	leniency	policy	is	
in	compliance	with	cooperating	and	non-cooperating	cartel	members’	fundamental	rights	
in	 the	 investigation	 stage,	 namely	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination	 and	 the	
presumption	of	innocence.	Focussing	on	the	developments	in	the	sentencing	stage	of	the	




1998	 Fining	Guidelines.	However,	 these	 guidelines	were	 also	 criticised	 for	 their	 lack	of	
transparency.	 Compared	 to	 the	 1998	 Guidelines	 the	 foreseeability	 of	 fines	 has	 been	





nonetheless	caused	uncertainty	 for	 infringing	undertakings	about	 their	estimated	 fines.	
The	 2006	 Leniency	 Notice	 in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 2006	 Fining	 Guidelines	 provides	
undertakings	with	better	understanding	about	 the	benefits	 of	 blowing	 the	whistle	 and	
the	 risks	 of	 not	 cooperating	 with	 the	 Commission.	 This	 awareness	 together	 with	 the	




‘effectiveness	 through	 fairness’	 in	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement.	 The	 2006	 Notice,	 the	 2006	
Fining	Guidelines	and	Regulation	1/2003	have	collectively	increased	deterrence	as	well	as	
retribution	 and	 due	 process.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 internalisation	 of	 deterrence	 and	
retribution	 brought	 about	 by	 the	 changes	 to	 the	 internal	 factors,	 deterrence	 and	
fundamental	 rights	protection	have	been	 internalised.	 In	assessing	 the	amendments	 to	
the	Leniency	Notice	and	 the	Fining	Guidelines	 it	 is	 submitted	here	 that	deterrence	has	




CHAPTER	 5:	 THE	 IMPACT	 OF	 PRIVATE	 ACTIONS	 FOR	 DAMAGES	 ON	 THE	
EFFECTIVENESS	AND	FAIRNESS	OF	THE	EU	LENIENCY	POLICY		
 Introduction		I.
After	a	 leniency	application	has	 led	 to	 the	 investigation,	prosecution	and	sentencing	of	
the	cartel,	the	enforcement	procedure	is	not	necessarily	over	for	the	parties	concerned.	
The	 sentenced	 cartel	 members	 may	 individually	 appeal	 the	 Commission’s	 decisions	
against	 them	before	 the	GC	–	a	possibility	 that	 is	 frequently	 taken	up	 in	order	 to	 limit	
liability	and	 to	get	 the	 fine	 reduced.	This	 is	also	 the	 stage	of	 the	procedure	where	 the	
cartel	 victims	may	 come	 into	 play.	 	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 only	 on	 leniency	 and	 private	
actions.	 The	 stage	addressed	here	 is	 considered	 the	 ‘private	enforcement	 stage’	which	
follows	 the	 ‘sentencing	 stage’	 dealt	 with	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 and	 the	 investigation	 stage	 in	
Chapter	3.	This	chapter	treats	private	actions	as	a	so-called	‘external	factor’,	which	is	to	
be	 contrasted	 with	 the	 ‘internal	 factors’	 dealt	 with	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 In	 the	
leniency	context	private	actions	are	an	external	factor	because	they	are	outside	the	realm	






the	 Modernisation	 Regulation	 which	 gave	 more	 enforcement	 powers	 to	 NCAs	 and	
national	courts.	For	the	past	ten	years	the	Commission	has	reinforced	efforts	to	raise	the	
level	 of	 private	 enforcement	 throughout	 the	 EU,	 following	 the	 Ashurst	 Report,1	which	
found	that	private	enforcement	was	in	a	state	of	“total	underdevelopment”.	Although	in	
some	Member	States	private	enforcement	has	clearly	picked	up	in	the	last	few	years,	the	
overall	 development	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 according	 to	 the	 Commission	 has	 not	 been	








satisfactory,	 and	 even	 less	 so	 in	 respect	 to	 harmonisation.	 There	 are	 substantial	
differences	 in	 the	Member	 States’	 laws	 on	 private	 antitrust	 enforcement,	 for	 instance	
regarding	 limitation	 periods	 or	 the	 passing	 on	 of	 damages.	 In	 the	 ‘Antitrust	 Damages	
Initiative’2	prior	to	the	recently	adopted	Antitrust	Damages	Directive,	the	Commission	has	
proposed	 measures	 to	 remedy	 two	 particular	 enforcement	 gaps	 in	 Europe:	 first,	 the	
ineffective	 exercise	 of	 the	 EU	 right	 to	 compensation;	 and	 secondly,	 the	 threat	 to	 the	
smooth	interaction	between	public	and	private	enforcement	with	regard	to	leniency.		
This	 chapter	 dwells	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 private	 actions	 for	 damages	 as	 a	 so-called	
‘external	factor’	on	the	effectiveness	and	fairness	of	the	EU	leniency	programme.	Unlike	
the	 previous	 two	 chapters,	 which	 dealt	 with	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	
programme	 on	 cooperating	 and	 non-cooperating	 cartel	 members,	 this	 chapter	 will	




if	 immunity	 and	 leniency	 recipients	 are	discouraged	 from	coming	 forward	due	 to	 their	
prospective	 civil	 liability.	 Notions	 of	 fairness	 are	 affected	 in	 several	 respects.	 The	
obligation	for	infringing	undertakings	to	pay	compensation	is	a	form	of	corrective	justice,	
and	 is	 treated	 here	 as	 substantive	 fairness,	 whereas	 the	 victims’	 right	 to	 an	 effective	
remedy	 is	 a	 fundamental	 right	and	as	 such	seeks	 to	ensure	procedural	 fairness.	 It	 also	
argued	here	that	private	actions	for	damages	can	have	a	deterrent	effect.	In	line	with	the	
previous	 chapters	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 leniency	 awards	 in	 relation	 to	 private	 enforcement	
must	 not	 adversely	 affect	 the	 level	 of	 deterrence	 and	 retribution.	 Again	 from	 a	
substantive	fairness	perspective	any	leniency	award	must	be	proportional	and	not	lead	to	
an	unfair	advantage.3	It	is	submitted	that	in	an	optimal	cartel	enforcement	system	public	
and	 private	 enforcement	 should	 complement	 each	 other,	 and	 that	 an	 optimal	






















newly	 emerging	 law	 on	 private	 competition	 law	 enforcement	 is	 less	 explored.	 The	
purpose	 of	 this	 section	 is	 therefore	 to	 give	 an	 introduction	 to	 this	 interaction	 before	
addressing	the	potential	tensions	and	solutions	in	section	III	of	this	chapter.		
 Complementarity	between	public	and	private	enforcement		A.
As	 established	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 the	 EU	 cartel	 enforcement	 system	principally	 pursues	 the	
objectives	 of	 achieving	 a	 high	 cartel	 clear-up	 rate	 and	 the	 provision	 of	 justice	 and	
restitution.	 These	 objectives	 can	 be	 advanced	 by	 the	 punitive,	 injunctive	 and	




Posner	 acknowledges	 the	 compensation	 of	 victims	 as	 another	 objective,	 however	
qualifies	compensation	as	subsidiary	“because	a	well-designed	system	of	deterrence	will	
reduce	the	incidence	of	violation	to	a	low	level	and	because	[…]	such	a	system	would,	as	a	









administering	 compensation	 are	 prohibitive.”6 	Competition	 enforcement	 thus	 has	 a	




cartel	 (‘follow-on	 actions’)	 may	 serve	 as	 an	 additional	 financial	 burden	 on	 top	 of	
corporate	 fines	 and	 therefore	 increase	 deterrence.	 Secondly,	 when	 competition	
authorities	 cannot	 or	will	 not	 prosecute	 a	 cartel	 for	whatever	 reasons,	 private	 actions	
(‘stand-alone	actions’)	may	offer	the	only	recourse	to	go	after	cartelists.8		
The	 prevailing	 view	 among	 competition	 authorities	 and	 scholars	 is	 that	 public	 and	
private	 enforcement	 can	 and	 should	 be	 combined.9	This	 view	 is	 also	 supported	 by	
political	 theory	 as	 well	 as	 law	 and	 economics	 theory.	 According	 to	 Kovacic,	 there	 are	
strong	 interdependencies	 between	 the	operation	of	 private	 rights	 of	 action	 and	public	
enforcement,10	and	 irrespective	 of	 the	 specific	 design	 of	 the	 private	 right	 of	 action,	 a	
jurisdiction	must	consider	the	possible	 interaction	between	the	operation	of	public	and	
private	 enforcement. 11 	The	 two	 systems	 aim	 at	 different	 aspects	 of	 the	 same	




























phenomenon,	 but	 they	 are	 complementary	 and	 necessary	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 optimal	
enforcement.12	
From	a	law	and	economics	perspective,	Becker	and	Stigler	argued	that	damages	could	




litigation,	 therefore	 causing	 over-enforcement	 and	 over-deterrence. 14 	By	 contrast,	
Polinsky	claimed	that	damages	recovered	by	private	claimants	would	often	be	limited	by	
the	net	worth	of	the	defendant.	In	cases	with	high	enforcement	costs	and/or	defendants	
with	 low	net	worth,	 it	would	 not	 be	 rational	 for	 potential	 claimants	 to	 bring	 damages	
actions.15	The	 risk	of	 over-deterrence	 through	private	 enforcers	 and	 the	more	efficient	
use	 of	 resources	 by	 public	 enforcers	 does	 not	 justify	 a	 total	 rejection	 of	 private	
enforcement.	It	rather	suggests	that	private	and	public	enforcement	should	complement	



























that	 allows	 private	 individuals	 and	 groups	 to	make	 enforcement	 claims	 in	 court.19	The	
ability	 of	 a	 private	 party	 to	 bring	 a	 case	 to	 a	 judicial	 official	 can	 also	 enhance	 the	
prosecutor’s	 accountability	 and	 raise	 the	 efficiency	 of	 competition	 law	 enforcement.20	
Given	that	competition	authorities	due	to	resource	constraints	are	not	able	to	prosecute	
every	 case,	 they	 should	 focus	 on	 a	 selected	 number	 of	 cases	 or	 certain	 types	 of	
infringement. 21 	Private	 claimants	 may	 supplement	 public	 enforcement	 by	 bringing	
actions	 against	 infringements	 that	 competition	 authorities	 are	 unwilling	 or	 unable	 to	
prosecute.22	Private	 enforcement	 may	 thus	 be	 a	 check	 on	 government	 or	 regulatory	
capture.23	The	combination	of	corporate	fines	and	private	damages	can	solve,	or	at	least,	
allay	 some	 of	 legitimacy-related	 problems	 that	 are	 typically	 raised	 when	 competition	
authorities	 impose	 extremely	 high	 fines.	 For	 example,	 in	 setting	 an	 offender’s	 fine,	 a	
























role	 of	 private	 enforcement.24	The	 right	 to	 damages	 is	 stipulated	 in	 Section	 4	 of	 the	
Clayton	Act	which	entitles	claimants	to	three	times	the	actual	damages	they	suffered	as	a	
result	 of	 the	 anti-competitive	 infringement.	 Treble	 damages	 serve	 a	 dual-objective,	
namely	 to	 compensate	 injured	 victims	 of	 anti-competitive	 conduct	 and	 to	 attract	
enforcement	 resources	 to	 supplement	 the	 government’s	 deterrence-oriented	 efforts.25	
The	motivation	of	the	drafters	of	the	antitrust	acts26	has	been	to	provide	deterrence	for	
offenders	and	compensation	 for	 victims.27	The	dual-objective	of	private	actions,	 and	of	
treble	damages	lawsuits	in	particular,	has	also	been	emphasised	by	the	Supreme	Court.28	
According	 to	 one	 commentator,	 the	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 private	 actions	 works	 at	 two	
different	levels:		
“On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 is	 an	 incentive	 for	 private	 enforcement	 since	 private	 plaintiffs	 are	
themselves	motivated	by	a	private	interest	and	treble	damages	might	convince	them	to	act,	
in	which	case,	they	might	heighten	the	probability	of	detection	of	serious	[anti-competitive]	
behaviour,	 and	 thus	 add	 to	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 offence	 as	 the	 offender	 would	 have	 more	
chances	of	being	apprehended.	On	the	other	hand,	the	prospect	of	paying	high	amounts	of	
damages	can	itself	be	a	strong	deterrent.”29	
	 The	 role	 of	 private	 actions	 at	 the	 first	 level	 is	 often	 described	 as	 ‘private	 attorney	
general’.	The	rationale	behind	this	concept	is	that	economic	agents	themselves	become	
instrumental	 in	 implementing	competition	policy	and	the	general	 level	of	compliance	 is	
raised.30	It	 is	 assumed	 that	 private	 litigation	 supplements	 government	 actions.	 Since	
public	enforcement	 is	 considered	 to	be	 inadequate	 in	achieving	effective	enforcement,	























incentivise	 and	 facilitate	 private	 enforcement,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 avoiding	
unmeritorious	lawsuits.33	A	common	criticism	is	that	the	reliance	on	private	litigation	may	
cause	 undesirable	 side	 effects.	 The	 prospect	 of	 treble	 damages	 may	 trigger	 frivolous	
lawsuits	 and	 excessive	 enforcement	 that	 could	 lead	 to	 ‘false	 negatives’.34	Defendants	
may	enter	into	unfavourable	settlements	in	order	to	avoid	litigation	in	court	and	the	risk	
of	 high	 damages. 35 	Historical	 indicators	 of	 private	 enforcement	 suggest	 that	 the	
incentives	 for	 bringing	 actions	 for	 damages	 depend	 on	 the	 interpretive	 framework	
applied	 by	 the	 courts	 to	 determine	 the	 boundary	 of	 permissible	 conduct	 in	 the	
marketplace.36	Deficiencies	 of	 private	 antitrust	 enforcement	 have	 led	 to	 ‘equilibrating	
tendencies’	 of	 the	 federal	 courts	 to	 raise	 substantive	 and	 procedural	 bars	 higher.37	In	
Trinko38	and	Twombly,39	the	 Supreme	 Court	 placed	 limits	 on	 the	 excessive	 recourse	 to	
































private	 damage	 claims.	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 in	 the	 US	 antitrust	 context	 the	 issue	
concerning	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 right	 to	 damages	 is	 not	 so	 much	 about	 determining	
which	objective	–	compensation	or	deterrence	–	shall	prevail	in	case	of	a	conflict	between	
them,	 but	 rather	 about	 finding	 an	 equilibrium	between	 facilitating	 private	 actions	 and	
protecting	the	enforcement	system	as	a	whole.		
 The	role	of	private	enforcement	within	EU	competition	law		2.
One	 of	 the	 policy	 objectives	 behind	 the	 modernisation	 of	 the	 EU	 competition	
enforcement	 system	 was	 to	 encourage	 private	 enforcement. 40 	Regulation	 1/2003	
introduced	 a	 new	 system	 in	which	 the	 interaction	between	 administrative	 actions	 and	
court	proceedings	are	designed	 to	 facilitate	private	 law	 remedies.41	However,	 an	 initial	
problem	was	the	omission	of	a	specific	remedy	for	the	breach	of	competition	rules	in	the	
EC	 Treaty.	 The	 right	 to	 damages	 for	 the	 breach	 of	 the	 EU	 competition	 rules	was	 only	









full	 effectiveness	 of	 Article	 101	 TFEU	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	 practical	 effect	 of	 the	
prohibition	 laid	down	 in	Article	101(1)	would	be	put	 at	 risk	 if	 it	were	not	open	 to	any	
individual	to	claim	damages	for	loss	caused	to	him	by	a	contract	or	by	conduct	liable	to	









restrict	 or	 distort	 competition.43	The	 existence	 of	 such	 a	 right	 would	 strengthen	 the	
working	of	the	EU	competition	rules	and	discourage	agreements	or	practices,	which	are	
often	 covert,	 and	 threaten	 to	 restrict	 or	 distort	 competition.44 	In	 other	 words,	 an	
offender’s	obligation	to	pay	compensation	to	the	victim	of	the	infringement	can	have	a	
deterrent	 effect.	 From	 that	 point	 of	 view,	 private	 actions	 can	 make	 a	 significant	
contribution	to	the	maintenance	of	effective	competition	in	the	EU.45	
The	 Commission	 asserts	 that	 the	Courage	 judgment	 is	 based	 on	 a	 long	 established	
jurisprudence	of	the	EU	Courts	relating	to	the	effective	protection	of	Union	rights	by	the	
courts	 of	 the	Member	 States.46	The	Court	 possibly	 based	 the	 right	 to	 damages	 for	 the	
breach	of	the	EU	competition	rules	both	on	the	principle	of	full	effectiveness	of	EU	law	
and	the	principle	of	effective	judicial	protection.47	The	uncertainty	as	to	what	is	the	main	
objective	 of	 the	 right	 to	 damages	 in	 the	 EU	 context	 stems	 from	 an	 ambiguous	
understanding	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘effectiveness’. 48 	Some	 commentators	 understand	
‘effectiveness’	as	meaning	‘effective	judicial	protection’.	49	They	argue	that	the	legal	basis	
is	 the	 principle	 of	 effective	 judicial	 protection	 and	 that	 the	 right	 to	 damages	 should	
therefore	ultimately	be	about	compensation.	Others	 interpret	 ‘effectiveness’	 to	denote	
‘full	 effectiveness	of	 EU	 law’.	50	They	 consider	 the	 legal	 basis	 to	 be	 the	principle	 of	 full	
effectiveness	 of	 EU	 law,	which	would	 support	 the	 deterrence	 approach.	 The	 common	
ground	 among	 these	 commentators	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 private	 actions	 can	 fulfil	 a	 dual-




























For	 many	 years	 there	 was	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 primary	 objective	 of	 the	 right	 to	
damages.	This	uncertainty	was	particularly	strong	due	to	the	wording	of	the	2005	‘Green	
Paper	 on	 damages	 actions	 for	 breach	 of	 the	 EC	 antitrust	 rules’,52	the	 first	 legislative	
initiative	on	private	enforcement	after	Courage.	The	Green	Paper	stated	that:		
“[d]amages	 actions	 for	 infringement	 of	 antitrust	 law	 serve	 several	 purposes,	 namely	 to	
compensate	 those	 who	 have	 suffered	 a	 loss	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 anti-competitive	




to	 be	 of	 equal	 importance.	 The	 Green	 Paper	 not	 only	 inappropriately,	 and	 to	 some	
extent,	implicitly	assimilated	the	US	perspective	of	private	actions	as	key	instrument	for	
deterrence,54	but	also	did	little	to	clarify	what	the	main	objective	of	private	enforcement	
was.	 Almost	 five	 years	 after	 Courage,	 the	 CJ	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	 clarify	 the	 main	
objective	of	the	right	to	damages	in	Manfredi.	The	issue	in	that	case	was	whether	Article	
101	must	 be	 interpreted	 as	 requiring	 national	 courts	 to	 award	 punitive	 damages,	 i.e.	
damages	greater	than	the	gain	obtained	by	the	infringing	party.55	The	Court	held	that	EU	
law	does	not	require	the	award	of	punitive	damages,	and	that	in	the	absence	of	EU	rules	
on	 this	matter,	 it	 is	 left	 to	 each	Member	 State	 to	 set	 the	 criteria	 for	 determining	 the	
extent	of	the	damages,	provided	that	the	principles	of	equivalence	and	effectiveness	are	
observed.56 	Had	 the	 Court	 ruled	 that	 victims	 of	 anti-competitive	 infringements	 are	













objective	 of	 the	 right	 to	 damages	 should	 be	 deterrence.	 However,	 the	 Court	 instead	
highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 full	 compensation	 and	 hence	 implied	 that	 the	 primary	
objective	should	be	compensation.57		
The	 2008	 ‘White	 Paper	 on	 Damages	 actions	 for	 breach	 of	 the	 EC	 antitrust	 rules’58	
seemed	to	confirm	the	approach	taken	in	Manfredi.	It	explicitly	stated	that:	
“[t]he	primary	objective	of	this	White	Paper	 is	 to	 improve	the	 legal	conditions	 for	victims	to	
exercise	 their	 right	 under	 the	 Treaty	 to	 reparation	 of	 all	 damage	 suffered	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	
breach	of	the	EC	antitrust	rules.	Full	compensation	is,	therefore,	the	first	and	foremost	guiding	







added	 by	 the	 recent	 Antitrust	 Damages	 Directive.	 The	 recitals	 clearly	 emphasise	 the	




































function.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 right’s	 secondary	 deterrent	 function,	 legal	 scholars	 have	 been	
debating	 about	 the	 interplay	 between	 public	 and	 private	 enforcement	 within	 EU	
competition	 law.	 Two	main	 views	 can	 be	 discerned.	 Following	 the	 CJ	 case-law,	 some	
scholars	 argue	 that	 private	 enforcement	 should	 assume	 a	 stronger	 role	 in	 deterring	




scholars	 submit	 that	 it	 is	 not	 appropriate	 to	 conceive	 of	 private	 antitrust	 litigation	 as	
advancing	 traditional	 objectives	 of	 public	 enforcement,	 such	 as	 deterrence-induced	
compliance,	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Commission	and	NCAs	can	only	prosecute	a	very	
small	 number	of	 cases	per	 year.65	Wils	 advocates	 a	 so-called	 ‘separate-tasks	 approach’	
under	which	public	and	private	enforcement	are	each	assigned	 to	 serve	 the	objectives	
they	 are	most	 suitable	 for.66	According	 to	 this	 approach	 public	 enforcement	would	 be	

















assigned	 the	 objective	 of	 clarifying	 and	 developing	 the	 cartel	 prohibition	 and	 the	
deterrence	objective,	while	the	objective	of	private	enforcement	would	be	injunctive	and	











the	 level	 of	 fines	 even	 further	 in	order	 to	 incorporate	 the	 amount	of	 private	damages	
might	be	detrimental	 to	 the	 legitimacy	of	 corporate	 fines.	 Excessive	 financial	 penalties	
might	bankrupt	cartel	offenders.71	Even	 if	corporate	fines	and	private	damages	were	of	
the	same	amount,	there	would	still	be	a	difference	in	terms	of	legitimacy.	While	private	
damages	 compensate	 cartel	 victims,	 fines	do	not	have	 a	direct	 compensatory	 function	




their	wide	 investigative	 powers	 competition	 authorities	 are	more	 apt	 at	 detecting	 and	
proving	 cartel	 infringements	 than	 private	 parties.	 Another	 central	 argument	 against	















stand-alone	 actions	 is	 that	 they	 are	motivated	 by	 the	 private	 interests	 of	 the	 parties,	
which	might	 often	 deviate	 from	 the	 public	 interest.	 Public	 enforcers	 strive	 for	 optimal	
enforcement	and	the	maximisation	of	social	welfare,	whereas	private	parties	are	driven	
by	 personal	 gains	 that	 might	 lead	 to	 unfavourable	 outcomes	 such	 as	 inadequate	
investment,	unmeritorious	lawsuits	and	undesirable	settlements.73	Based	on	the	above,	it	






optimal	 sanctions	but	also	carries	more	 legitimacy.	The	primary	 role	of	 the	EU	 right	 to	
damages	is	to	ensure	full	compensation	for	the	victims	of	anti-competitive	infringements.	
Still,	 the	 right	 should	 also	 pursue	 a	 deterrent	 role	 to	 the	 extent	 possible,	 and	 thus	
complement	 public	 enforcement.	 The	 complementarity	 between	 enforcement	
mechanisms	is	essential	to	the	concept	of	effectiveness	through	fairness.	
 Leniency	and	Private	Actions	for	Damages		III.


















and	 private	 enforcement,	 in	 particular	 with	 respect	 to	 leniency.	 In	 this	 section,	 it	 is	
submitted	that	both	objectives	are	interrelated.	Even	though	private	actions	for	damages	
can	potentially	have	an	adverse	effect	on	leniency	programmes	and	therefore	on	public	
enforcement,	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 proper	 measure	 may	 not	 only	 safeguard	 the	
effectiveness	 of	 leniency	 but	 also	 at	 the	 same	 time	 give	 more	 effect	 to	 the	 right	 to	
compensation.	 In	other	words,	 the	right	measure	to	regulated	the	 interaction	between	
private	actions	and	the	leniency	programme	can	lead	to	effectiveness	through	fairness.		
	 The	first	section	outlines	the	interaction	between	effectiveness	and	fairness	in	private	




The	 design	 of	 individual	 elements	 of	 a	 system	 of	 private	 competition	 enforcement	
involves	 three	 essential	 legal	 and	 economic	 considerations.	 First,	 the	 fairness	
consideration	 which	 requires	 that	 any	 individual	 including	 final	 consumers,	 shall	 have	
access	 to	 justice	 to	 seek	 compensation	 for	 their	 losses	 incurred	 as	 a	 result	 of	 an	 anti-
competitive	 behaviour;75	second,	 the	 effectiveness	 consideration	 which	 requires	 that	
deterrence	 is	 recognised	 as	 a	 secondary	 objective	 of	 private	 damages	 actions	 and	
consequently	 individual	 elements	 of	 the	 private	 enforcement	 regime	 are	 designed	 to	
realise	 this	 object;	 and	 finally,	 the	 efficiency	 consideration	which	 requires	 that	 private	
damages	actions	do	not	disturb	judicial	economy	by	imposing	an	overwhelming	burden	of	
economic	and	factual	analysis	on	the	judiciary.76		










There	are	 inevitable	 connections	 and	 conflicts	between	 these	 three	elements.77	The	
first	 two	elements	essentially	 concern	 the	compensation	and	deterrence	objectives.	As	
argued	above,	the	right	to	damages	has	a	dual-function	and	can	therefore	advance	both	
objectives.	 Ineffectiveness	 in	 private	 enforcement	 often	 stems	 from	under-deterrence.	
Unfairness	in	the	system,	by	contrast,	is	mainly	a	result	of	under-compensation.	However,	
unfairness	or	 ineffectiveness	 can	also	arise	 if	 victims	of	 anti-competitive	behaviour	 are	
over-compensated.	 The	 third	 element	 relates	 to	 the	 procedural	 aspects	 of	 bringing	







Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 primary	 objective	 of	 the	 EU	 right	 to	 damages	 is	 the	 full	
compensation	 of	 victims	 of	 anti-competitive	 practices,	 a	 private	 enforcement	 system	
should	ideally	also	accommodate	the	deterrence	objective.	The	CJ’s	preliminary	rulings	in	
Pfleiderer,78	Otis,79	Donau	 Chemie,80	and	 Kone81	confirmed	 the	 principle	 established	 in	
Courage	 and	Manfredi	 that	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	 right	 to	 damages	 strengthens	 the	
enforcement	 of	 the	 EU	 competition	 rules.	 The	 right	 to	 damages	 and	 its	 enforcement	
should	therefore	ensure,	to	the	greatest	extent	possible,	that	an	infringing	undertaking	is	
at	risk	of	being	held	liable	for	the	whole	loss	it	caused	as	a	result	of	its	anti-competitive	
conduct.82	Moreover,	 the	 smaller	 the	 likely	 number	 of	 victims	 bringing	 private	 actions,	
the	 lower	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 infringing	 undertaking	 being	 held	 liable	 for	 the	 whole	 loss.	
Effective	redress	therefore	equals	effective	enforcement	of	EU	competition	law.83		













of	 effectiveness	 (and	 efficiency).	 For	 instance,	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 goal	 of	 full	
compensation	raises	severe	problems	as	to	judicial	economy	as	it	is	an	intricate	task	for	
courts	 to	adjudicate	on	 the	quantum	of	harm.	With	view	to	balancing	 the	elements	of	
fairness	 and	 effectiveness,	 suitable	 procedural	 rules	 must	 be	 in	 place	 so	 that	 so	 that	
antitrust	victims	can	bring	meritorious	lawsuits.	At	the	same	time	it	is	also	important	to	
prevent	unmeritorious	 litigation.	Frivolous	actions	for	damages	are	not	 just	detrimental	







enforcement	 measure.	 The	 conditions	 imposed	 on	 and	 benefits	 granted	 to	 leniency	
applicants	have	traditionally	been	confined	to	public	enforcement.86	The	2006	Leniency	
Notice	 expressly	 states	 that	 cooperation	 under	 the	 Notice	 does	 not	 provide	 cartel	
members	with	any	immunity	from	the	civil	law	consequences	of	its	cartel	participation.87	
However,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 interaction	 between	 private	 actions	 and	 leniency	 it	 is	
necessary	to	re-evaluate	the	conditions	and	benefits	of	leniency.	Since	public	and	private	
enforcement	 are	 complementary,	 as	 established	 above,	 changes	 in	 one	 enforcement	
mechanism	can	have	repercussions	in	the	other.	 In	order	to	understand	the	interaction	
between	leniency	and	private	actions,	the	basic	functioning	of	a	leniency	programme	and	
the	 role	 of	 fines	 as	 the	 foremost	 internal	 factor,	 as	 dealt	 with	 in	 the	 previous	 two	
chapters,	needs	be	recalled.		












If	 the	 formation	 and	 continuation	 of	 a	 cartel	 is	 profitable	 and	 the	 likelihood	 of	
detection	is	low,	cartelists	are	unlikely	to	apply	for	leniency.	In	such	a	case	the	collusive	
payoff	exceeds	the	collaborative	payoff.	The	incentives	for	cartelists	to	come	forward	are	
stronger	 the	 higher	 the	 fines	 and/or	 the	 higher	 the	 likelihood	 of	 detection	 is.	 By	
increasing	the	fine,	it	is	possible	to	enhance	the	deterrence	of	the	leniency	programme,	
even	if	the	likelihood	of	detection	remains	unchanged.	It	is	of	course	possible	to	increase	
the	 likelihood	of	detection	 through	a	 leniency	programme	by	making	changes	 to	other	
internal	factors.	Private	actions	can	play	a	similar	role	as	fines	in	creating	deterrence	and	
leniency	 may	 either	 raise	 or	 constrain	 the	 deterrent	 effect	 depending	 on	 the	 rules	
governing	the	interaction.	The	higher	likelihood	of	public	conviction	due	to	leniency	may	
at	 the	 same	 time	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 follow-on	 actions,	 and	 thus	 the	 expected	
amount	of	civil	liability.88		
Nonetheless,	it	not	entirely	clear	what	kind	of	impact	damages	actions	will	have	on	the	
effectiveness	 of	 leniency	 programmes.89	In	 a	 report	 of	 2007,	 the	 ICN	 Cartels	Working	
Group	noted	that	leniency	was	frequently	sought	despite	the	risk	of	subsequent	private	
actions,	 especially	 where	 the	 main	 motivation	 is	 to	 avoid	 penal	 sanctions.90	A	 survey	
carried	out	among	companies	and	competition	lawyers	on	behalf	of	the	OFT	in	the	same	
year	 found	that	businesses	 in	 the	UK	ranked	private	actions	as	a	 factor	 that	motivated	




may	 reduce	 the	 incentives	 to	defect.	But,	at	 the	same	time,	 the	 risk	of	damages	 if	 the	
















cartel	member	 does	 not	 defect	 yet	 the	 cartel	 is	 detected	 diminishes	 the	 incentives	 to	
continue	participating	in	a	cartel.92	The	ICN	report	observes:		
“As	the	predominant	experiences	of	the	[national	authorities]	show,	leniency	applicants	will	
decide	 to	make	 their	 application	 in	 the	 knowledge	 that	 the	 risk	 of	 fines	 and/or	 criminal	
sanctions	can	be	reduced	or	eliminated,	whilst	the	risk	of	a	damage	claim	will	in	any	event	
exist.	The	applicant	knows,	in	a	cartel	case,	that	there	is	always	the	possibility	that	another	




for	 leniency	 that	 private	 actions	might	 otherwise	 create.94	Even	 though	private	 actions	
may	in	theory	have	a	positive	impact	on	the	EU	leniency	programme,	the	Pfleiderer	and	





In	 a	 series	 of	 attempts	 over	 the	 last	 few	 years,	 claimants	 in	 follow-on	 actions	 have	
sought	 access	 to	 leniency	 files	 in	 various	 national	 and	 European	 cartel	 decisions.97	
Concerned	about	the	negative	impact	on	leniency,	the	Commission98	and	NCAs99	have	
refused	 access	 to	corporate	 statements	 and	 other	 evidence	 provided	 by	 leniency	
applicants.	 The	 issue	 of	 access	 to	 file	 is	 of	 great	 significance	 due	 of	 its	 impact	 on	






























information	 asymmetry	 between	 claimants	 and	 defendants	 making	 private	 actions	
potentially	less	forceful.		
Seeking	access	to	the	leniency	file	is	worthwhile	for	claimants	in	terms	of	saving	time	




provide	 as	 part	 of	 its	 leniency	 application,	 such	 as	 minutes	 of	 corporate	 meetings,	
agreements,	emails,	and	any	other	kind	of	corporate	record	or	information	classified	as	
‘pre-existing	 documents’.	 Prohibition	 decisions	 usually	 provide	 sufficient	 information	
about	 the	existence	of	a	cartel	 infringement	and	 the	 functioning	of	 the	cartel,	but	 lack	
substance	 with	 regard	 to	 causation	 and	 quantification. 102 	Depending	 on	 the	 exact	
content,	 access	 to	 the	 leniency	 file	may	 enable	 claimants	 to	 bring	more	 substantiated	
actions	than	would	otherwise	be	possible.		
b. Risks	of	access	to	file	for	cooperating	cartel	members		








of	 their	 leniency	 application.	 In	 order	 to	 shield	 defendants	 from	 US	 discovery,	 the	
Commission	 later	 introduced	 the	 possibility	 of	 giving	 oral	 leniency	 statements.103	The	
minutes	 of	 the	 oral	 statement	 become	 part	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 file	 and	 leniency	
applicants	do	not	retain	a	copy	or	transcription	of	it.	The	intention	is	to	diminish	the	risk	
of	US	discovery	by	ensuring	that	the	leniency	applicant	or	a	party	granted	access	to	the	
Commission’s	 file	 does	 not	 retain	 in	 its	 possession	 any	 documents	 that	 could	 become	
subject	 to	 discovery.104 	The	 Commission	 itself	 assures	 not	 to	 disclose	 oral	 leniency	
statements.	This	raises	legal	certainty	for	leniency	applicants.		
By	 allowing	 access	 to	 file,	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 successful	 follow-on	 actions	may	 be	
possible,	and	all	cartel	members	–	both	the	collaborating	and	non-collaborating	ones	–	
would	be	exposed	to	greater	civil	liability.	However,	non-collaborating	and	collaborating	
cartel	 members,	 particularly	 immunity	 recipients,	 may	 be	 in	 different	 positions.	 If	






for	 the	 leniency	 applicant	 to	 appeal	 the	 decision.	 An	 immunity	 recipient	 is	 at	 risk	 of	
becoming	a	“sitting	duck”	for	any	damages	claims	and	could,	in	theory,	bear	liability	for	
the	entire	amount	of	any	loss	suffered	as	a	result	of	the	cartel.105	
Since	 cartels	 are	 collective	 antitrust	 infringements,	 liability	 is	 shared	 jointly	 and	
severally	by	all	cartel	members.106	Generally,	under	the	rules	of	civil	liability	applicable	to	
private	damages	actions,	cartelists	are	liable	for	the	entire	damage	caused	by	the	cartel.	














All	 co-offenders	 are	 jointly	 and	 severally	 liable	 for	 the	 damage	 caused	 by	 their	
infringement.	 A	 cartel	 victim	may	 claim	his	 entire	 damage	not	 only	 against	 his	 trading	
partner	but	also	against	any	of	its	trading	partner’s	co-offenders.	However,	between	the	
co-offenders	 the	 liability	 is	 several.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 offender	 which	 initially	




uncertainty	 faced	 by	 leniency	 applicants	 and	 may	 therefore	 adversely	 affect	 the	
Commission’s	and	the	Member	States’	leniency	programmes.				
 Access	to	file	and	the	right	to	an	effective	judicial	remedy	3.
The	right	 to	access	 to	 file	 is	a	corollary	of	 the	right	 to	a	 fair	hearing.108	Access	 to	 file	 is	
intended	 to	 give	 effect	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 of	 arms,	which	 is	 enshrined	 in	 the	
jurisprudence	of	 the	ECtHR.109	Parties	 to	a	proceeding	have	 the	 right	 to	know	the	case	
against	 them	 including	 the	 evidence	 against	 them. 110 	EU	 law	 gives	 access	 to	 the	
Commission’s	 file	 to	 three	 categories	 of	 persons	 in	 competition	 proceedings.	 First,	 as	
stated	in	Chapter	2,	defendants	in	these	proceedings	enjoy	a	right	of	access	which	allows	
them	 the	 effective	 exercise	 of	 their	 right	 of	 defence.111	Secondly,	 complainants	 have	 a	
right	of	access	that	is	more	limited	than	that	of	defendants.112	Finally,	third	parties	who	
can	demonstrate	a	sufficient	interest	in	the	outcome	of	the	proceedings	are	given	some	
right	 of	 access	 after	 they	 have	 been	 heard	 by	 the	 Commission	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	



















third	parties	wishing	 to	bring	 follow-on	actions,	 various	paths	 to	 request	 access	 to	 the	
Commission’s	 file,	 including	 leniency	 documents,	 have	 been	 explored.	 It	 is	 noteworthy	
that	access	to	file	in	this	situation	does	not	underlie	the	principle	of	equality	of	arms	but	
rather	 the	 principle	 of	 effective	 judicial	 protection.	 In	 recent	 years,	 claimants	 have	
predominantly	 sought	 access	 to	 leniency	 files	 through	 four	 different	 paths:	 first,	 by	
relying	on	Regulation	1049/2001;	secondly,	through	requests	to	NCAs	or	national	courts	
(i.e.	 inter	 partes	 disclosure);	114	thirdly,	 via	 requests	 before	 courts	 in	 third	 countries,	 in	




against	 disclosure	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 follow-on	 actions.	 When	 balancing	 the	 right	 of	
access	of	third	parties	to	leniency	material	against	the	protection	of	the	Commission	and	
NCAs’	 investigations	 and	 decision-making	 procedures	 as	 well	 as	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
undertakings	under	investigation,	the	EU	Courts	had	to	consider	how	public	and	private	





gives	 EU	 citizens	 access	 to	 all	 documents	 of	 the	 EU	 institutions,	 including	 the	
















their	 right	 of	 access	 to	 file	 parties	 sometimes	 also	 lodge	 complaints	 to	 the	 European	
Ombudsman.	
	 In	 their	 first	 judgments	 on	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Transparency	 Regulation,	 the	 EU	
Courts	have	interpreted	it	in	light	of	its	purpose,	namely	to	enable	access	to	documents.	
In	 the	 very	 first	 case,	 the	 GC	 stated	 that	 the	 exception	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 access	 to	
documents	needs	to	be	interpreted	strictly.119	The	Court	also	found	that	the	examination	
of	 the	 exceptions	 in	 Article	 4(2)	 needs	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 in	 a	 concrete	 and	 individual	
manner	rather	than	abstractly	and	generally.120	However,	in	subsequent	cases	the	Courts	
took	a	more	restrictive	approach.	In	Technische	Glaswerke	Ilmenau,	an	EU	State	aid	case,	
the	 CJ	 overturned	 the	 GC’s	 judgment	 and	 acknowledged	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 general	
presumption	 that	 disclosure	 of	 documents	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 administrative	 file	
undermines,	in	principle,	the	protection	of	the	objectives	of	investigations.121		
In	 two	 subsequent	 merger	 cases,	 Agrofert122 	and	 Éditions	 Odile	 Jacob,123 	the	 CJ	
confirmed	 its	 judgment	 in	 Technische	 Glaswerke	 Ilmenau.	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 GC	 had	
annulled	the	Commission’s	decision	to	refuse	access	to	its	file	based	on	the	exceptions	in	
Article	 4(2)	 and	 4(3)	 on	 account	 that	 it	 should	 have	 undertaken	 a	 specific	 individual	
assessment	of	the	content	of	the	documents	covered	by	the	application	for	access,	with	a	
view	 to	 ensuring	 that	 the	 disclosure	 of	 those	 documents	would	 have	 undermined	 the	














interests	 protected	 by	 those	 exceptions.124	Unlike	 the	 GC,	 the	 CJ	 recognised	 a	 general	
presumption	 that	 the	 disclosure	 of	 documents	 exchanged	 between	 the	 parties	 to	 a	
merger	and	 the	Commission	would	undermine,	 in	principle,	both	 the	protection	of	 the	




would	 significantly	 impede	 competition	 in	 view	 of	 which	 the	 Commission	 gathers	
commercially	sensitive	 information.126	Without	the	protection	of	undertakings’	business	
secrets	 and	 confidential	 information,	undertakings	would	be	 less	 inclined	 to	 cooperate	
with	the	Commission	in	those	proceedings.	
	 Finally,	 the	 Transparency	 Regulation	 has	 also	 been	 invoked	 to	 gain	 access	 to	
documents	relating	to	Article	101	TFEU	proceedings.	In	CDC	Hydrogene	Peroxide,127	CDC	
sought	access	to	the	table	of	contents	to	the	Commission’s	file	for	the	hydrogen	peroxide	
cartel	 investigation	 with	 view	 to	 using	 that	 information	 in	 follow-on	 actions.	 The	
Commission	refused	access	based	on	the	Article	4	exceptions	relating	to	the	protection	of	
the	purpose	of	the	investigation	activities,	the	protection	of	the	commercial	interests	of	
the	 undertakings	 in	 the	 cartel	 proceedings,	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
decision-making	 process.	With	 regards	 to	 the	 purpose	 of	 investigations	 exception,	 the	
Commission	 argued	 that	 the	 Commission’s	 cartel	 policy,	 and	 in	 particular	 its	 leniency	
programme,	would	 be	 undermined	 if	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	material	 were	 allowed,	 as	
leniency	 applicants	might	 refrain	 from	cooperating	with	 the	Commission	 in	 the	 future.	
The	 GC	 annulled	 the	 Commission	 decision.	 The	 Court	 rejected	 the	 Commission’s	
argument,	 as	 it	would	 amount	 to	 permitting	 the	 latter	 to	 avoid	 the	 application	 of	 the	
Transparency	Regulation,	without	any	limit	in	time,	to	any	competition	document	merely	
by	reference	to	a	possible	future	adverse	impact	on	its	leniency	programme.128	The	Court	












also	 noted	 that	 the	 document	 sought	 after	 by	 CDC	 contained	 no	 information	 likely	 to	
harm	the	interests	of	a	leniency	applicant.129	In	relation	to	the	protection	of	commercial	




cartel.132	On	 appeal,133	the	 CJ	 set	 aside	 the	 GC’s	 judgment.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 GC,	 it	
followed	 the	 approach	 in	 Technische	 Glaswerke	 Ilmenau,	 which	 was	 also	 applied	 in	
Agrofert	and	Éditions	Odile	Jacob,	and	stated	that	the	Commission	is	entitled	to	rely	on	a	
similar	 general	 presumption	 that	 disclosure	 of	 a	 set	 of	 documents	 in	 a	 file	 relating	 to	
proceedings	 under	Article	 101	 TFEU	will,	 in	 principle,	 undermine	 the	protection	of	 the	
purpose	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 commercial	 interests	 of	 the	
undertakings	 involved	 in	 such	proceedings.134	The	Court,	however,	also	 stated	 that	 this	
general	 presumption	 is	 rebuttable.	 A	 private	 claimant	 needs	 to	 establish	 that	 it	 is	
necessary	for	him	to	get	access	to	the	documents	in	the	Commission’s	file,	and	that	the	
latter	is	required	to	weigh	up	the	respective	interests	in	favour	of	disclosure	and	in	favour	
of	protection	on	a	case-by-case	basis	 taking	 into	account	all	 the	 relevant	 factors	 in	 the	




	 To	 sum	up,	 even	 though	 it	 initially	 seemed	 as	 if	 the	 Commission	 could	 successfully	
invoke	the	Article	4	exceptions	of	the	Transparency	Regulation	to	prevent	disclosure	of	
documents	kept	 in	 its	 cartel	 investigation	 files,	 the	GC	 in	CDC	Hydrogene	Peroxide	and	














EnBW	 then	 narrowed	 the	 scope	 of	 these	 exceptions,	 striking	 the	 balance	 in	 favour	 of	








Since	 the	 FCO	 rejected	 disclosure	 of	 the	 leniency	material,	 Pfleiderer	 appealed	 to	 the	
Local	Court	of	Bonn.	The	latter	made	a	preliminary	reference	to	the	CJ,	asking	whether	
the	 provisions	 of	 EU	 competition	 law	were	 to	 be	 interpreted	 as	meaning	 that	 parties	
adversely	affected	by	a	cartel	may	not,	for	the	purpose	of	bringing	follow-on	actions,	be	
given	access	 to	 leniency	applications.	 The	CJ’s	 ruling	was	expected	 to	 refer	 to	 leniency	
programmes	 in	 general,	 and	 not	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	Member	 States’	 and	 the	
Commission’s	leniency	programmes.		
While	several	Member	States	suggested	that	claimants	should	have	no	access	to	any	
type	 of	 leniency	 evidence,	 the	 Commission	 and	 AG	 Mazák	 proposed	 a	 distinction	
between	 corporate	 statements,	 i.e.	 voluntary	 submissions	 specifically	 for	 a	 leniency	
application,	 to	 which	 disclosure	 should	 not	 be	 granted	 under	 any	 circumstances	
whatsoever,	 and	other	pre-existing	documents	 to	which	disclosure	 can	be	granted	but	
should	 be	 assessed	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis.138 	The	 CJ	 rejected	 this	 distinction	 but	
acknowledged	the	difficulty	in	striking	a	balance	between	the	conflicting	private	interests	
of	claimants	in	obtaining	evidence	to	facilitate	damages	claims	and	the	public	interest	of	
securing	effective	enforcement	of	 competition	 law	 through	 the	 leniency	 regime.139	The	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 leniency	 regime	 would	 be	 compromised	 if	 cartel	 members	 were	
deterred	 from	 making	 use	 of	 leniency	 due	 to	 the	 more	 likely	 exposure	 to	 damages	









In	Donau	 Chemie,	 nearly	 two	 years	 after	 Pfleiderer,	 the	 CJ	 had	 the	 opportunity	 to	
clarify	the	issue	of	access	to	file	in	another	preliminary	reference.	The	case	concerned	an	
Austrian	 federal	 cartel	 law	 that	 restricted	 access	 to	 file	 including	 leniency	 documents,	
unless	 the	parties	 to	 the	cartel	give	 their	consent.	The	Court	held	 that	an	outright	ban	
imposed	 by	 national	 law	 on	 access	 to	 any	 of	 the	 documents	 in	 the	 cartel	 file	 was	 in	




harmful	consequences	to	the	public	 interest	or	the	 legitimate	 interests	of	other	parties	
which	may	result	if	access	were	granted.143	Despite	acknowledging	the	public	interest	of	
having	 effective	 leniency	 programmes,	 the	 Court	 found	 the	 fact	 that	 disclosure	 may	
undermine	the	effectiveness	of	a	leniency	programme	cannot	justify	an	outright	refusal	
to	grant	access	 to	 that	evidence.144	By	contrast,	 the	 fact	 that	 such	a	 refusal	 is	 liable	 to	
prevent	follow-on	actions,	by	giving	the	undertakings	concerned,	who	may	have	already	
benefited	from	immunity	or	a	fine	reduction,	an	opportunity	also	to	circumvent	their	civil	
liability	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	 injured	 parties,	 requires	 that	 refusal	 to	 be	 based	 on	
overriding	reasons	relating	to	the	protection	of	 the	 interest	relied	on	and	applicable	to	
each	 document	 to	 which	 access	 is	 refused.145	It	 is	 only	 if	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 a	 given	
document	may	actually	undermine	the	public	interest	relating	to	the	effectiveness	of	the	
national	 leniency	programme	that	non-disclosure	of	 that	document	may	be	 justified.146	
This	statement	of	the	Court	implies	a	retributive	notion.	Cartelists	should	not	be	unduly	
protected	against	the	legitimate	interests	of	the	other	economic	operators.			

















to	 the	principles	 of	 equivalence	 and	 effectiveness.149	Indeed,	 there	 is	 some	divergence	
among	 the	 national	 rules.150	Moreover,	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Pfleiderer	 balancing	 test	
also	 depends	 on	 the	 receptiveness	 of	 the	 national	 court	 to	 disclosure	 requests.	 It	 has	
therefore	been	warned	 that	 forum	 shopping	might	 arise	 in	 the	wake	of	Pfleiderer	 and	
Donau	 Chemie.151	In	 order	 to	 prevent	 the	 uncertainty	 on	 this	 issue	 from	 adversely	
affecting	 the	 Commission’s	 and	 the	 Member	 States’	 leniency	 programmes,	 it	 was	
incumbent	upon	the	EU	to	issue	harmonised	legislation	on	this	matter.	Before	addressing	
the	recently	adopted	measures	in	the	Antitrust	Damages	Directive,	the	next	section	sheds	
light	 on	 the	 main	 interests	 that	 need	 to	 be	 reconciled	 in	 regulating	 the	 interaction	
between	leniency	and	private	actions.			
c. Effective	enforcement	and	fundamental	rights		
Various	 interests	 that	 are	 at	 stake	 when	 private	 claimants	 request	 access	 to	 the	
Commission’s	or	an	NCA’s	cartel	file,	including	leniency	applications,	can	be	identified	in	
the	 aforementioned	 cases.	While	 the	 former	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	
leniency	 file	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 more	 substantiated	 follow-on	 actions,	 the	 Commission,	



















NCAs	 and	 cooperating	 cartel	 members	 seek	 to	 prevent	 disclosure	 of	 leniency	




partes	disclosure	claimants	 relied	merely	on	 the	 right	 to	an	effective	 remedy.	 It	 is	also	





	 In	 examining	 the	 interaction	 between	 leniency	 and	 private	 actions,	 the	 Courts	 and	
Advocate	Generals	 in	the	above	case-law	juxtaposed,	and	 if	necessary,	 tried	to	balance	
the	various	interests.	The	claimants’	right	to	an	effective	remedy	supported	by	the	right	
of	the	general	public	to	learn	about	the	infringement	conflicts	with	the	Commission’s	and	
NCAs’	 interest	 in	 operating	 effective	 leniency	 programmes.	 The	 relationship	 between	
these	interests	was	convincingly	analysed	by	AG	Mazák	in	Pfleiderer.	He	first	referred	to	
the	 settled	 case-law	 that	 victims	 of	 an	 anti-competitive	 infringement	 have	 a	 right	 to	
damages	 that	 the	 enforcement	 of	 that	 right	 strengthens	 the	 working	 of	 the	 EU	




right	 to	 an	 effective	 remedy	 guaranteed	 by	 Article	 101	 TFEU	 and	 Article	 47	 CFR	 in	
conjunction	with	 Article	 51	 CFR	 and	Article	 6(1)	 ECHR.153	He	 argued	 that	 the	 potential	
adverse	 effects	 of	 disclosure	 on	 the	 incentives	 of	 leniency	 applicants	would	 constitute	
such	an	overriding	justification.154		













vast	majority	 of	 private	 actions	 is	 brought,	 is	 undoubtedly	 dependent	 on	 an	 effective	
leniency	 programme. 156 	In	 other	 words,	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 effective	 cartel	
enforcement	 trumps	 the	 individual’s	 right	 to	 an	 effective	 remedy.	 It	 is	 therefore	
necessary	 to	preserve	as	much	as	possible	 the	attractiveness	of	a	 leniency	programme	
without	unduly	 restricting	 a	private	 claimant’s	 access	 to	 information	and	ultimately	 an	
effective	remedy.157		
	 As	noted	above,	 the	GC	 in	CDC	Hydrogene	Peroxide	 and	EnBW	 sought	 to	 strike	 the	
balance	more	 in	 favour	 of	 claimants	 and	 therefore	 denied	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 general	
presumption	that	disclosure	of	documents	in	the	Commission’s	cartel	file	undermines,	in	
principle,	the	protection	of	the	objectives	of	investigations	within	the	meaning	of	Article	
4(2)	 of	 the	 Transparency	 Regulation.	 According	 to	 the	 Court,	 the	 Commission	 should	
undertake	 a	 specific,	 individual	 assessment	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	 documents	 to	which	





















the	other	hand,	 is	a	 legitimate	private	and	public	 interest	which	should	be	advanced	to	
the	extent	that	public	enforcement	is	not	adversely	affected.	The	CJ	 in	EnBW	therefore	
deemed	 the	 general	 presumption	 to	 the	 Article	 4	 exception	 in	 the	 Transparency	
Regulation	to	be	rebuttable.		
	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 case-law	 on	 access	 to	 cartel	 files	 has	 so	 far	 neglected	 to	
address	 more	 explicitly	 the	 clashing	 interests	 of	 cartel	 victims	 and	 cooperating	 cartel	
members.160 	The	 former	 might	 argue	 that	 any	 interest	 the	 latter	 might	 pursue	 in	
concealing	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 infringement	 is	 outweighed	 by	 the	 public	 and	 private	
interests	 to	 make	 factual	 information	 on	 such	 infringements	 publicly	 known.161	With	
regard	to	the	publication	of	cartel	decisions,	 the	GC	held	that	confidentiality	about	 the	
details	of	a	cartel	does	not	warrant	any	particular	protection,	due	to	the	public	interest	in	






339	 TFEU	 and	 Article	 28(2)	 of	 Regulation	 1/2003,163	in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 right	 to	
private	 and	 family	 life	 under	 Article	 8	 ECHR	 and	 Article	 7	 CFR,164	cartel	 victims	 could	




























tortious	 behaviour	 are	 covered	 under	 Article	 1	 of	 Protocol	 No.	 1,	 which	 gives	 every	
natural	 and	 legal	 person	 the	 right	 to	 protection	 of	 property.165 	Any	 action	 of	 the	





In	summary,	the	cooperating	members’	 interest	 in	non-disclosure	 is	only	ancillary	to	
the	public	interest	of	effective	leniency.	It	is	not	an	interest	that	justifies	protection,	and	
hence	 there	 is	 also	 no	 need	 to	 balance	 it	 against	 cartel	 victim’s	 interest	 in	 effective	
redress.	 Quite	 the	 opposite;	 due	 to	 the	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 damages	 actions,	 cartel	
members	 should	 bear	 the	 civil	 liability	 they	 are	 responsible	 for.	 Thus,	 private	
enforcement	 should	 be	 facilitated	 provided	 that	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 leniency	
programmes	 is	 not	 impaired.	 Any	measure	 that	 the	 legislator	 adopts	 should	 reconcile	
cartel	 victims’	 interest	 in	 effective	 redress	 and	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 effective	 leniency	
programmes.	As	pointed	out	by	AG	Mazák,	public	enforcement	should	have	priority	over	
private	 enforcement.168	The	 focus	 of	 competition	 enforcement	 should	 be	 on	 effective	
public	 enforcement,	 based	 on	 the	 recognition	 that	 public	 enforcement	 has	 a	 greater	
deterrent	effect,	seeking	to	prevent	the	occurrence	of	anti-competitive	behaviour	before	
any	harm	may	unfold.	Private	enforcement,	by	contrast,	is	of	a	reactive	nature	and	seeks	













deterrent	 effect.170	The	 issue	 of	 establishing	 the	 hierarchy	 between	 public	 and	 private	
enforcement	is	ultimately	between	effectiveness	and	fairness.	
 Regulating	the	interaction	between	leniency	and	private	actions	for	damages	B.





the	 imperfections	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programme	 established	 under	 the	 1996	 Notice,	





greater	 importance	 of	 public	 enforcement	 over	 private	 enforcement,	 damages	 actions	
should	not	impair	the	effectiveness	of	leniency.	Any	measure	should	therefore	encourage	
damages	actions	as	long	as	the	effectiveness	of	leniency	is	safeguarded.	In	applying	the	
normative	 framework	 in	 this	 section,	 the	 complementarity	between	public	 and	private	
enforcement	 is	mirrored	 in	 the	 assessment	 of	 deterrence	 and	 retributive	 justice.	 Even	

























	 This	 section	will	 first	 deal	with	 the	 solution	 under	US	 law	 to	 address	 the	 impact	 of	
private	actions	on	 the	US	Corporate	 Leniency	Program.	This	measure	will	help	 to	 shed	






in	 the	 US	 than	 in	 the	 EU,	 and	 the	 magnitude	 of	 damages	 has	 been	 perceived	 as	 a	
disincentive	 for	potential	 immunity	applicants.	 In	2004,	Congress	enacted	 the	Antitrust	
Criminal	 Penalty	 Enforcement	 and	 Reform	 Act	 (ACPERA).173	The	 Act	 was	 passed	 to	
increase	the	deterrence	and	incentives	for	cartel	offenders	to	self-report	illegal	conduct	
through	the	DOJ’s	 leniency	programme.174	With	respect	 to	 the	potential	clash	between	
leniency	 and	 private	 actions,	 the	 Act	 offers	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 potential	 immunity	
recipient’s	 civil	 liability.	An	 immunity	 recipient	 can	 confine	 its	 civil	 liability	 to	 the	harm	












actually	 inflicted	by	 its	conduct,	provided	 that	 it	 cooperates	with	 the	claimants	 in	 their	
private	 actions	 against	 the	 other	 cartel	 members.175	This	 is	 the	 so-called	 ‘de-trebling	
provision’.	In	other	words,	the	successful	immunity	applicant	is	liable	for	single	damages	
instead	of	 treble	damages.	 In	 addition,	 the	 successful	 immunity	 applicant	 is	 not	 jointly	
liable	for	the	damage	of	its	co-offenders.	Satisfactory	cooperation	includes	providing	a	full	
account	of	all	facts	known	to	the	immunity	applicant	that	are	potentially	relevant	to	the	




de-trebled	 damages	 and	 no	 joint	 and	 several	 liability	 under	 the	 Corporate	 Leniency	
Program;177	and	 (3)	 immunity	 from	 prison	 sentences	 for	 the	 relevant	 corporate	 actors	
under	 the	 Leniency	 Program	 for	 Individuals.	 Even	 though	 the	 prospect	 of	 a	 prison	
sentence	 is	generally	considered	to	be	the	greatest	deterrent	 for	corporate	actors,	one	
should	not	underestimate	the	financial	repercussions	that	treble	damages	(in	conjunction	
with	 joint	 and	 several	 liability)	 can	have	on	 an	undertaking.	 By	 reducing	 the	 immunity	
recipient’s	 civil	 liability	 to	 single	 damages	 and	 excluding	 joint	 liability	 in	 return	 for	 its	
cooperation	with	 claimants,	 the	de-trebling	 provision	offers	 an	 additional	 incentive	 for	
cartel	 members	 to	 come	 forward	 while	 ensuring	 that	 claimants	 are	 adequately	
compensated	for	their	losses.178		
a. Impact	on	deterrence			
In	 theory	 the	 de-trebling	 provision	 has	 a	 positive	 impact	 on	 private	 enforcement	 and	
overall	 cartel	 enforcement	 as	 it	 enhances	 the	 likelihood	 of	 more	 successful	 private	














actions	with	 higher	 damages	 amounts	 than	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 Act.	 Since	 the	 total	
sanctions	are	higher,	 the	 leniency	programme	will	be	more	effective,	 resulting	 in	more	
applications.179	In	other	words,	the	de-trebling	provision	reinforces	the	virtuous	circle	as	
it	 increases	 both	 the	 incentives	 to	 self-reporting	 and	 deterrence. 180 	Yet,	 based	 on	
empirical	evidence	in	a	Government	Accountability	Office	(GAO)	report	to	Congressional	
Committees	 in	 2011	 it	 is	 questionable	 whether	 the	 anticipated	 reinforcement	 of	 the	
virtuous	circle	has	completely	materialised	in	practice.	The	first	stage	of	the	circle,	namely	
that	 total	 compensation	 to	 cartel	 victims	 increases	 as	 a	 result	 of	 immunity	 recipients’	







data	 in	 the	GAO	report	 reveals	 that	 the	threat	of	prison	sentences	and	corporate	 fines	
have	 been	 the	 most	 motivating	 factors,	 both	 before	 and	 after	 the	 enactment	 of	





























Nonetheless,	 the	 GAO	 report	 indicates	 that	 “the	 ACPERA’s	 offer	 of	 relief	 from	 civil	
liability	 had	 a	 slight	 positive	 effect	 on	 leniency	 applicants’	 decisions	 to	 apply	 for	
leniency”.185	Under	 the	 ACPERA,	 in	 order	 to	 benefit	 from	 de-trebling,	 an	 immunity	
recipient	must	 cooperate	with	 claimants	 in	 civil	 litigation	by	providing	 them	with	a	 full	
account	 of	 relevant	 facts,	 and	 all	 relevant	 documents	 and	 other	 items	 that	 are	 in	 its	
possession.186	Claimants’	 lawyers	 in	the	GAO’s	sample	stated	that	 information	obtained	
through	cooperation	under	the	ACPERA	both	reinforced	and	streamlined	their	cases.187	
The	types	of	information	that	immunity	recipients	shared	with	claimants	have	comprised	
attorney	 proffers,	 witness	 interviews,	 e-mails	 and	 other	 documentary	 evidence	 of	 the	
companies	 and	 individuals	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 cartel,	 the	 product	 market	 and	






















punishment	 has	 become	 more	 severe	 for	 the	 latter.	 The	 gap	 between	 the	 first	 and	
second	confessor	has	grown	wider	and	hence	 the	 race	 for	 immunity	has	become	even	
more	 intensive.	 With	 view	 to	 the	 benefits	 for	 the	 first	 confessor	 even	 before	 the	
enactment	of	 the	ACPERA,	 it	 can	be	asked	whether	de-trebling	 is	necessary,	 especially	
considering	the	fact	that	cartelists	are	said	to	regard	prison	sentences	and	corporate	fines	















“To	 ensure	 effective	 private	 enforcement	 actions	 under	 civil	 law	 and	 effective	 public	
enforcement	 by	 competition	 authorities,	 both	 tools	 are	 required	 to	 interact	 to	 ensure	
maximum	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 competition	 rules.	 It	 is	 necessary	 to	 regulate	 the	
coordination	 of	 those	 two	 forms	 of	 enforcement	 in	 a	 coherent	 manner	 […].	 Such	
coordination	at	Union	level	will	also	avoid	the	divergence	of	applicable	rules,	which	could	
jeopardise	the	proper	functioning	of	the	internal	market.”193	
The	 Directive	 pursues	 two	 objectives:	 first,	 to	 address	 the	 perceived	 threat	 by	
disclosure	 of	 leniency	 material	 to	 public	 enforcement;	 and	 secondly,	 to	 strengthen	






private	 enforcement	 at	 national	 level.	 This	 section	 is	 only	 concerned	 with	 the	 first	
objective.		
The	 Directive	 regulates	 the	 interaction	 between	 private	 actions	 for	 damages	 and	
leniency	with	the	help	of	two	distinct	measures,	namely	a	disclosure	regime	and	a	regime	
on	cartel	members’	civil	 liability.	Both	measures	are	 intended	to	assuage	different	risks	
posed	by	 the	 interaction.	They	apply	at	different	stages	of	 the	proceedings	and	have	a	
different	scope	of	application.	The	disclosure	regime	applies	at	the	‘discovery	stage’	and	
covers	 all	 leniency	 applicants.	 The	 measure	 remedies	 the	 disadvantage	 leniency	







that	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 consistency	 of	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 competition	 rules	
require	 a	 common	 approach	 on	 the	 disclosure	 of	 evidence	 included	 in	 the	 file	 of	 an	
NCA. 194 	With	 the	 purpose	 of	 ensuring	 the	 effective	 protection	 of	 the	 right	 to	
compensation,	it	is	not	necessary	that	every	document	in	the	cartel	file	should	be	subject	
to	disclosure	 for	 the	purpose	of	 damage	actions,	 since	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 claimants	will	




into	 three	 distinct	 types	 of	 documents	 which	 are	 subject	 to	 a	 different	 degree	 of	
protection.	 The	 first	 category,	 the	 ‘black	 list’,	 comprises	 documents	 whose	 disclosure	
could	expose	leniency	applicants	the	most	and	therefore	jeopardise	public	enforcement	
efforts.	 Corporate	 leniency	 statements	 and	 settlement	 submissions	 fall	 under	 this	











and	 replies	 to	 SOs),	 and	 settlement	 submissions	 that	 have	 been	 withdrawn.198	These	
documents	are	disclosable	by	court	order	only	after	the	competition	authority	has	taken	
a	decision	in	the	case	or	closed	its	file.	In	other	words,	the	protection	against	discovery	is	
only	 temporary.	The	third	category,	 ‘the	white	 list’,	 comprises	pre-existing	 information,	
i.e.	evidence	that	exists	independently	of	the	proceedings	of	a	competition	authority.199	
These	 documents,	 as	 with	 the	 privilege	 against	 self-incrimination,	 do	 not	 justify	 any	
special	protection	and	need	to	be	clearly	distinguished	from	voluntary	statements.	
Apart	 from	 the	 risks	 relating	 to	 disclosure,	 the	 Directive	 is	 also	 aware	 of	 the	
abovementioned	 specific	 risk	 applying	 to	 immunity	 recipients.	 The	Directive	 states	 it	 is	
appropriate	 to	 protect	 immunity	 recipients	 from	 undue	 exposure	 to	 damages	 claims,	
taking	 into	 account	 that	 the	 NCA’s	 infringement	 decision	 may	 become	 final	 for	 the	
immunity	 recipient	before	 it	 becomes	 final	 for	 the	other	 co-offenders,	 thus	potentially	
making	 the	 immunity	 recipient	 the	 preferential	 target	 of	 litigation.200 	As	 a	 second	
measure	to	safeguard	the	effectiveness	of	the	leniency	programmes,	the	Directive	adopts	
a	harmonised	regime	on	cartel	members’	civil	liability.	While	all	members	of	the	cartel	are	
jointly	 and	 severally	 liable	 for	 the	 entire	 harm	 caused	 by	 the	 cartel,201	the	 immunity	
recipient	 is	only	 liable	 to	 its	direct	and	 indirect	purchasers.202	The	other	 injured	parties	
may	only	seek	redress	from	the	immunity	recipient	where	full	compensation	cannot	be	
obtained	 from	 its	 co-offenders.203	In	 other	words,	 the	 immunity	 recipient	 is	 exempted	
from	 joint	and	several	 liability.	Under	certain	conditions,	an	SME	can	also	benefit	 from	
the	exemption	from	joint	and	several	liability.204		













The	 two	 measures	 adopted	 in	 the	 Directive	 supplement	 each	 other	 in	 creating	
deterrence.	 The	 disclosure	 regime	 provides	 a	 balanced	 approach	 that	 incentivises	
damages	 actions	 without	 discouraging	 cartel	 members	 from	 coming	 forward	 and	
consequently	affecting	the	effectiveness	of	public	enforcement.205	It	 is	vital	that	for	the	
effectiveness	 and	 fairness	 of	 both	 public	 and	 private	 enforcement	 that	 the	 Directive	
leaves	sufficient	scope	for	the	disclosure	of	material	other	than	leniency	statements	and	
settlement	 submissions.	 First,	 leniency	 applicants,	 in	 principle,	 are	 no	 longer	 in	 a	 less	
favourable	 position	 than	 non-cooperating	 cartel	 members.	 That	 is	 because	 the	
documents	 that	 are	 discoverable,	 namely,	 pre-existing	 information	 and	 documents	
prepared	for	the	purpose	of	a	cartel	 investigation,	 incriminate	all	cartel	members	alike,	
not	 just	 cooperating	 undertakings.	 By	 contrast,	 corporate	 statements	 and	 settlement	
submissions	 are	 more	 self-incriminating	 on	 the	 undertaking	 that	 has	 prepared	 them.	
Secondly,	due	to	the	claimants’	access	to	evidence	cartel	members	are	more	likely	to	face	
civil	 liability	 which	 will	 increase	 deterrence.	 	 Moreover,	 the	 disclosure	 regime	 is	
sufficiently	clear	and	more	foreseeable	than	the	Pfleiderer	balancing	test	and	therefore	
removes	a	disincentive	to	apply	for	leniency.		
The	 removal	of	 joint	 and	 several	 liability	 for	 the	 immunity	 recipient	 is	 an	additional	
incentive	 for	 cartel	 members	 to	 be	 the	 first	 through	 the	 door.	 The	 gap	 between	 the	
collaborative	and	collusive	payoff	is	widened	in	case	of	the	inability	to	pay	of	one	of	the	
immunity	 recipient’s	co-defendants	as	 the	 immunity	 recipient	 is	 the	 last	 in	 line	 to	bear	
the	insolvent	co-defendant’s	liability.		This	has	a	positive	effect	on	whistle-blowing	and,	in	
turn,	on	deterrence,	since	the	likelihood	of	detection	increases.206	Victims	would	also	be	
more	 inclined	 to	 bring	 damages	 claims	 against	 the	 non-collaborating	 cartel	 members,	
who	would	 remain	 jointly	 and	 severally	 liable.207	The	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 this	measure	
would	increase,	and	with	it	the	effectiveness	of	leniency	programmes,	if	it	became	easier	





























liability	 prevents	 them	 from	 being	 the	 first	 ones	 to	 be	 sued	 for	 the	 entire	 damage.	
Shielding	the	immunity	recipient	from	joint	and	several	liability	puts	it	in	a	better	position	





























An	 interesting	provision	 is	 the	exemption	of	 SMEs215	from	 joint	 and	 several	 liability,	











Overall,	 the	 two	 measures	 in	 the	 Directive	 reconcile	 effectiveness	 and	 fairness.	 The	




to	 more	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 leniency	 programme.	 Hence,	 from	 a	 procedural	 fairness	
perspective	the	Antitrust	Damages	Directive	gives	rise	to	effectiveness	through	fairness.		








The	 disclosure	 regime	 has	 received	 positive	 feedback	 from	 practitioners	 and	
scholars.218	This	measure	notably	resembles	AG	Mazák’s	proposal	in	Pfleiderer	which	was	
eventually	rejected	by	the	CJ.	The	categorisation	of	evidence	as	stipulated	in	the	Directive	
is	 sensible	 and	 makes	 the	 disclosure	 regime	 well-balanced.219	While	 the	 protection	 of	
leniency	 statements	 and	 settlement	 submissions	 is	 justified	 in	 light	 of	 the	 risk	 for	 the	
leniency	applicants,	 there	 is	no	need	 to	protect	pre-existing	 information.	Moreover,	 as	
the	Directive	correctly	notes,	the	disclosure	of	documents	other	than	leniency	statements	
and	 settlements	 ensures	 that	 claimants	 retain	 sufficient	 recourse	 to	 accessible	
information	that	can	assist	them	in	filing	an	action	for	damages.220	The	disclosure	regime	
is	neither	too	liberal	nor	too	restrictive.	The	partial	disclosure	of	documents	also	prevents	
undertakings	 from	applying	 for	 leniency	merely	 to	prevent	 discovery,	 in	 the	hope	 that	
their	non-cooperating	co-offenders	will	be	sued	first.	Finally,	the	rules	on	disclosure	are	
sufficiently	 clear.	 The	proposal	 by	 Kersting	 that	 the	 rule	 in	Article	 6(6)	 is	 too	 rigid	 and	




The	 exemption	 from	 joint	 and	 several	 liability	 for	 immunity	 recipients	 protects	 the	
effectiveness	of	the	leniency	programme	without	unduly	impairing	claimants’	right	to	full	
compensation.	Immunity	recipients	remain	liable	for	their	share	of	the	cartel	harm,	and	
therefore	unjust	 enrichment	on	 their	 side	 is	 prevented.	Only	 in	 the	 very	 rare	 situation	
where	 claimants	 cannot	 claim	 damages	 from	 any	 of	 the	 other	 co-offenders	 will	 the	
immunity	 recipient	be	 liable	 for	damages	of	other	 injured	parties.	 It	 is	argued	that	 this	
fallback	 might	 disincentivise	 potential	 immunity	 applicants,	 and	 hence	 diminish	 the	
effectiveness	of	leniency	programmes.	Granted	the	likelihood	of	recourse	to	the	fallback	
is	very	low,	it	is	still	noteworthy	that	the	Directive	has	opted	for	full	compensation	over	













case-law	 pursuant	 to	 which	 any	 individual	 should	 be	 able	 to	 claim	 damages	 for	 loss	
caused	 to	him	by	a	 restriction	of	 competition.	The	Directive	 therefore	does	not	 impair	





with	 the	 claimants	 in	 damages	 actions	 against	 its	 co-offenders.	 This	 would	 thus	 be	 a	
measure	 conceptually	 similar	 to	 the	 de-trebling	 provision	 under	 ACPERA	 and	 be	more	
retributive.	 Such	 a	 collaboration	 clause	was	 already	 contemplated	 in	 the	Green	Paper,	
albeit	with	respect	to	a	discount	on	damages.		
 Concluding	remarks	C.
The	 consequences	 of	 the	 increase	 in	 private	 enforcement,	 and	 in	 particular	 claimants’	
interest	 in	access	 to	 file,	 threatened	to	put	 leniency	applicants	and	above	all	 immunity	
recipients	at	a	disadvantage	compared	to	non-cooperating	cartel	members,	which	would	
ensue	adverse	effects	 for	overall	 cartel	 enforcement.	 Even	 though	 it	 needs	 to	be	 seen	
how	these	measures	work	out	in	practice,	the	combination	of	the	two	measures	adopted	




competition	 rules	 across	 Europe.	 Private	 enforcement	 may	 complement	 public	
enforcement	 in	making	overall	cartel	enforcement	more	effective	and	fair.	The	right	to	
damages	under	EU	competition	 law	can	exercise	both	a	compensatory	and	a	deterrent	
function.	 Its	 primary	 objective	 is	 nevertheless	 the	 compensation	 of	 injured	 parties.	




always	 positive.	 The	 impact	 of	 private	 actions	 on	 the	 leniency	 programmes	 of	 the	
Commission	and	NCAs	 is	ambiguous.	On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 threat	of	being	exposed	 to	
both	 cartel	 fines	 and	 private	 actions	 might	 incentivise	 cartel	 members	 to	 blow	 the	
whistle.	On	the	other	hand,	the	prospect	of	facing	private	actions	may	discourage	them	
from	 coming	 forward.	 The	 latter	 risk	 might	 primarily	 apply	 to	 potential	 immunity	
applicants.	 Due	 to	 joint	 and	 several	 liability,	 a	 potential	 immunity	 recipient	might	 in	 a	
worst-case	scenario	be	the	first	and	only	cartel	member	to	be	liable	for	the	harm	caused	
by	the	cartel.		
To	 overcome	 the	 information	 asymmetry	 in	 strengthening	 their	 claims,	 private	
claimants	have	in	recent	years	sought	access	to	corporate	leniency	statements	by	relying	
on	 the	 right	 of	 access	 to	 file	 and	 the	 right	 to	 an	 effective	 remedy.	 With	 a	 view	 to	
protecting	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 their	 leniency	 programmes,	 and	 therefore	 public	
enforcement,	the	Commission	and	NCAs	traditionally	denied	such	access.	In	ruling	on	this	
issue,	 the	 EU	Courts	 faced	 the	 dilemma	of	 choosing	 between	 the	 right	 to	 an	 effective	
remedy	 for	 cartel	 victims	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 leniency	 programmes.	 Overall,	 the	
judgments	of	the	CJ	and	GC	were	unsatisfactory	as	they	created	uncertainty	for	potential	
leniency	 applicants.	 The	 Antitrust	 Damages	 Directive	 was	 adopted	 with	 the	 aim	 to	
facilitate	 private	 actions	 across	 the	 EU	 and	 to	 enhance	 the	 interaction	between	public	
and	private	enforcement.	With	regard	to	solving	the	tension	between	private	actions	and	
leniency,	 the	 Directive	 has	 adopted	 two	measures.	 The	 first	measure	 is	 a	 harmonised	
disclosure	 regime	under	which	corporate	 leniency	 statements	 in	 the	Commission’s	and	
NCAs’	cartel	files	are	excluded	from	disclosure,	while	pre-existing	material	remains	open	
to	 discovery.	Other	 documents	 such	 as	 replies	 to	 request	 for	 information	 and	 SOs	 are	
disclosable	only	after	the	competition	authority	has	taken	a	decision	in	the	case	or	closed	
its	file.	The	second	measure	harmonises	the	rules	on	joint	and	several	liability	and	limits	
immunity	 recipients’	 civil	 liability	 to	 their	direct	and	 indirect	purchasers.	Together	both	
measures	 protect	 leniency	 and	 immunity	 recipients	 from	 potential	 adverse	 effects	 of	
access	 to	 file	without	unduly	 impairing	cartel	victims’	 right	 to	an	effective	remedy.	The	
















system	 with	 extensive	 and	 invasive	 measures	 that	 are	 sometimes	 even	 likened	 to	
enforcement	 powers	 under	 criminal	 law.	 However,	 in	 establishing	 a	 legitimate	 cartel	
enforcement	 system,	 the	 Commission	 should	 not	merely	 aim	 to	 achieve	 effectiveness	
through	 deterrence.	 Effectiveness	 alone	 cannot	 in	 itself	 justify	 why	 severe	 sanctions	
should	 be	 imposed	 on	 undertakings	 for	 breaching	 the	 cartel	 prohibition	 laid	 down	 in	
Article	 101	 TFEU.
	
Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Article	 101	 is	 based	 on	 the	 explicit	 threat	 of	
sanctions,	the	provision	still	depends	profoundly	on	voluntary	compliance.	Lower	 levels	
of	 legitimacy	might	not	only	 result	 in	distortions	of	 competition	but	also	 lead	 to	 lower	
levels	 of	 compliance,	 consequently	 making	 competition	 regulation	 and	 enforcement	
more	 costly	 and	 cumbersome.	 Undertakings	 subject	 to	 cartel	 proceedings	 not	 only	
demand	reasonable	sanctions	but	also	fair	proceedings	in	which	their	claims	on	whether	
or	 not	 their	 practices	 breached	 Article	 101	 could	 be	 heard.	 Legitimacy	 of	 EU	 cartel	
enforcement	therefore	requires	a	proper	balance	between	effectiveness	and	fairness.	In	
the	 EU	 system,	 substantive	 fairness	 is	 ensured	 by	 maintaining	 a	 sufficient	 level	 of	
retribution	 while	 procedural	 fairness	 is	 achieved	 by	 an	 adequate	 protection	 of	 the	
fundamental	rights	of	the	parties	involved.	Even	though	the	Commission’s	fining	policy	is	
primarily	based	on	instigating	deterrence,	retribution	still	warrants	that	cartel	offenders	
are	punished	 in	a	more	or	 less	proportionate	manner.	Equally	 important	 is	 that	the	EU	
cartel	enforcement	procedure	is	in	compliance	with	the	undertakings’	due	process	rights.	
















Secondly,	 in	the	vast	majority	of	cases	 it	 is	an	application	for	 leniency	that	enables	the	
detection	 and	 subsequent	 prosecution	 and	 punishment	 of	 cartels.	 The	 gathering	 of	
evidence	is	not	only	the	starting	point	of	the	many	cartel	prosecutions	but	the	collected	
evidence	 is	 also	 of	 crucial	 importance	 for	 the	 entire	 enforcement	 procedure.	 The	 EU	
leniency	policy	needs	to	complement	effectiveness	with	an	adequate	account	of	fairness.	
Essential	 in	that	respect	is	the	specific	design	of	the	leniency	programme	governing	the	
eligibility	 and	 conditions	 for	 immunity	 and	 leniency	 as	 well	 as	 the	 legal	 framework	 in	
which	the	leniency	programme	is	situated.	A	leniency	programme	might	not	only	entail	
positive	 effects	 on	 enforcement	 but	 also	 negative	 ones.	 If	 immunity	 and	 penalty	
reductions	 are	 awarded	 too	 generously	 the	 overall	 level	 of	 deterrence	 and	 retribution	
might	be	disproportionately	 lowered	compared	to	 the	benefits,	which	could	result	 in	a	




The	 Commission’s	 early	 leniency	 policy,	 running	 from	 the	 years	 preceding	 the	
adoption	of	the	1996	Leniency	Notice	until	its	first	revision	in	2002,	failed	in	finding	the	
right	 balance	 between	 incentivising	 cartel	 members	 to	 blow	 the	 whistle	 and	 avoiding	
overly	 generous	 fine	 reductions.	 Under	 its	 informal	 leniency	 practice	 the	 Commission	
awarded	 leniency	 too	 generously.	 Fine	 reductions	 amounted	 to	 undeserved	 leniency	
awards	considering	that	the	Commission	had	already	been	in	possession	of	evidence.	In	
response	 to	 this	 lesson	 the	Commission	was	determined	 to	avoid	undeserved	 leniency	
under	 the	 1996	 Notice.	 Undertakings,	 in	 addition	 to	 being	 the	 first	 to	 come	 forward,	





latter	 conditions	 not	 only	 set	 a	 very	 high	 threshold	 for	 obtaining	 immunity	 but	 also	
caused	 uncertainty.	 The	 threshold	 appeared	 even	 more	 excessive	 compared	 to	 the	




nevertheless.	 Moreover,	 the	 leniency	 programme	 established	 under	 the	 1996	 Notice	
suffered	from	a	lack	of	clarity	as	well	as	low	levels	of	deterrence	and	retribution.	
	 The	Leniency	Notice	was	subject	 to	an	extensive	 reform	process	between	2002	and	
2006.	 This	 period	 saw	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 2002	 and	 2006	 Leniency	 Notices,	 the	





2002	 Notice	 made	 ringleaders	 eligible	 for	 immunity.	 Both	 changes	 increased	 the	
incentives	 for	 whistleblowing	 and	 raised	 the	 level	 of	 distrust	 among	 cartelists.	 These	
changes	 were	 taken	 over	 in	 the	 2006	 Leniency	 Notice	 which	 slightly	 amended	 its	
predecessor	by	adding	further	transparency	and	certainty.	The	benefits	flowing	from	the	
Leniency	Notice	as	well	as	the	risks	of	not	coming	forward	have	also	been	considerably	
clarified	 and	 intensified	 with	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 2006	 Fining	 Guidelines.	 These	
guidelines	 have	 made	 the	 calculation	 of	 fines	 more	 transparent	 and	 predictable	













potentially	 place	 leniency	 applicants	 and	 immunity	 recipients	 at	 a	 disadvantage	
compared	 to	 their	 co-offenders	who	 did	 not	 cooperate	with	 the	 Commission.	 If	 given	
access,	private	claimants	would	be	likely	to	sue	the	immunity	recipient	first,	which	due	to	
joint	 and	 several	 liability	 might	 in	 a	 worst-case	 scenario	 become	 a	 sitting	 duck	 for	
damages	 actions.	 As	 a	 consequence	 current	 and	 potential	 cartel	 members	 would	 be	
discouraged	from	coming	forward.	The	case-law	of	the	EU	Courts	failed	to	bring	clarity.	
However,	 the	 recently	adopted	Antitrust	Damages	Directive	appears	 to	be	a	promising	
development	 in	 removing	 the	 tension	 between	 private	 actions	 and	 the	 leniency	
programme.	 The	 Directive	 introduced	 a	 disclosure	 regime	 under	 which	 corporate	
leniency	statements	are	altogether	excluded	from	disclosure	while	pre-existing	material	is	
not.	The	Directive	also	removes	the	immunity	applicant	from	joint	and	several	liability	by	
limiting	 its	 civil	 liability	 to	 its	 direct	 and	 indirect	 purchasers.	 Together,	 these	 two	






to	 substantive	 fairness,	 it	 has	 become	evident	 since	 the	 2002	 revision	 of	 the	 Leniency	
Notice	that	deterrence	and	retribution	 in	the	 leniency	programme	are	two	sides	of	the	
same	 coin.	 The	 relevant	measures	 increasing	 deterrence	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 retribution	
lead	 to	 better	 detection	 and	 prosecution	 of	 cartels.	 In	 turn,	 the	 aggregate	 level	 of	
retribution	is	higher	as	more	cartelists	are	successfully	brought	to	justice.	Both	in	relation	
to	the	lower	threshold	for	immunity	and	the	immunity	eligibility	for	ringleaders	the	gains	
in	 terms	 of	 retribution	 outweigh	 the	 initial	 sacrifices	 which	 are	 therefore	 justified.	 In	
other	words,	those	measures	can	be	considered	as	“investments”	for	higher	deterrence	
and	retribution.	In	addition,	the	higher	thresholds	for	all	subsequent	leniency	applicants	






The	 positive	 effect	 on	 deterrence,	 and	 therefore	 indirectly	 on	 retributive	 justice,	
through	 the	 higher	 level	 of	 fines,	 is	 strengthened	 by	 the	 greater	 transparency	 in	 the	
calculation	of	these	fines.	The	internalisation	between	fundamental	rights	protection	and	
effectiveness	 in	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programme	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 publication	 and	




ruled	 against	 a	 complete	 foreseeability	 of	 the	 calculation	 of	 fines	 under	 the	 Fining	
Guidelines.	Undertakings	would	otherwise	be	able	to	conduct	a	cost-benefit	analysis	of	
their	 cartel	participation	and	determine	whether	and	when	 to	blow	 the	whistle,	which	
would	diminish	the	effectiveness	of	 the	 leniency	programme.	Similar	 to	the	sacrifice	of	
retribution	for	the	sake	of	deterrence,	in	weighing	up	fundamental	rights	protection	and	
effectiveness	 the	 balance	 is	 struck	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 latter.	 Although	 the	 EU	 leniency	
programme	 does	 not	 impair	 the	 due	 process	 rights	 of	 the	 cooperating-	 and	 non-
cooperating	 cartel	 members,	 as	 a	 whole	 the	 interpretation	 of	 certain	 individual	
fundamental	rights	such	as	the	privilege	against	self-incrimination	under	EU	competition	
law	 is	not	 as	broad	as	under	ECHR	 law.	The	 lower	 standard	of	protection,	however,	 is	
justified	 by	 the	 public	 interest	 of	maintaining	 effective	 cartel	 enforcement	 in	 order	 to	
prevent	distortions	of	competition	and	barriers	to	integration	of	the	internal	market.		
Finally,	 the	 internalisation	 of	 effectiveness	 and	 fairness	 has	 not	 only	 been	
demonstrated	regarding	the	above	internal	factors	but	also	regarding	private	actions	for	
damages	 as	 an	 external	 factor.	 Even	 though	 the	 primary	 function	 of	 damages	 is	 to	
compensate	the	victims	of	cartel	infringements,	they	nonetheless	also	serve	as	a	form	of	
additional	sanction.	The	obligation	to	pay	back	their	illicit	cartel	profits	carries	a	deterrent	
and	 a	 retributive	 function.	 The	 complementarity	 between	 public	 and	 private	
enforcement	in	theory	has	a	positive	effect	both	on	the	EU	leniency	programme	and	the	






potential	 damages	 actions	 increases	 the	 deterrent	 effect	 of	 the	 leniency	 programme,	
leading	to	better	cartel	detection	and	more	follow-on	actions.	This	virtuous	circle	created	
by	the	EU	leniency	programme	is	reinforced	by	the	positive	interaction	between	internal	
and	 external	 factors.	 The	 threat	 of	 severe	 fines	 and	 huge	 damages	 instigate	 higher	
distrust	among	cartel	members	and	render	defection	a	more	dominant	strategy.		
This	 thesis,	 by	 example	 of	 the	 EU	 leniency	 programme,	 offers	 guidance	 as	 to	 the	
design	and	 the	applicable	 legal	 framework	 in	order	 to	establish	a	 leniency	programme	
that	is	effective	and	fair.	The	analysis	presented	in	this	thesis	can	be	taken	into	account	
by	 countries	 that	either	 intend	 to	 implement	a	new	 leniency	programme	or	 to	 reform	
their	existing	one.	The	guidance	 is	mainly	of	use	 to	 the	EU	Member	States	due	 to	 the	























1998	 2	(2)	 -	 -	
1999	 1	(1)	 -	 -	
2000	 2	(2)	 -	 1	
2001	 14	(7)	 -	 8	
2002	 9	(9)	 -	 7	
2003	 4	(4)	 -	 3	
2004	 3	(3)	 -	 3	
2005	 4	(4)	 -	 4	
2006	 5	(5)	 -	 6	
2007	 10	(7)	 -	 5	
2008	 6	(6)	 -	 5	
2009	 10	(6)	 0	 6	
2010	 6	(6)	 3	 6	
2011	 4	(4)	 6	 4	
2012	 8	(4)	 10	 8	
2013	 6	(2)	 2	 8	
2014	 12	(10)	 5	 8	























Reduction	 Frequency	 1998-2002	 2003-2007	 2008-2014	
0%	 268	 38	 76	 154	
1-9%	 37	 24	 7	 6	
10-49%	 168	 46	 44	 78	
50%	 52	 25	 10	 17	
51-99%	 3	 2	 0	 1	
100%	 76	 9	 20	 47	
Sub-total4		 336	 106	 81	 149	

































percentage	 0-0.99%	 1-2.99%	 3-5.99%	 6-8.99%	 9-9.99%	 total	
undertak-
ings	fined	 131	 44	 34	 21	 23	 253	






                                                
1	Updated	until	31	December	2014.	
2	Updated	until	25	June	2014.	
1990	-	1994	 1995	-	1999	 2000	-	2004	 2005	-	2009	 2010	-	2014	






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Guidelines	 on	 the	 method	 of	 setting	 fines	 imposed	 pursuant	 to	 Article	 23(2)(a)	 of	
Regulation	(EC)	No	1/2003	[2006]	C210/2	

















Antitrust	 Criminal	 Penalties	 Enforcement	 and	 Reform	 Act	 of	 2004	 Extension	 Act	 of	
2010,	Pub.	L.	No	111-190,	124	Stat.	1275	(2010)	
  277	
TABLE	OF	CASES	
COURT	OF	JUSTICE	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	
Case	26/62	Van	Gend	en	Loos	v	Administratie	der	Belastingen	[1963]	ECR	1	
Case	56/65	Société	La	Technique	Minière	v	Maschinebau	Ulm	[1966]	ECR	337	
Case	5/69	Völk	v	Vervaecke	[1969]	ECR	295	
Case	41/69	ACF	Chemiefarma	v	Commission	[1970]	ECR	661	
Case	45/69	Boehringer	Mannheim	v	Commission	[1970]	ECR	769	
Case	48/69	Imperial	Chemical	Industries	v	Commission	[1972]	ECR	619		
Case	49/69	BASF	v	Commission	[1972]	ECR	713		
Case	11/70	Internationale	Handelsgesellschaft	v	Einfuhr	und	Vorratstelle	für	Getreide	
und	Fuhrmittel	[1970]	ECR	1125		
Case	4/73	Nold	v	Commission	[1974]	ECR	491	
Joined	Cases	40/73	to	48/73,	50/73,	54	to	56/73,	111/73,	113/73	and	114/73	Suiker	Unie	
and	Others	v	Commission	[1975]	ECR	1663		
Case	36/75	Roland	Rutili	v	Ministre	de	l'intérieur	[1975]	ECR	1218	
Case	155/79	AM	and	S	Europe	v	Commission	[1982]	ECR	1575	
Case	100/80	Musique	Diffusion	Française	v	Commission	[1983]	ECR	1825	
Joined	Cases	29/83	and	30/83	Compagnie	Royale	Asturienne	des	Mines	and	Rheinzink	v	
Commission	[1984]	ECR	1679	
Case	70/83	Gerda	Kloppenburg	v	Finanzamt	Leer	[1984]	ECR	1075	
Joined	Cases	25/84	and	26/84	Ford	v	Commission	[1985]	ECR	2725	
Joined	Cases	C-89/85,	C-104/85,	C-114/85,	C-116/85,	C-117/85,	C-125/85	to	C-129/85	
Ahlström	Osakeyhtiö	and	Others	v	Commission	[1994]	ECR	I-99		
Case	326/85	Netherlands	v	Commission	[1987]	ECR	5091	
Joined	Cases	46/87	and	227/88	Hoechst	v	Commission	[1989]	ECR	2859	
Case	265/87	Hermann	Schräder	HS	Kraftfutter	v	Hauptzollamt	Gronau	[1989]	ECR	2237	
Case	374/87	Orkem	v	Commission	[1989]	ECR	3283	
Joined	Cases	C-6/90	and	9/90	Andrea	Francovich	and	Others	v	Italy	[1991]	ECR	I-5357	
Case	C-271/91	Helen	Marshall	v	Southampton	and	South	West	Hampshire	Area	Health	
Authority	[1993]	ECR	I-4367	
Case	C-49/92	P	Commission	v	Anic	Partecipazioni	[1999]	ECR	I-4125	
Case	C-137/92	P	Commission	v	BASF	[1994]	ECR	I-2555	
Case	C-199/92	P	Hüls	v	Commission	[1999]	ECR	I-4287	
Case	C-235/92	P	Montecatini	v	Commission	[1999]	ECR	I-4539	
  278	
Joined	Cases	C-46/93	and	C-48/93	Brasserie	du	Pêcheur	v	Germany	and	The	Queen	v	Sec-
retary	of	State	for	Transport,	ex	parte	Factortame	and	Others	[1996]	ECR	I-1029	
Case	C-185/95	P	Baustahlgewebe	v	Commission	[1998]	ECR	I-8417	
Case	C-298/98	P	Metsä-Serla	Sales	(Finnboard)	v	Commission	[2000]	ECR	I-10157	
Case	C-176/99	P	ARBED	v	Commission	[2003]	ECR	I-10687	
Case	C-196/99	P	Siderúrgica	Aristrain	Madrid	v	Commission	[2003]	ECR	I-11005	
Joined	Cases	C-238/99,	C-244/99	P,	C-245/99	P,	C-247/99	P,	C-250/99	P	to	C-252/99	P	
and	C-254/99	P	Limburgse	Vinyl	Maatschappij	and	Others	v	Commission	[2002]	ECR	I-
8375	
Case	T-54/99	max.mobil	Telekommunikation	Service	v	Commission	[2002]	ECR	II-313.		
Case	C-453/99	Courage	Ltd	v	Bernard	Crehan	and	Bernard	Crehan	v	Courage	Ltd	and	Oth-
ers	[2001]	ECR	I-6297	
Case	C-94/00	Roquette	Frères	v	Directeur	général	de	la	concurrence	and	Others	[2002]	
ECR	I-9011	
Case	T-377/00	Philip	Morris	International	v	Commission	[2003]	ECR	II-1.	
Joined	Cases	C-204/00	P,	C-205/00	P,	C-211/00	P,	C-213/00	P,	C-217/00	P	and	C-219/00	P	
Aalborg	Portland	v	Commission	[2004]	ECR	I-123	
Case	C-338/00	P	Volkswagen	v	Commission	[2003]	ECR	I-9189.	
Joined	Cases	C-65/02	P	and	C-73/02	P	ThyssenKrupp	Stainless	and	Other	v	Commission	
[2005]	ECR	I-6773	
Joined	Cases	C-189/02	P,	C-202/02	P,	C-205/02	P	to	C-208/02	P	and	C-213/02	P	Dansk	
Rorindustri	v	Commission	[2005]	ECR	I-5425.	
Case	C-12/03	P	Commission	v	Tetra	Laval	[2005]	ECR	I-987.		
Case	C-540/03	European	Parliament	v	Council	[2006]	ECR	I-5769.	
Case	C-248/04	Koninklijke	Coöperatie	Cosun	v	Minister	van	Landbouw,	Natuur	en	Voed-
selkwaliteit	[2006]	ECR	I-10211.	
Case	C-289/04	P	Showa	Denko	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	I-5859.		
Case	C-295/04	Vincenzo	Manfredi	v	Lloyd	Adriatico	Assicurazioni	[2006]	ECR	I-6619.	
Case	C-301/04	P	Commission	v	SGL	Carbon	AG	[2006]	ECR	I-5915.	
Joined	Cases	C-403/04	and	405/04	P	Sumitomo	Metal	Industries	and	Other	v	Commis-
sion	[2007]	ECR	I-729	
Case	C-407/04	P	Dalmine	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	I-829	
Case	C-411/04	P	Salzgitter	Mannesmann	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	I-959	
Case	C-238/05	Asnef-Equifax	v	Asociación	de	Usuarios	de	Servicios	Bancarios	(Ausbanc)	
[2006]	ECR	I-11125	
Case	C-3/06	P	Groupe	Danone	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	I-1331	
Case	C-266/06	P	Evonik	Degussa	v	Commission	[2008]	ECR	I-81	
  279	
Joined	Cases	C-501/06	P,	C-513/06	P,	C-515/06	P	and	C-519/06	P	GlaxoSmithKline	and	
Others	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	I-9291	
Case	C-510/06	P	Archer	Daniels	Midland	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	I-1843	
Case	C-139/07	P	Commission	v	Technische	Glaswerke	Ilmenau	[2010]	ECR	I-5885	
Case	C-555/07	Seda	Kücükdeveci	v	Swedex	[2010]	ECR	I-365	
Case	C-8/08	T-Mobile	Netherlands	and	Others	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	I-4529	
Case	C-271/08	Commission	v	Germany	[2010]	ECR	I-7091	
Case	C-407/08	P	Knauf	Gips	v	Commission	[2010]	ECR	I-6375	
Case	C-413/08	P	Lafarge	v	Commission	[2010]	ECR	I-5361	
Case	C-52/09	Konkurrensverket	v	TeliaSonera	Sverige	[2011]	ECR	I-527	
Case	C-352/09	P	ThyssenKrupp	Nirosta	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	I-2359	
Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	v	Bundeskartellamt	[2011]	ECR	I-5161	
Case	C-386/10	P	Chalkor	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	I-13085	
Case	C-389/10	P	KME	Germany	and	Others	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	I-13125	
Case	C-404/10	P	Commission	v	Éditions	Odile	Jacob,	ECLI:EU:C:2011:37	
Case	C-477/10	P	Commission	v	Agrofert	Holding,	ECLI:EU:C:2012:394	
Case	C-32/11	Allianz	Hungária	Biztosító	and	Others	v	Gazdasági	Versenyhivatal,	
ECLI:EU:C:2013:160	
Case	C-199/11	Europese	Gemeenschap	v	Otis	and	Others,	ECLI:EU:C:2012:366	
Case	C-226/11	Expedia	v	Autorité	de	la	concurrence	and	Others,	ECLI:EU:C:2012:795		
Joined	Cases	C-239/11	P,	C-489/11	P	and	498/11	P	Siemens	and	Others	v	Commission,	
ECLI:EU:C:2013:866	
Case	C-501/11	P	Schindler	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:C:2013:522	
Case	C-536/11	Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde	v	Donau	Chemie	and	Others,	
ECLI:EU:C:2013:366	
Case	C-578/11	P	Deltafina	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:C:2014:1742	
Case	C-295/12	P	Telefónica	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062	
Case	C-365/12	P	Commission	v	EnBW	Energie	Baden-Württemberg,	ECLI:EU:C:2014:112	
Case	C-557/12	Kone	and	Others	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:C:2014:1317	
Case	C-67/13	P	Groupement	des	cartes	bancaires	(CB)	v	Commission,	
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204	
Case	C-286/13	P	Dole	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:C:2015:184.	
Case	C-345/14	SIA	‘Maxima	Latvija’	v	Konkurence	padome,	ECLI:EU:C:2015:784	
	
ADVOCATE-GENERAL	OPINIONS	
  280	
Case	T-1/89	Rhône-Poulenc	v	Commission	[1991]	ECR	II-867,	Opinion	of	Mr	Vesterdorf	
acting	as	Advocate	General	
Case	C-185/95	P	Baustahlgewebe	v	Commission	[1998]	ECR	I-8417,	Opinion	of	AG	Lé-
ger	
Joined	Cases	C-65/02	P	and	C-73/02	P	ThyssenKrupp	Stainless	and	Other	v	Commission	
[2005]	ECR	I-6773,	Opinion	of	AG	Léger	
Case	C-301/04	P	Commission	v	SGL	Carbon	[2006]	ECR	I-5915,	Opinion	of	AG	Geelhoed	
Case	C-413/06	P	Bertelsmann	and	Sony	Corporation	of	America	v	Independent	Music	Pub-
lishers	and	Labels	Association	(Impala)	[2008]	ECR	I-4951,	Opinion	of	AG	Kokott	
Case	C-272/09	P	KME	Germany	and	Others	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	I-12789,	Opinion	
of	AG	Sharpston	
Case	C-360/09	Pfleiderer	v	Bundeskartellamt	[2011]	ECR	I-5161,	Opinion	of	AG	Mazák	
Case	C-536/11	Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde	v	Donau	Chemie	and	Others,	Opinion	of	AG	
Jääskinen,	ECLI:EU:C:2013:67	
Case	C-681/11	Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde	and	Bundeskartellanwalt	v	Schenker	and	
Others,	Opinion	of	AG	Kokott,	ECLI:EU:C:2013:126	
Case	C-365/12	P	Commission	v	EnBW	Energie	Baden-Württemberg,	Opinion	of	AG	Cruz	
Villalón,	ECLI:EU:C:2013:643	
C-67/13	P	Groupement	des	cartes	bancaires	v	Commission,	Opinion	of	Advocate	Wahl,	
ECLI:EU:C:2014:1958,	
Case	C-557/12	Kone	and	Others	v	ÖBB-Infrastruktur,	Opinion	of	AG	Kokott,	
ECLI:EU:C:2014:45	
Case	C-583/13	P	Deutsche	Bahn	and	Others	v	Commission,	Opinion	of	AG	Wahl,	
ECLI:EU:C:2015:92	
Case	C-373/14	P	Toshiba	v	Commission,	Opinion	of	Advocate	General	Wathelet,	
ECLI:EU:C:2015:427	
	
GENERAL	COURT	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	UNION	
Case	T-1/89	Rhône-Poulenc	v	Commission	[1991]	ECR	II-867	
Case	T-14/89	Montedipe	v	Commission	[1992]	ECR	II-1155	
Case	T-147/89	Société	métallurgique	de	Normandie	v	Commission	[1995]	ECR	II-1057	
Case	T-148/89	Trefilunion	v	Commission	[1995]	ECR	II-1063	
Case	T-151/89	Société	des	Treillis	et	Panneaux	Soudés	v	Commission	[1995]	ECR	II-1191	
Case	T-39/90	Samenwerkende	Elektriciteits-Produktiebedrijven	v	Commission	[1991]	ECR	
II-1497	
Case	T-32/91	Solvay	v	Commission	[1995]	ECR	II-1775	
Case	T-83/91	Tetra	Pak	International	v	Commission	[1994]	ECR	II-755		
  281	
Case	T-29/92	Vereniging	van	Samenwerkende	Prijsregelende	Organisaties	in	de	
Bouwnijverheid	(SPO)	and	Others	v	Commission	[1995]	ECR	II-289	
Joined	Cases	T-305/94	to	T-307/94,	T-313/94	to	T-316/94,	T-318/94,	T-325/94,	T-328/94,	
T-329/94	and	T-335/94	Limburgse	Vinyl	Maatschappij	and	Others	v	Commission	[1999]	
ECR	II-931	
Case	T-311/94	Kartonfabriek	de	Eendracht	v	Commission	[1998]	ECR	II-1129	
Case	T-347/94	Mayr-Melnhof	Kartongesellschaft	v	Commission	[1994]	ECR	II-1751	
Case	T-348/94	Enso	Española	v	Commission	[1998]	ECR	II-1875	
Joined	Cases	T-374/94,	375/94,	384/94	and	388/94	European	Night	Services	and	Oth-
ers	v	Commission	[1998]	ECR	II-3141	
Joined	Cases	T-25/95,	T-26/95,	T-30/95,	T-31/95,	T-32/95,	T-34	to	39/95,	T-42/95	to	
46/95,	T-48/95,	T-50/95	to	65/95,	T-68/95	to	T-71/95,	T-87/95,	T-88/95,	T-103/95	and	
T-104/95	Cimenteries	CBR	and	Others	v	Commission	[2000]	ECR	II-491	
Case	T-41/96	Bayer	v	Commission	[2000]	ECR	II-3383	
Case	T-48/98	Compañia	española	para	la	fabricación	inoxidables	(Acerinox)	v	Commission	
[2001]	ECR	II-3859	
Case	T-112/98	Mannesmannröhren-Werke	v	Commission	[2001]	ECR	II-729	
Case	T-21/99	Dansk	Rørindustri	v	Commission	[2002]	ECR	II-1681	
Case	T-31/99	ABB	Asea	Brown	Boveri	v	Commission	[2002]	ECR	II-1881	
Case	T-342/99	Airtours	v	Commission	[2002]	ECR	II-2585		
Joined	Cases	T-67/00,	T-68/00,	T-71/00	and	T-78/00	JFE	Engineering	and	Others	v	
Commission	[2004]	ECR	II-2501	
Case	T-230/00	Daesang	Corporation	and	Sewon	Europe	v	Commission	[2003]	ECR	II-2733	
Case	T-368/00	General	Motors	Nederland	v	Commission	[2003]	ECR	II-4491	
Case	T-57/01	Solvay	v	Commission	[2009]	ECR	II-4621	
Case	T-208/01	Volkswagen	v	Commission	[2003]	ECR	I-5141	
Joined	Cases	T-236/01,	T-239/01,	T-244/01	to	T-246/01,	T-251/01	and	T-252/01	Tokai	
Carbon	and	Others	v	Commission	[2004]	ECR	II-1181	
Case	T-241/01	Scandinavian	Airline	Systems	v	Commission	[2005]	ECR	II-2917	
Case	T-322/01	Roquette	Frères	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-3137	
Case	T-325/01	DaimlerChrysler	v	Commission	[2005]	ECR	II-3319	
Case	T-329/01	Archer	Daniels	Midland	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-3255	
Case	T-15/02	BASF	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR-II	497	
Case	T-38/02	Groupe	Danone	v	Commission	[2005]	ECR	II-4407	
Case	T-43/02	Jungbunzlauer	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-3435	
Case	T-44/02	OP	Dresdner	Bank	and	Others	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-3567	
  282	
Joined	Cases	T-109/02,	T-118/02,	T-122/02,	T-125/02,	T-126/02,	T-128/02,	T-129/02,	T-
132/02	and	T-136/02	Bolloré	and	Others	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	II-947	
Case	T-279/02	Degussa	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-897	
Case	T-303/02	Westfalen	Gassen	Nederland	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-4567	
Case	T-2/03	Verein	für	Konsumenteninformation	v	Commission	[2005]	ECR	II-1121	
Case	T-53/03	BPB	v	Commission	[2008]	ECR	II-1333	
Case	T-54/03	Lafarge	v	Commission	[2008]	ECR	II-120	
Joined	Cases	T-125/03	and	T-253/03	AKZO	Nobel	Chemicals	and	Other	v	Commission	
[2003]	ECR	II-4771	
Case	T-198/03	Bank	Austria	Creditanstalt	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-1429	
Case	T-410/03	Hoechst	v	Commission	[2008]	ECR	II-881	
Case	T-99/04	AC-Treuhand	v	Commission	[2008]	ECR	II-1501	
Case	T-120/04	Peróxidos	Orgánicos	v	Commission	[2006]	ECR	II-4441	
Case	T-276/04	Compagnie	Maritime	Belge	v	Commission	[2008]	ECR	II-1277	
Case	T-21/05	Chalkor	v	Commission	[2010]	ECR	II-1895	
Case	T-25/05	KME	Germany	and	Others	v	Commission	[2010]	ECR	II-91	
Case	T-101/05	BASF	and	UCB	v	Commission	[2007]	ECR	II-4949	
Case	T-237/05	Éditions	Odile	Jacob	v	Commission	[2010]	ECR	II-2245	
Case	T-446/05	Amann	&	Söhne	and	Cousin	Filterie	v	Commission	[2010]	ECR	II-1255	
Case	T-11/06	Romana	Tabacchi	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-6681	
Case	T-39/06	Transcatab	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-6831	
Case	T-40/06	Trioplast	Industrier	v	Commission	[2010]	ECR	II-4893	
Case	T-53/06	UPM-Kymmene	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2012:101	
Case	T-186/06	Solvay	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-2839	
Case	T-191/06	FMC	Foret	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-2959	
Case	T-192/06	Caffaro	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-3063	
Case	T-208/06	Quinn	Barlo	and	Others	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-7953	
Case	T-343/06	Shell	Petroleum	and	Others	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2012:478	
Case	T-348/06	Total	Nederland	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2012:481	
Case	T-357/06	Koninklijke	Wegenbouw	Stevin	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2012:488	
Case	T-377/06	Comap	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-1115	
Case	T-384/06	IBP	and	Other	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-1177	
Case	T-385/06	Aalberts	Industries	and	Others	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-1223	
Case	T-42/07	The	Dow	Chemical	Company	and	Others	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-4531	
  283	
Case	T-44/07	Kaučuk	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-4601	
Case	T-45/07	Unipetrol	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-4629	
Case	T-53/07	Trade-Stomil	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-4657	
Case	T-59/07	Polimeri	Europa	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-4687	
Case	T-110/07	Siemens	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-477	
Case	T-111/07	Agrofert	Holding	v	Commission	[2010]	ECR	II-128	
Case	T-112/07	Hitachi	and	Others	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-3871	
Case	T-113/07	Toshiba	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-3989	
Joined	Cases	T-117/07	and	T-121/07	Areva	and	Others	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-633	
Joined	Cases	T-122/07	to	T-124/07	Siemens	Österreich	and	Others	[2011]	ECR	II-793	
Case	T-132/07	Fuji	Electric	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-4091	
Case	T-133/07	Mitsubishi	Electric	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-4219	
Case	T-138/07	Schindler	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-4819	
Case	T-234/07	Koninklijke	Grolsch	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-6169	
Case	T-235/07	Bavaria	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-3229	
Case	T-240/07	Heineken	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-3355	
Case	T-439/07	Coats	Holdings	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2012:320	
Case	T-462/07	Galp	Energía	España	v	Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:459 
Case	T-343/08	Arkema	France	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-2287	
Case	T-344/08	EnBW	Energie	Baden-Württemberg	v	Commission,	EU:T:2012:242	
Case	T-348/08	Aragonesas	Industrias	y	Energía	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-7583	
Case	T-406/08	Industries	chimiques	du	fluour	(ICF)	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2013:322	
Case	T-437/08	CDC	Hydrogene	Peroxide	Cartel	Damage	Claims	(CDC	Hydrogene	Perox-
ide)	v	Commission	[2011]	ECR	II-8251	
Case	T-540/08	Esso	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2014:630	
Case	T-566/08	Total	Raffinage	Marketing	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2013:423	
Case	T-68/09	Soliver	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2014:867	
Case	T-72/09	Pilkington	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2014:1094	
Joined	Cases	T-147/09	and	T-148/09	Trelleborg	Industrie	and	Other	v	Commission,	
ECLI:EU:T:2013:259	
Case	T-154/09	Manuli	Rubber	Industries	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2013:260	
Case	T-399/09	Holding	Slovenske	elektrarne	(HSE)	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2013:647	
Case	T-519/09	Toshiba	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2014:263	
  284	
Joined	Cases	T-23/10	and	T-24/10	Arkema	France	and	Other	v	Commission,	
ECLI:EU:T:2014:62	
Case	T-30/10	Reagens	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2014:253	
Case	T-534/11	Schenker	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2014:854	
Case	T-341/12	Evonik	Degussa	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2015:51	
Case	T-345/12	Akzo	Nobel	and	Others	v	Commission,	ECLI:EU:T:2015:50	
	
	
EUROPEAN	COURT	OF	HUMAN	RIGHTS	
Engel	and	Others	v	the	Netherlands,	App	nos	5100/71,	5101/71,	5102/71,	5354/72	and	
5370/72	(ECtHR,	8	June	1976)	
Le	Compte	and	Others	v	Belgium,	App	nos	6878/75	and	7238/75	(ECtHR,	23	June	1981)	
Deweer	v	Belgium,	App	no	6903/75	(ECtHR,	27	February	1980)	
X	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	no	7306/75	(ECtHR,	6	October	1976)	
Campbell	and	Fell	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	nos	7819/77	and	7878/77	(ECtHR,	28	
June	1984)	
Ashingdane	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	no	8225/78	(ECtHR,	28	May	1985)	
Öztürk	v	Germany,	App	no	8544/79	(ECtHR,	21	February	1984)	
Market	Intern	Verlag	and	Klaus	Beermann	v	Germany,	App	no	10572/82	(ECtHR,	20	
November	1989)	
Salabiaku	v	France,	App	no	10519/83	(ECtHR,	7	October	1988)	
Funke	v	France,	App	no	10828/84	(ECtHR,	25	February	1993)	
Société	Stenuit	v	France,	App	no	11598/85	(ECtHR,	27	February	1992)	
Bendenoun	v	France,	App	no	12547/86	(ECtHR,	24	February	1994)	
Margareta	and	Roger	Andersson	v	Sweden,	App	no	12963/87	(ECommHR,	3	October	
1990)	
Dombo	Beheer	v	the	Netherlands,	App	no	14448/88	(ECtHR,	27	October	1993)	
G	v	France,	App	no	15312/89	(ECtHR,	27	September	1995)	
Pressos	Compania	Naviera	and	Others	v	Belgium,	App	no	17849/91	(ECtHR,	20	No-
vember	1995)	
John	Murray	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	no	18731/91	(ECtHR,	8	February	1996)	
Saunders	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	no	19187/91	(ECtHR,	17	December	1996)	
Mantovanelli	v	France,	App	no	21487/93	(ECtHR,	18	March	1997)	
Findlay	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	no	22107/93	(ECtHR,	25	February	1997)	
Foucher	v	France,	App	no	22209/93	(ECtHR,	18	March	1997)	
JB	v	Switzerland,	App	no	31827/97	(ECtHR,	8	March	2001)	
  285	
Janosevic	v	Sweden,	App	no	34619/97	(ECtHR,	21	May	2003)	
Ezeh	and	Connors	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	nos	39665/98	and	40086/98	(ECtHR,	9	
October	2003)	
Tamminen	v	Finland,	App	no	40847/98	(ECtHR,	5	July	2004)	
Bosphorus	Hava	Yollari	Turizm	ve	Ticaret	Anonim	Sirketi	v	Ireland,	App	no	45036/98	
(ECtHR,	30	June	2005)	
Allan	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	no	48539/99	(ECtHR,	5	November	2002)	
Jalloh	v	Germany,	App	no	54810/00	(ECtHR,	11	July	2006)	
Sidabras	and	Džiautas	v	Lithuania,	App	nos	55480/00	and	59330/00	(ECtHR,	27	Octo-
ber	2004).	
Achour	v	France,	App	no	67335/01	(ECtHR,	29	March	2006).	
Jussila	v	Finland,	App	no	73053/01	(ECtHR,	23	November	2006).	
O’Halloran	and	Francis	v	the	United	Kingdom,	App	nos	15809/02	and	25624/02	(29	
June	2007)	
Marttinen	v	Finland,	App	no	19235/03	(ECtHR,	21	July	2009)	
Taliadorou	and	Stylianou	v	Cyprus,	App	nos	39627/05	and	39631/05	(ECtHR,	16	Octo-
ber	2008)	
Gillberg	v	Sweden,	App	no	41723/06	(ECtHR,	3	April	2012)	
Soros	v	France,	App	no	50425/06	(ECtHR,	6	October	2011)	
Société	Bouygues	Telecom	v	France,	App	no	2324/08	(ECtHR,	13	March	2012)	
A.	Menarini	Diagnostics	v	Italy,	App	no	43509/08	(ECtHR,	27	September	2011)	
Debút	Zrt	and	Others	v	Hungary,	App	no	24851/10	(ECtHR,	20	November	2012)	
	
	
EUROPEAN	COMMISSION	DECISIONS		
Quinine	[1969]	OJ	L192/5		
Dyestuffs	[1969]	OJ	L195/11	
Pioneer	Hi-Fi	Equipment	[1980]	OJ	L60/28		
Polypropylene	[1986]	OJ	L230/1	
French-West	African	shipowners'	committees	[1992]	OJ	L134/1	
Cartonboard	[1994]	OJ	L243/1	
CEPI-Cartonboard	[1996]	OJ	C310/3	
Pre-insulated	pipes	[1996]	OJ	L24/1	
Alloy	surcharge	[1998]	OJ	L100/55	
Amino	acids	[2001]	OJ	L152/24	
  286	
Graphite	electrodes	[2002]	OJ	L100/1	
Carbonless	paper	[2004]	OJ	L115/1	
Sorbates	[2005]	OJ	L182/20	
Italian	Raw	Tobacco	[2005]	OJ	L353/45	
Hydrogen	peroxide	[2006]	OJ	L353/54	
Gas	Insulated	Switchgear	[2008]	OJ	C5/7	
Marine	Hoses	[2009]	OJ	C168/6	
Carglass	[2009]	OJ	C173/13	
Mountings	for	windows	and	window-doors	[2012]	OJ	C292/6	
	
	
EUROPEAN	FREE	TRADE	ASSOCIATION	
Case	E-14/11	Schenker	North	and	Others	v	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	[2013]	OJ	
C118/35	
Case	E-15/10	Posten	Norge	v	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	[2012]	OJ	C307/25	
	
	
NATIONAL	COURTS	AND	COMPETITION	AUTHORITIES	
France		
Decision	of	the	French	Competition	Authority	of	17	December	2010,	No.	10-D-36	
Germany	
Judgment	of	the	Amtsgericht	Bonn	of	18	January	2012,	Case	no.	51	Gc	53/09)	
United	Kingdom	
National	Grid	Electricity	Transmission	v	ABB	and	Others	[2012]	EWHC	869	(Ch)	
United	States	
Perma	Life	Mufflers,	392	US	134,	139	(1968)	
Illinois	Brick	v	Illinois,	431	US	720,	746	(1977)	
Texas	Industries	v	Radcliff	Materials,	451	US	630	(1981)	
Verizon	Communication	v	Law	Offices	of	Curtis	V	Trinko,	540	US	398,	408	(2004)	
Stolt-Nielsen	v	United	States,	352	F.	Supp.	2d	553	(E.D.	Pa.	2005)	
Order	No	1:03-CV-04576.	In	re	Sulfuric	Acid	Antitrust	litigation	(N.D.	III	7	July	2005)	
Bell	Atlantic	v	Twombly,	550	US	544	(2007)	
	
  287	
 
